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KHARG ISLAND – MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

          The international media is flooded with information regarding the US leadership's intention to perform a military operation to occupy Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. It is believed that seizing the island, which is Iran's primary oil hub, would deal a powerful blow to the Tehran regime. However, such an operation involves an assault and the occupation of the island by an expeditionary force. In other words, boots on the ground.[1]

          Kharg Island is located 483 km from the Strait of Hormuz and 25 km from the Iranian coast. The shortest distance to the Saudi coast is approximately 190 km, as is the distance to the Kuwaiti coast. The island's surface area is about 20 km².


            A simple consultation of the map and a minimal knowledge of the situation show us that there are two options (courses of action) for occupying the island: 1. An amphibious assault; 2. An airborne assault. These can be conducted by US Marines or airborne troops, possibly with the support of special forces.

        At this moment, the first course of action is impossible. Because the Strait of Hormuz is blocked for US Navy warships, and there are no prospects for unblocking it.

       The second course of action is possible, at least at first glance. From forward operating bases located in Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, American forces could execute an airborne assault using helicopters. The action would be preceded by heavy strikes on Iranian military infrastructure on the island and along the coast, carried out with missiles and aviation. Subsequently, the assault force, embarked on transport helicopters and Boeing V-22 Osprey aircraft, escorted by attack helicopters, would land on the island. However, the danger would be Iranian drones, which would jeopardize the transport helicopters. To counter them, a large number of attack helicopters would be necessary, because the assault force need around-the-clock air cover. In any case, losses are inevitable.

        Once the island is occupied, two problems would arise. The first is resupply, via helicopter support or airdrops from transport planes. This is solvable. However, I do not know to what extent the second problem could be resolved. The island would become the target of continuous bombardment by Iranian forces, using missiles and drones. There would be no warships at sea to provide anti-aircraft protection, and the Saudi and Kuwaiti coasts are too far away; the support units there would not be able to provide continuous protection. The island's small surface area does not allow for the efficient dispersal of troops. Essentially, the landing force would find itself in a shooting gallery, at the mercy of the Iranians. A total fiasco.




[1] "Trump eyes "Hormuz Coalition," seizure of Iran's Kharg Island oil hub", Axios, accessed March, 17, https://www.axios.com/2026/03/16/trump-iran-hormuz-strait-kharg-island.


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