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1.    The Gulf Missile Crisis - https://www.google.ro/books/edition/The_Gulf_Missile_Crisis/e_jBEQAAQBAJ?hl=ro&gbpv=1&dq=The+Gulf+Missile+Crisis&printsec=frontcover

 

The paper, published in 2018, foresaw certain aspects of the current Gulf conflict.

Presentation:

The theme of the book is the Al-Hussein ballistic missiles launching operations (Iraqi derivative of the soviet Scud missiles) during the First Gulf War (1991), their consequences and the International Coalition effort to prevent and to combat them.

          The book focuses on the following aspects development:

-       Al-Hussein ballistic missiles launching operations were ways the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, used to respond against International Coalition Forces, led by USA, that were established to liberate Kuwait; Al-Hussein missile was, in fact, a derivative of an old soviet missile, Scud – type, that had a primitive guiding system;

-       The Coalition Forces leadership realized the danger posed by the Al-Hussein missiles; in this respect, Coalition Air Forces attacked the missiles facilities from the very beginning of the air campaign. Anticipating this, Iraqi Army scattered the missiles and deployed them on a large area, by mounting them on launcher vehicles (TEL – transporter erector launcher); Iraqi missile forces conducted all the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations from TELs (Iraqi-made vehicle Al-Waleed);

-       Al-Hussein missiles launching operations begun immediately after the International Coalition Air Forces had initiated the air campaign, against targets located on Iraqi and Kuwait territories; Al-Hussein missiles targeted locations on Saudi Arabia and Israel; the launching operations against Israel posed a major threat on International Coalition, due to a possible Israeli response, followed by Arab States withdrawal from this coalition;

-       In order to prevent the missiles launching operations, International Coalition Forces allocated many resources: Air Forces units, sensors, anti-rockets systems (Patriot systems) and Special Operations Forces units;

-       The Patriot systems efficiency was low; there are some authors and scientists which demonstrated that the Patriot system was almost inefficient, although the media has tried to present it as highly efficient;

-       Although the Coalition Air Forces had high-tech equipment, it was not able either to stop Al-Hussein missiles launching operations or to prevent them; one of the reasons was the lack of ground teams, designated to locate the Iraqi missiles units, to call Air Forces and to guide the air teams to the TELs;

-       For terrain reconnaissance, Iraqi missiles units’ localization, TELs identification, air teams’ guidance and missiles neutralization, Coalition Forces deployed Special Operations Forces teams on the Iraqi territory (the well-known Green Berets, Delta Force and SAS); their operations were called Scud-hunting;

-       It is difficult to figure-out the results of Scud-hunting operations results from the books related to the First Gulf War or to the special operations. The authors that have approached this subject have identified very few results, but revealed many failures;

-       The assessment of the Scud-hunting operations shows huge errors in the strategic Desert Storm planning activities;

-       Despite of the International Coalition Forces huge effort to stop the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations, they could not been stopped;

-       After the success of Desert Storm operation, consisting of Kuwait liberation, Iraqi agreement for cease-fire and massive diminution of the Iraqi Army capabilities, a normal step was the continuation of the actions to replace the Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime. If achieved, this aspect would have provided a lot of benefic elements.  At that moment, this was possible, due to the international situation and the Iraqi internal unrest;

-       It is not clear why the International Coalition did not remove Saddam Hussein from power.  Since then, a huge question mark has remained.  The book provides a possible answer: the chemical weapons at the disposal of the Iraqi Army and the inability to stop Al-Hussein missiles launching operations; the probability of a Saddam Hussein’s desperate attack using chemical charges on board of Al-Hussein missiles, discouraged the International Coalition to dethrone him;

-       Another International Coalition (led by USA) succeeded to dethrone Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime, after 12 years, by performing Iraqi Freedom operation (a blitzkrieg – type operation).  The military actions were well-coordinated and very fast, but the anti-Saddam Hussein attitude of the majority of the Iraqi population contributed to the coalition success;

-       Despite the evident success of the International Coalition Forces operations and despite the quick advance of the ground forces, Iraqi Army succeeded to launch ballistic missiles. Although the Coalition Forces overwhelmed the Iraqi Forces and the situation was disastrous for them, Iraqi missiles units continued to conduct launching operations;

-       A hypothesis for the high-speed conducting of the Iraqi Freedom operation is the Coalition Forces fear of the Iraqi missile operations. Coalition Forces tried to prevent the missiles launches by a fast ground advance. The Coalition Forces leaders were aware that there was no other way to prevent them.

 

Conclusions:

Ø  Modern military technology is not as effective as it is presented in media;

Ø  The high-tech equipment should not determine the military leaders not to take into consideration all the art of war principles when planning and when conducting military operations; in short, the technology does not represent everything;

Ø  There were numerous errors done by a military system which was considered the most efficient all over the world (USA and its allies). These errors are highlighted in the book, for instance the underestimation of the transporter erector launchers threat;

Ø  A country that has little financial resources is sometimes able to protect its independency using obsolete military equipment;

Ø  It is possible that not all the Revolution in Military Affairs theories are entirely viable; the book provides some arguments in this respect, although this is not its subject;

Saddam Hussein regime was saved in 1991 by the success of the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations and by the chemical weapons that the Iraqi Army had at that time; if the Scud-hunting operations had succeeded, Saddam Hussein would have been dethroned in 1991.

 

2.    Kosovo – An Unfinished War - https://books.google.ro/books?id=LyjJEQAAQBAJ&newbks=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA4&dq=Kosovo+-+An+Unfinished+war&hl=ro&source=newbks_fb&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Kosovo%20-%20An%20Unfinished%20war&f=false

 

Presentation:

          The book does not concern the history of the conflict. It is a work in the military analysis field. The history part is necessary to understand the origins of the war and the reasons of the military campaign conducted by NATO in 1999 against Republic of Yugoslavia. The military analysis of the war has two main goals:

1.    To emphasize the significant issues of the military campaign, which, without few exceptions, have not been approached or have been little approached.

2.    To demonstrate that the conflict might not be finished yet. From the political point of view, this is well-known. Nevertheless, there might be some chances to transform the political conflict into a military one.

          The military analysis of the armed conflict approaches certain subjects that I consider not enough, even superficial approached in the previous works regarding the Kosovo War. These are as the following:

- How many invisible planes were hit or downed?

- How efficient was the Yugoslav air defense?

- Is the old military equipment still useful in the modern armed conflict?

- How efficient is the military technology against armed forces which use old and obsolete military equipment?

- What did the NATO Special Forces do during the campaign?

- How many Yugoslav tanks were destroyed in Kosovo?

- Were the armed forces of the Republic of Albania involved?

- Was a ground offensive against Yugoslavia achievable?

- Did NATO leaders really wish to conduct a ground offensive?

- Which were the actions of the Russian Federation armed forces during the conflict and at the end of it?

          There are still false stories regarding some of the subjects above-mentioned. For instance, there are journalists (and not only journalists) still convinced that NATO air assets destroyed only 14 Yugoslav tanks in Kosovo. This problem is approached in a separate chapter. Another false story concerns the loss of an F-117 Stealth. Many believe that this was the only victory of the Yugoslav air defense. On contrary, more aircrafts were downed or damaged, but not as many as some sources claimed at the end of campaign or after that.

          By approaching the details using military analysis methods, based on the above-mentioned questions, one can find interesting facts. A complex picture, full of interesting aspects, results. And these aspects could not be seen before, while studying the wide range of sources that provide information on the subjects. For instance, the loss of the invisible fighter, corroborated with the details of the air operations, offers many opportunities to search and to reach novel conclusions.  The book only tries to clarify some aspects, without pretending a high level of accuracy.

          The most important theme of the book starts from a question: the Allied Force campaign (air offensive conducted by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999) put an end to the military conflict? In my opinion, there are two answers: one for short term, another one for long term. For the short term, the answer is YES, the bloodshed was stopped, the problems were solved, the humanitarian crisis ended. For long term, the evolution of the political conflict is full of uncertainties. One can state, by watching the TV news, that it is not ended. What will it happen? Are there still risks to degenerate into a military conflict? This book tries to give an answer.

 

3.    PROJECT: INFANTRY

        https://books.google.ro/books?id=_D3cEQAAQBAJ&newbks=0&printsec=frontcover&pg=PA61&dq=Project+infantry&hl=ro&source=newbks_fb&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Project%20infantry&f=false

 

Presentation:

 

After the military campaigns performed during the period that ended the Cold War and imediately after that, most of the military analists  drew some conclusions:

-       The states no longer need the big armies, consisting of huge constituent parts and equiped with obsolete weapons;

-       The states need new kind of armed forces; these must be smaller, consisting of high professional, interoperable, mobile and modern units, led by very skillful managers and equiped with high-tech weapons;

-       There is no chance of succes for a big army, equiped with obsolete weapons, in confrontation with a small but modern army, consisting of mobile and modern units.

The term „technology trap” was added to the above mentioned assessments. That means the accelerated increase of the military equipments prices, which results in the decrease of their amount, due to the lower quantities that the governments purchase. As a result, few states can actually afford a great number of tanks and planes, provoking a continouos military sizedown.

The wars that errupted in Ukraine and Syria have overthrown the above mentioned concepts and revealed an esential aspect: it is necessary to cover the entire battlefield with troops, which is impossible for a modern army, using modern weapons but having a small number of units, meaning few personnel. A question results from this: how can a state, that has a low defence budget, counter an external aggression?

The answer is:

1.     Infantry subunits and units, permanently active, that have specific organization, weapons, equipment and training; these featers would provide them with the capability to perform succesful operations on the modern battlefield; all of these are presented in this book;

2.     Infantry subunits established in case of war, consisting of reservists, or infantry subunits that are strengthened with reservists; these are also presented in this book;

3.     Territorial infantry units, consisting of mostly reservists, which would be mobilized in case of crise or war, by the units mentioned above (paragraph 1); these should have specific organization, weapons, equipment and training, different from the permanently active infantry units and subunits;  their featers would provide them with the capability to quickly become operational and to perform limited operations; these are presented in this book, too;

4.     Guerilla warfare subunits and units, designed to conduct intelligence gathering actions, specific unconventional operations and own troops support operations on the national territory ocupied by the enemy;  these are not presented in this book, but will be the subject of another book, because they are not infantry units/subunits and need a comprehensive approache, involving a huge amount of details and specific elements.

The permanently active infantry subunits and units should have a new table of organization, resulting so the necessity to create a new echelon, between section and platoon, that we call „infantry group”. This group needs to have infantry weapons, as well as anti-tank missiles, light surface-to-air missiles systems and a drone. The new tactics used by the infantry group would be quite different from the current tactics of the infantry troops. Its main capability: to conduct operations independently and isolately, behind the enemy lines or in the areas not controlled by any belligerent state. The infantry company, consisting of infantry groups and support elements would also have a new kind of organization and use new tactics.

In case of an aggression, the permanently active infantry subunits and units would establish territorial infantry units, organize, equip and train them. After this phase, the territorial infantry units prepare strong defensive lines.

Usually, the permanently active infantry subunits and units and territorial infantry units would perform operations together, in order to stop the enemy ofensive operations. The enemy would be able to get through a couple of defensive lines, but, due to the lack of capability to cover all the theater of operations or areas, there will be gaps in his lines and will also let some areas behind without control. These gaps and areas cannot be controlled or surveyed. At the same time, the ofensive operations conducted against own defensive lines would exhaust the enemy troops and own troops should take advantage of this. The territorial infantry would maintain certain lines and areas, from where the permanent active infantry subunits would infiltrate and launch offensive actions against enemy forces, independently and/or isolately, especially far behind enemy lines. By conducting low-scale but numerous operations, infantry subunits will provoke losses to the enemy and will compel it to deploy forces, to spread its units and to stop the strategic ofensive. In this way, a major impasse would produce, which may transform into a military defeat.

An entire chapter is dedicated to the airborne units. Basically, a country that may be the subject of an aggression cannot use the airborne units. But, if the hibryd war specific actions precede military aggression, there will remain isolated areas under the government control, as happened in Syria. There will also be very high-sensitive areas that the government need to do the best in order to regain the control of them, before the enemy coventional attack. For this purpose, infantry airborne units are specially designed. They will be dropped or inserted in those areas, will take them under control, will organize territorial troops and prepare all-around defence.