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THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART VI

1978 – Intervention in Lebanon

           In 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, Israel already possessed clear military superiority over its Arab neighbors. The defeat suffered and the heavy losses within the Arab coalition guaranteed this reality. The superiority was reflected in the trump cards it consistently held or had regained: strong US support, highly effective intelligence services, air power, and the tactics of (blitzkrieg). Technological superiority was not yet evident.

        Israel’s security was already very solid compared to the 1950s and 1960s. Peace negotiations were underway with Egypt. Jordan no longer posed a problem. Syria remained the only neighboring state enemy, but it was far from having the capacity to launch any military campaign against Israel. Other enemies still existed—namely Iraq and Libya—but they were not in a position to act directly. What remained were the Palestinian armed groups, the most powerful of which was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In 1971, the Jordanian government expelled the Palestinian armed groups. They settled in southern Lebanon, where they effectively took control of an area located between the southern border (with Israel) and the Litani River, with the exception of several enclaves controlled by a Christian paramilitary group[1]. In this territory, the PLO established military and civilian institutions, thereby evolving into a quasi-state entity. The consequences emerged relatively quickly. The presence of Palestinian militants was one of the factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. At the same time, the area under PLO control became a forward operating base for launching attacks against northern Israel.[2]

          On March 11, 1978, a Palestinian commando unit infiltrated by sea north of Tel Aviv and carried out a major terrorist attack, resulting in the killing of 35 civilians (including 13 children) and the wounding of other 71.

The Israeli response was swift. On the night of March 14–15, Israeli combat planes carried out heavy strikes against Palestinian targets in southern Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, mechanized and airborne brigades crossed the border and assaulted sectors held by Palestinian armed groups, which numbered approximately 4,000 fighters in total. The Israelis coordinated their operations with Christian paramilitary groups. Israeli combat vessels provided fire support. On March 16, armored units crossed the border, reinforcing the Israeli offensive deployment. Overall, the force consisted of more than 25,000 troops. On March 17, the mission objective was achieved, namely the establishment of a line approximately 10 km from the border. During this period, Palestinian paramilitary forces conducted artillery strikes against Israeli territory. Immediately after securing the designated line, the Israeli military leadership decided to continue the offensive toward the Litani River (approximately 25 km from the border). This line was fully secured on March 21. Israeli forces did not attempt to seize control of the city of Tyre (a port south of the Litani River), where significant Palestinian forces were present. Israeli leadership argued that such an operation, conducted in an urban environment, would have resulted in heavy casualties.

On March 19, the UN issued two resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory and the establishment of a peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL). On March 21, Israeli operations ceased. On March 23, the first UN subunits were deployed to the area. Subsequently, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon began, concluding on June 13. The area was taken over by Christian paramilitary groups, which were later named the 'South Lebanon Army'.

Following the military operations, approximately 300 Palestinian fighters were killed. It is estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed, while the number of those who fled the area was between 160,000 and 250,000. The Israelis recorded 18 fatalities among their military personnel.[3]

The analysis of the campaign is fairly straightforward. The superiority of the Israeli forces was overwhelming. Palestinian groups lacked the technical capabilities to counter Israeli aircraft, naval vessels, and armor. Consequently, they withdrew, although they put up resistance in certain areas. The Israeli leadership's refusal to storm the city of Tyre remains a point of contention. Potential casualties would have indeed been high among both Palestinian and Israeli combatants, as well as civilians. Israeli experience in urban operations was precarious at the time. The personnel who had fought in 1948, when extensive urban warfare took place, were no longer on active duty. Subsequently, the only significant urban battles had occurred in 1967, in Jerusalem.



[2] Wars of the Twentieth Century, article March 14, 1978 – 1978 South Lebanon Conflict: Israel invades Southern Lebanon, https://20thcenturywars.com/march-14-1978-israel-invades-southern-lebanon-to-destroy-plo-bases/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[3] Act for the Disappeared, article Litani Operation – Battle, https://waynoun.com/en/database/events/litani-operation?utm_source=chatgpt.com; Jewish Virtual Library, article Operation Litani, https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-litani?utm_source=chatgpt.com; Ynet.Global, article Operation Litani (1978), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1%2C7340%2CL-3686831%2C00.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com; Wars of the Twentieth Century, article March 14, 1978 – 1978 South Lebanon Conflict: Israel invades Southern Lebanon, https://20thcenturywars.com/march-14-1978-israel-invades-southern-lebanon-to-destroy-plo-bases/?utm_source=chatgpt.com; The Guardian, article How does Israel’s Lebanon invasion compare with its previous operations?, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/08/israel-lebanon-invasion-compare-previous-operations?utm_source=chatgpt.com; Wars and Operations, article Operation Litani, https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/wars-and-operations/operation-litani-1/?utm_source=chatgpt.com. 


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