THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART II

1956 – Suez Crisis

          Crisis erupted due to the nationalization of the Suez Canal. In 1954, the Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, started ambitious projects, including Aswan Dam (on Nile) and armed forces modernization. Initially, he asked USA and UK for funding but was refused. Taking advantage of the rivalry between Eastern and Western blocs, he approached the USSR for help and received a positive answer. Based on Soviet security guarantees, he took a step forward: on 26 July 1956, he nationalized Suez Canal, owned by an Anglo-French company. Due to the highly geostrategic and economic importance of the canal, UK and France reacted. Their first approach, supported by the USA, was a diplomatic one but later, planned a military intervention to seize the canal by force. Israel was included in this plan. According to it, the Israeli forces were supposed to conduct offensive operations in Sinai Peninsula and the French and British government, pretending the threat on the ships transit, would issue an ultimatum, demanding both parties to withdraw troops at a certain distance from the canal. Of course, the planners were certain that Egypt would reject the demand and were equally sure Israel would comply. If their plan had succeeded, Israel would have gained the Sinai, the French and British forces would have occupied the canal, and Nasser would have been neutralized.   

At that time, the regional security of Israel faced serious problems. Israeli ships were not allowed to enter Suez Canal. Egypt subsequently blockaded the Straits of Tyran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel's only other seaway to Asia and Africa. Egyptian paramilitary groups often crossed the border into Israel and performed attacks against military and civilian objectives.[1]

The events gone according to the plan. French government substantially increased weapons delivery to Israel, in violation of Tripartite Agreement, signed in 1950[2]. Using the pretext of the attacks conducted by the Egyptian paramilitary groups (fedayeen), which was absolutely real, Israeli forces launched military reprisals that masked a full-scale invasion, on 29 October.

There were 3 Egyptian divisions in Sinai Peninsula, not fully staffed. The total number of troops was about 30,000, including Palestinian groups and territorial defense subunits. Previously, important forces had been redeployed on Suez Canal and beyond, because the Egyptian HQ anticipated Anglo-French operations there. The total number of Israeli troops designated for Sinai offensive was 45,000, who had more weapons and equipment than Egyptians. Their quality was also superior. The only issue for Israelis was the Egyptian Air Force, whose main fighter was the Soviet MiG-15. The Israeli offensive began with an airborne operation designed to seize an important pass. Immediately, Israeli brigades rapidly deployed and surpassed Egyptian defense lines, taking advantage of the surprise. Some Egyptian units succeeded to resist in certain areas, but not for a long time.[3] In approximately 100 hours, Israeli troops advanced close to the canal. In the southern part of peninsula, Israelis conquered Sharm-el-Sheikh and thus unblocked the Tyran strait for Israeli ships. Egyptian jets intervened, but they could not combat efficiently Israeli Air Force and support ground troops.  

On 30 October, France and Britain issued an ultimatum, demanding cease-fire and withdrawal of all combatants at 10 miles from the canal. Because the Egyptians refused, the air campaign began next day. On 5 November, French and British airborne subunits seized objective in the proximity of the canal, and, next day, a combined expeditionary force landed there, from ships.

The conflict suddenly stopped, due to the firm diplomatic intervention of USA and USSR (the Soviets threatened to use nuclear weapons). On 7 November, the expeditionary force withdrew. Israeli forces refused to leave Sinai. After US government put significant pressure, they withdrew, starting with 16 March 1957. Meanwhile, the Israelis destroyed roads, railways and telecommunication network[4]. For sure they mapped the territory, placed weapons, ammunition and supply caches, recruited agents and let behind secret cells, anticipating a potential future conflict.

The Israeli forces suffered 189 killed and 899 wounded. Four Israelis were captured. Egyptian losses were much higher, most of them in Sinai: 1,650 killed, 4,900 wounded and 6,185 captured.

Israeli achievements in this campaign were amazing. They succeeded to cross Sinai Peninsula (60,000 square kilometers) and gain control over it in approximately 100 hours, in spite of the defense operations performed by three Egyptian divisions and in spite of air operations conducted with MiG-15, which, at that time, was one of the best fighters in the world. There were also many difficulties due to the harsh desert environment, mountainous terrain, shifting sand and underdeveloped transportation network. One of the main problems was the sand, which caused frequent breakdowns of fighting and transportation vehicles[5]. But, behind these achievements, there were some less visible trump cards.

During the campaign planning process, Israeli HQ identified a threat, which could cause much damage for them: Egyptian Air Force, much more superior to Israeli Air Force. Between 1955 and 1956, USSR delivered to Egypt 86 MiG-15 fighters and 39 IL-28 medium range jet-bombers. Although it was about a high number for that period, the Egyptians were not able to operate all of them, because the short period did not allow them to train enough pilots. And just few of the trained ones could conduct complex dog fight missions and air support for ground troops.[6] But, nevertheless, there were enough to hit Israeli ground troops and important objectives deep inside Israel, because Israeli Air Force had mostly piston engine fighters. In 1954, they bought 22 British Gloster Meteor jet fighters[7], in 1955, 24 Ouragan jet fighters were bought from France[8] (regarding the combat capabilities, both of them were inferior to MiG-15), and in April 1956 they received 4 French Mystere jet fighters (comparable with MiG-15). It was a matter of time to train enough pilots and technical personnel.[9] Immediately after the crisis erupted, Israeli Air Force received 60 Mystere fighters from France[10]. Nevertheless, this solved just a part of the problem. Many pilots were in need and it was impossible to train them in a very short period. The solution was identified very quickly: French military pilots. They were experienced not only in operating fighter jets, but also in air combat, due to the missions performed in Algeria and Indochina. The fighter jets operated by French pilots proved to be essential for Israeli air combat missions: they provided protection for ground forces, downed Egyptian fighters, including MiG-15, bombed military airfields and other important objectives and provided tactical support. This happened because there were not sufficient Egyptian pilots who could fly MiG-15 and IL-28 (approximately 40) and, however, most of them were not train for combat operations. There were also not enough technical air force personnel, too. This is why only 30 MiGs could fly.[11] The Egyptian forces were not able to use the only advantage that they had at least theoretically. The result was immediately clear: Israeli planes, most of them operated by French pilots, gained control over the battlefield.

On sea, it was the same. The Egyptian Navy, bigger than the Israeli Navy, could cause much damage to Israeli forces and infrastructure. But this did not happen. French Navy, together with Israeli ships, blocked all their actions. On 31 October, French destroyer Kersaint opened fire on an Egyptian destroyer, which was trying to bomb Haifa city. Egyptian ship was damaged, tried to escape but Israeli ships chased and captured her.[12]

On land, Israeli forces, protected from air and sea, supported by fighters operated by experienced pilots, enjoyed freedom of action. Another advantage was the withdrawal of more Egyptian divisions beyond the canal. French transportation aircrafts offered support to Israeli airborne operations in Sinai, by dropping military equipment and supplies[13]. French war ships supported Israeli ground offensive operations in Gaza and on the Northern Sinai coastline, using heavy cannons.[14] But the most important trump card of Israelis was the combat experience achieved during the WWII and the Arab – Israeli war between 1947 and 1949. The technology did not differ too much and the tactics were almost the same: attacks of combined armored units and infantry on main axis, supported by artillery fire, evasive and envelopment maneuvers, rapid seizure of bridgeheads, long distance reconnaissance actions using light vehicles and light aircrafts, consistent air support, deep operations conducted by mobile subunits. There were many Israelis who fought in those two wars, by comparison with the Egyptian forces, which had just few military men who participated. Although the Egyptian ground forces put up a stubborn resistance in certain areas, practically they did not have any chance.  

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[1]National Security Agency, The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/Suez_Crisis.pdf.

[2] Between USA, France and UK; their governments decided to not supply weapons to a state harboring aggressive designs, in order to stabilize the situation in the region; on-line publication Jewish Virtual Library, article Harry Truman Administration: Tripartite Declaration, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/tripartite-declaration-may-1950.

[3] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute, The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/key-to-the-sinai.pdf.

[4] On-line publication Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, article Ike Forces Israel to End Occupation After Sinai Crisis, https://www.wrmea.org/from-our-archives/ike-forces-israel-to-end-occupation-after-sinai-crisis.html.

[5] U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute, The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/key-to-the-sinai.pdf.

[6] On-line publication War History.org, article The Egyptian Air Force 1956, https://warhistory.org/@msw/article/the-egyptian-air-force-1956.

[7] On-line publication Jewish Virtual Library, article IAF Aircraft Inventory: Gloster Meteor, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/gloster-meteor.

[8] On-line publication Jewish Virtual Library, article IAF Aircraft Inventory: Dassault M.D. 450 Ouragan, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/dassault-m-d-450-ouragan.

[9] On-line publication Jewish Virtual Library, article IAF Aircraft Inventory: Dassault M.D. 454 Mystere IVA, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/dassault-m-d-454-mystere-iva.

[10] National Security Agency, The Suez Crisis: A Brief Comint History, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-histories/Suez_Crisis.pdf.

[11] Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, Suez Crisis, 1956, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/20515408/doc-5-cna-suez-1956.pdf.

[12] New York Times, article Paris Collusion in Egypt Denied; French Rebut Report That Mollet and Israeli Leader Held a Secret Meeting Anti-Nasser Move Is Cited, https://www.nytimes.com/1957/03/30/archives/paris-collusion-in-egypt-denied-french-rebut-report-that-mollet-and.html.

[13] Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, Suez Crisis, 1956,  https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/20515408/doc-5-cna-suez-1956.pdf.

[14] New York Times, article Paris Collusion in Egypt Denied; French Rebut Report That Mollet and Israeli Leader Held a Secret Meeting Anti-Nasser Move Is Cited, https://www.nytimes.com/1957/03/30/archives/paris-collusion-in-egypt-denied-french-rebut-report-that-mollet-and.html.