TURKEY – ISRAEL. ENEMIES, PARTNERS OR ALLIES?

       Recently, Turkish authorities refused to grant overflight rights to the aircraft carrying the President of Israel to a summit in Azerbaijan ^[1]. This event, quite unusual in international relations, has reignited debates regarding the tensions between the two states, which could even trigger a potential armed conflict. Although tensions between them are quite old, they were amplified by the emergence of divergent interests in Syria following the fall of the Al-Assad regime (December 2024). It even reached the risk of armed clashes between Turks and Israelis, but the two sides managed to agree on coordination mechanisms to avoid them[2].

The history of tensions between Turkey and Israel is quite rich. In the last ten years alone, we can find plenty of incidents. In 2018, following the actions of the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip, the two countries withdrew their ambassadors[3]. In December 2019, Israel opposed an agreement between Libya and Turkey regarding the demarcation of maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. In turn, Turkey opposed a project jointly developed by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to build a pipeline to deliver natural gas to Europe. Turkey's intervention blocked the project. In 2021, an Israeli couple was arrested in Istanbul on espionage charges after photographing the presidential palace.[4] In January 2024, Turkish authorities arrested 15 people and deported eight others for alleged links to Israeli special services. At the same time, information appeared in the Israeli and international media indicating that Turkey had granted citizenship to Hamas operatives, thereby facilitating their freedom of movement within the territory of other states.[5] Moreover, the tensions between the two states are also reflected in their commercial exchanges, which, according to official data, have dropped dramatically starting from 2024. As an example, in 2021 Turkish exports to Israel totaled 6.36 billion USD, in 2022 – 7.03 billion USD, in 2023 – 5.43 billion USD, and in 2024 – 1.52 billion USD.[6]

          Of all the aspects that have emerged on this topic in the public sphere, the most significant are the actions of the Turkish President. His harsh statements regarding potential military operations against Israel are not entirely unusual. In July 2024, he threatened a military intervention in Israel to protect the Palestinian population[7], and on April 12, 2026, he announced once again that he could invade the country[8]. The statements of a head of state carry significant weight. He does not speak in a personal capacity, but on behalf of the state, including the armed forces. Judging by his declarations and other information regarding the tensions between the two countries, a military conflict seems imminent. That is at first glance. Approaching the situation from a different perspective, something else is observed.

          The most important supplier of oil to Israel is Azerbaijan. In 2024, oil imports from this country accounted for approximately 57% of the total imported quantity[9], and in 2025, they stood at 46%[10]. The oil is delivered through the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum–Ceyhan pipeline, the largest part of which is on Turkish territory. In Ceyhan (a port on the Mediterranean Sea), the oil is loaded onto ships and transported to Israel. At the same time, other types of Turkish goods continue to reach Israel, but not directly, instead going through intermediaries from third-party states[11]. By the way, for every barrel of oil transited through that pipeline, the Turkish state collects 1.27 USD[12]. In February 2026, representatives of Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) attended a conference in Israel to develop the subway construction project in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. DEİK is the main economic diplomacy organization in Turkey, supervised by the Ministry of Trade.[13]  Ultimately, business is business, and money has no smell. And these aspects constitute only the visible part of Turkish-Israeli cooperation, since they can be found in open sources. Is there also a less visible part of their economic cooperation? We cannot know.

          The Turkey–Azerbaijan strategic alliance is well known. Close ties exist between the two states in important fields: economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military. The aforementioned oil pipeline is a living example. However, the economic cooperation is much more extensive, encompassing several spheres: tourism, agriculture, industry, transport, etc. In the military arena, the partnership led to a particularly important victory: Azerbaijan managed to regain control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. That speaks volumes. Ultimately, it is about the same people living in two different states, speaking dialects of the same language.[14] However, less visible is Azerbaijan's role in the Turkish 'Greater Turan' project, which involves expanding Turkish influence in Central Asian countries by promoting Turkish culture. Of course, the less official but primary objective is economic expansion. Within this project, Azerbaijan plays a very important role as a stepping stone between Turkey and the Central Asian states. Naturally, this project runs counter to the interests of Russia, Iran, and China, which perceive it as a threat.[15] There is much to be said about this project and its geopolitical implications, but essentially, it is a Turkish vector in Central Asian countries, supported by the US and its allies[16], thus constituting a component of an offensive system directed against US rivals. And Azerbaijan represents a key piece in this overall architecture.

          On the other hand, a strategic partnership exists between Israel and Azerbaijan in the economic and military fields. The most important aspect is oil. In exchange for oil, Azerbaijan receives weaponry and military equipment from Israel, significantly reducing its dependence on Russia, which was inherited due to Soviet military hardware. Also, through Azerbaijan, Israel promotes its interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[17] What is less known is that Israel uses Azerbaijan's territory for activities against Iran. As far back as the 1990s, the Israelis set up electronic surveillance systems on the Azerbaijan–Iran border, with the approval of the Azerbaijani leadership, of course[18]. In the context of the two recent Israeli military campaigns against Iran, these aspects reveal the special relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan, which is no longer just an economic partnership with a military side. In turn, Israel substantially supported the Azerbaijani campaign to retake the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2023 from an intelligence standpoint, an aspect that has been officially acknowledged[19]. All of this demonstrates that the two states are more than just partners. The assistance provided in armed conflicts shows only one thing: it is a military alliance, even if it remains undeclared. Moreover, between true friends, written agreements are not even necessary.

          The topic of the Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership is vast, but it is not the subject of this material. What I wanted to present is that, in practice, Azerbaijan is the point of convergence between Turkey and Israel. And here, there is no conflict at all. On the contrary, their interests are aligned.

          There will be no armed conflict between Turkey and Israel. Neither side has an interest in such a thing. And it is not just about business. It is more than that. Both countries are in the same geopolitical camp. They cannot afford to fight each other. The enemies lie elsewhere. All of this has transformed the relations between the two states into an alliance, voluntary or not. Misunderstandings and minor frictions will still occur; it is inevitable. And the Turkish President will continue to threaten Israel with military action, but this is as much for his image before his own population as it is for the image of a leader of the Islamic world that he is trying to build. But, beyond the inflammatory declarations, there is no concrete threat.

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[1] “Turkey's Erdogan says Israel's Herzog was denied airspace en route to Azerbaijan’’, Reuters, accessed May 6, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-israels-herzog-was-denied-airspace-en-route-azerbaijan-2024-11-19/.

[2] “Turkey-Israel Rivalry in the New Syria”, Stimson Center think-tank website, accessed May 6, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2026/turkey-israel-rivalry-in-the-new-syria/.

[3] “Turkey halts trade with Israel over 'humanitarian tragedy' in Gaza”, BBC, accessed May 18, 2026 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68945380.

[4] “TIMELINE-Turkey and Israel aim to move on from years of tension”, Devdiscourse, accessed May 18, 2026, https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/law-order/1953235-timeline-turkey-and-israel-aim-to-move-on-from-years-of-tension.

[5] “Turkey-Israel Relations”, Jewish Virtual Library, accessed May 18, 2026, https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/turkey-israel-relations.

[6] “Turkey Exports to Israel”, Trading Economics, accessed May 18, 2026, https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports/israel.

[7] “Turkey threatens to ‘enter’ Israel to protect Palestinians”, Politico, accessed May 18, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-nato-tayyip-erdogan-threatens-enter-israel-help-palestinians/.

[8] “Erdogan: 'Just as we entered Libya, we can invade Israel'”, Israel Hayom, accessed May 18, 2026, https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/04/12/erdogan-just-as-we-entered-libya-we-can-invade-israel/.

[9] “Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous exports to Israel in 2024”, World Integrated Trade Solutions, accessed May 18, 2026, https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/All/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ISR/product/270900?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[10] “Israeli oil imports via Türkiye surged in 2025”, The Cradle, accessed May 18, 2026, https://thecradle.co/articles/israeli-oil-imports-via-turkiye-surged-in-2025.

[11] Ibid.

[12] “Turkey earns $1.27 a barrel from pipeline that supplies much of Israel’s crude oil”, Turkish Minute, accessed May 20, 2026, https://www.turkishminute.com/2024/11/15/turkey-earn-1-27-a-barrel-from-pipeline-that-supplies-much-of-israels-crude-oil/.

[13] “Turkish business diplomacy group, contractor attend Israeli metro tender conference: report”, Turkish Minute, accessed May 20, 2026, https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/02/25/turkish-business-diplomacy-group-contractor-attend-israeli-metro-tender-conference-report/; DEIK official website, accessed May 20, 2026, https://www.deik.org.tr/deik-about-us.

[14] “General Outlook on Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations”, Institute of Armenian Studies, accessed May 22, 2026, https://dornsife.usc.edu/armenian/initiatives/resources-on-karabakh/general-outlook-on-turkey-azerbaijan-relations/.

[15] “Moscow Fears Ankara’s Greater Turan Ideas Threaten Russia Abroad and at Home”, Jamestown Foundation website, accessed May 22, 2026, https://jamestown.org/moscow-fears-ankaras-greater-turan-ideas-threaten-russia-abroad-and-at-home/.

[16] Atlantic Council official website, report “Why the Middle Corridor matters amid a geopolitical resorting”, accessed May 22, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/ac-turkey-defense-journal/why-the-middle-corridor-matters-amid-a-geopolitical-resorting/.

[17] “Azerbaijan–Israel Relations Represent Middle Power Consolidation”, Jamestown Foundation website, accessed May 22, 2026,https://jamestown.org/azerbaijan-israel-relations-represent-middle-power-consolidation/.

[18] “Israel – Azerbaijan: an alliance in search of renewal”, Fondation Mediterraneenne d’Etudes Strategiques, accessed May 24, 2026, https://fmes-france.org/israel-azerbaijan-an-alliance-in-search-of-renewal/.

[19] “Azerbaijan, Israel. Baku thanks Mossad and Israeli military over Nagorno-Karabakh victory”, Intelligence Online, accessed May 24, 2026, https://www.intelligenceonline.com/asia-pacific/2023/10/03/baku-thanks-mossad-and-israeli-military-over-nagorno-karabakh-victory,110060879-art.