THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART VIII

1991 – The Gulf Missile Crisis

           In the early 1990s, Israel's military superiority in the Middle East was undisputed. The Jewish state possessed, by and large, the same assets: consistent US support, highly efficient intelligence services, air power, and technological superiority. This last advantage was evident. The military equipment of the Israel Defense Forces provided a clear edge on the battlefield. 'Blitzkrieg' tactics were no longer relevant, as they were no longer necessary in that context. Israeli forces no longer needed to launch large-scale offensives. There were no longer enemies of that nature.

          Israel's security remained very solid. Neighboring states no longer posed a threat, with the exception of Syria, which, however, was far from being a real danger, lacking the military capabilities to that effect. There remained the Palestinian groups in the West Bank and Gaza, which were countered quite effectively, and the armed groups in southern Lebanon, the most aggressive of which was Hezbollah. The 1982 intervention, the maintenance of a contingent in southern Lebanon, and the airstrikes only slightly diminished the threats. Iraq no longer posed an immediate danger following the invasion of Kuwait and the formation of the international coalition for its liberation. Libya remained an enemy state, but it did not pose a direct threat. The Libyans provided support to various Palestinian armed groups, being unable to do much else. Similarly, Iran did not represent any direct danger; at that time, it was recovering from eight years of war with Iraq. However, the threat from this state was palpable through the actions of Hezbollah, which received all the necessary support from Iran for its attacks on Israel. Effectively, Hezbollah could be considered a division of the Iranian forces. Although they carried out numerous actions against this group in southern Lebanon, inflicting significant losses, the Israelis did not succeed in significantly diminishing its potential.

          On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, which was occupied within two days. At the initiative of the USA, an international military coalition of 34 states was established with the goal of liberating Kuwait. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 678, which demanded that Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, and authorized the international coalition to use force to liberate the country. Due to Iraq's non-compliance, Operation Desert Storm was launched on January 17, 1991. It began with an aerial bombing campaign of targets in Iraq and Kuwait; on February 15, ground operations preceding the offensive were initiated, and on February 24, the general offensive was launched, lasting approximately 100 hours. The coalition's operations were successful, liberating Kuwait, inflicting heavy losses on Iraqi forces, and forcing them to withdraw from the country. On February 28, a suspension of operations was declared, and on March 3, the conflict was officially concluded.[1]

          In an attempt to break up the international coalition, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to launch missiles at Israel, hoping for a retaliation from the IDF, which would have caused the Arab states to withdraw from the coalition. This subject was extensively covered in the work The Gulf Missile Crisis[2]. This occurred despite Israel having absolutely no involvement in the crisis. Iraqi forces utilized Al-Hussein ballistic missiles (referred to in the media as Scud, which was incorrect). This type of missile was, in fact, an adaptation of the Soviet R-17 (Scud-B) missile developed in the 1960s. The modifications led to a significant increase in range (from 300 to 650 km) but, at the same time, resulted in a reduction of the warhead payload (from 600 to 190 kg). The missile's accuracy was poor, with a circular error probable (CEP) between 500 and 2,000 meters.[3]  

          The launches against Israel began on January 18 (eight missiles). Israeli forces lacked missile defense systems. In effect, the state of Israel was completely exposed to this threat. The major danger arose from the fact that the missiles could, theoretically, carry chemical warheads. On January 20, the first Patriot anti-missile systems arrived in Israel, operated by US and Dutch military personnel, marking the first time since the War of Independence (1947–1948) that the Jewish state had accepted foreign troops on its territory.[4]

          Of the total of 86 missiles launched by Iraqi forces throughout the conflict, 44 targeted Israeli territory. The damage was not extensive, consisting of a few destroyed buildings and several others damaged. Based on available data, two people were killed and 316 were injured, all of whom were civilians. Several missiles fell in uninhabited areas.[5] The serious issue lay in the fact that the Patriot missile systems had a low interception rate. According to official data, it stood at 40%[6]. Other sources indicate much poorer, I would even say catastrophic, results. For instance, military analyst Reuven Pedatzur stated before the US House of Representatives that, in Israel, Patriot batteries intercepted only a single Al-Hussein missile[7]. In order to prevent any potential Israeli retaliation, the international coalition did everything possible to stop the launches from Iraqi territory by locating and destroying the launchers, but it did not succeed. Although numerous combat and reconnaissance aircraft were allocated and special forces were deployed on the ground, few launchers were destroyed. Iraqi missile crews continued the launches throughout the entire campaign.[8] Even if Israeli forces had launched retaliatory operations or attempted to locate and destroy the launchers, the outcome would have been the same. The coalition was heavily bombing targets in Iraq, and the launch areas were being carefully scouted by aviation and special forces. A few extra commandos or a few dozen additional aircraft would not have changed the situation. However, it would have resulted in the breakup of the coalition and the halting of the campaign against Iraqi forces. And the Israelis had every interest in seeing the multinational forces achieve their objectives, thereby weakening one of the Jewish state's enemies.

          The Israeli military establishment's total lack of preparedness for the threat posed by ballistic missiles is incomprehensible. It was not the first time they had faced them. In 1973, the Egyptian army attacked Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula with Scud-B missiles[9]. And Iraq was on the list of adversaries. Certainly, the Iraqi ballistic missiles were known, especially since the Al-Hussein had been used during the Iran–Iraq War, when 203 missiles of this type were launched[10]. These targeted urban centers, causing a high number of casualties (in the thousands, according to official reports, though Western analysts believed the figures were much higher)[11]. Undoubtedly, the Israeli special services, particularly the military ones, had studied the threat posed by Iraqi ballistic missiles. Whether they drew erroneous conclusions or the military leadership made wrong decisions in this regard, we cannot know.

          From January 18 to February 25, 1991, Israeli territory was at the mercy of Iraqi missile units. No one could prevent this—not even the Patriot systems operated by foreign military personnel. The Israeli forces were powerless. Although, overall, the war benefited Israel's security by vastly weakening an adversary's military capabilities, a major question remains regarding the Jewish state's preparedness to face future conflicts. In such scenarios, enemies who are militarily weaker could still pose grave problems through the use of ballistic missiles. In essence, it was a preamble to what was yet to come.

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[1] Philippe Rondot, Istoria Irakului, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest-2003, p. 134 – 137.

[2] Stefan Olariu, The Missile Gulf Crisis, Google Books. https://www.google.ro/books/edition/The_Gulf_Missile_Crisis/e_jBEQAAQBAJ?hl=ro&gbpv=1&dq=the+missile+gulf+crisis&printsec=frontcover.

[3] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Assessing Iraq's Al-Husayn Missiles, accessed March 24, 2026, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/assessing-iraqs-al-husayn-missiles?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[4] Stefan Olariu, p. 33.

[5] Ibid, pp. 39 – 36.

[6] United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Operation Desert Storm – Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed, September 1992, pp. 2 – 3.

[7] “The Israeli Experience Operating Patriot in the Gulf War”, Statement of Reuven Pedatzur, Tel Aviv, Israel, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 7, 1992, GlobalSecurity.org, accessed March 26, 2026, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/congress/1992_h/h920407r.htm.

[8] Stefan Olariu, pp. 59 – 72.

[9] Major Scott M. Reynolds, Needle in a Haystack: Hunting Mobile Theater Missiles on the Battlefield , School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Second termay 96-97, p. 61.

[10] William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets – Lessons from Vietnam and Persian Gulf War, RAND, 2001, p. 31.

[11] W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Iraq's Al-Husayn Missile Programme, Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1990), pp. 242-248.