TANKS
OR DRONES?
Tactical aerial drones have conquered the
battlefield. Literally. There is no need to elaborate, as it is all common
knowledge. The battlefield has become transparent. Any movement stands a high
chance of being detected, especially when it comes to heavy assets (tanks,
armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery pieces, machinery, etc.). And upon
these, swarms of kamikaze drones swoop down, putting them out of action.
Sometimes with ease, other times with difficulty, but as a rule, they damage or
even destroy them. This is why the tank has become a secondary weapon on the
battlefield in Ukraine. It is used during severe weather conditions, when
drones cannot fly, but most often, as mobile artillery. This is exactly what
caused a deadlock: large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible. Because there is no
longer the possibility of concentrating large armored forces to break through
the front line. Is this the end of the tank? At this point, tactical drones
appear to be the ultimate weapon on the battlefield. And the tank no longer
stands a chance. And it is not just the tank. This is why the defense industry
in the West and the US has pivoted primarily toward drones. It is a natural
shift. Based on the lessons learned from the actions in Ukraine, this is the
correct direction. Huge sums have been invested in research and production.
Retrained specialists, specialized training courses, testing equipment,
dedicated testing facilities and proving grounds, retooled production lines,
established supply chains, and so much more. Overhauling industrial production
is no simple task. This
takes some years. Of course, the profits are matching, as the armed forces are
procuring drones on a massive scale. This comes to the detriment of tanks and
other heavy combat assets, which have lost their primary role in combat. Of
course, their production continues, but at a low level, since the investments
are no longer worth it. The images of Russian tanks damaged or even destroyed
by drones say it all. Money must flow toward drone production.
The
trend is clear and correct, looking strictly through the lens of the present.
But we should also take a look at history.
The
submarine was widely used as a weapon in the First World War. Particularly by
the Germans, who inflicted massive losses on the Allied transport fleet. Thus,
throughout the entire duration of the war, the Germans sank 6,394 ships, while
losing 229 submarines[1]. And this was despite the
fact that the submarine did not possess impressive technical-tactical
characteristics, its submerged time being quite short and its onboard weaponry
insufficiently developed.
Peace
came. The submarine was forgotten. But not by the Germans.
The effects of German
submarine actions during the first part of World War II are well known.
Documentaries on this topic, presented by some television networks, are very
interesting. The losses inflicted on the Allies in the Atlantic were huge. The
aspects of the confrontation between German submarines and Allied naval forces
are fairly well known. However, starting in 1943, the efficiency of the
operations carried out by the German submarine fleet decreased considerably. In
1944, its losses were very high: January – 14 submarines (and 8 Allied ships
sunk); February: 15 submarines (and 4 Allied ships sunk); March: 17 submarines
(11 Allied ships sunk)[2]. Four years earlier, in
March 1940, the ratio was 43 Allied ships to 1 sunk submarine[3]. German losses grew higher
and higher, starting in 1943. In 1945, this branch of the German Navy had an
insignificant impact on military operations. The most important aspect to
mention: German submarines failed to prevent the Allied invasions of Europe in
1943 (Sicily) and 1944 (Normandy). Why? Because, starting in 1942, the Allies
implemented innovative anti-submarine technologies in their naval forces:
high-performance sonars, radars, long-range aircraft, SIGINT systems, etc. And
the submarine is, by its very nature, highly vulnerable. Its power lies in
invisibility, when it hides in the deep. But if it is detected, its chances of
survival drop dramatically. Counter weapons were found. Why wasn't this done
during the interwar period? Were the investments not worth it?
The conclusion is that,
although the danger posed by submarines was already known from the period of
the First World War, no measures were taken during the interwar period, not
even when it was clear that another war with Germany would begin. German submarines
once again caught the British fleet by surprise in the autumn of 1939.
Practically, the Germans had freedom of movement because the Allies ignored the
need to prepare for anti-submarine warfare. The price paid was high.
Drones
have been used in armed conflicts for over 40 years. The use of tactical drones
intensified during the civil war in Donbas. But nobody paid attention, except
for the Ukrainian forces.
The
tactical aerial drone is, by its very nature, highly vulnerable. Because it has
reduced dimensions and is made of lightweight materials, generally plastics. A
single mechanical impulse disables it. It can be shot down with a slingshot,
literally. Why are these drones dangerous? Due to their speed, surprise
appearance, and large numbers. And due to the absence of generalized and
effective countermeasure systems. All kinds of countermeasures have been
developed, but none have been widespread enough. Research is ongoing.
Just
as effective systems were developed against submarines, reducing their attack
capabilities, I am convinced that identification and countermeasure systems
will also be developed against tactical drones, significantly reducing their
efficiency on the battlefield. They will not eliminate them definitively;
drones will still remain an effective weapon under certain conditions. But they
will no longer be supreme, "game-changer" weapons. And I am convinced
that tanks and other heavy equipment will reclaim their place on the
battlefield, only adapted, both technically and tactically, to yet another new
anti-tank weapon: the tactical drone. And
the massive investments in industry and the changes in technological processes
(for tactical drone production) will be written off as losses, for the most
part. And this will happen when we see large-scale offensive operations,
involving major armored units, that will break through strong defensive lines
and resume maneuver warfare. Meanwhile, the European and American defense
industries, with their huge production of drones, will not be able to ensure
the resumption of armored vehicle production at the required level. I do not
think it will be long before that moment arrives.
[1] ‘Submarines and Submarine Warfare’, International Encyclopedia of the First
World War, accessed September 16, 2026, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/submarines_and_submarine_warfare.
[2] ‘German U-Boats at
War, Part 5 of 6’, Naval History, accessed September 16,
2026, https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats5.htm.
[3] ‘German U-Boats at
War, Part 1 of 6’, Naval History, accessed September 16,
2026, https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats5.htm.

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