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AFGHANISTAN – QUO VADIS?

Article published on 27 May 2021

       The withdrawal of the international Coalition Forces, led by USA, from Afghanistan, is one of the major events of 2021. There is no surprises regarding this withdrawal, because it was negotiated, beginning with 13 October 2018, between the representatives of the Afghan government, US officials and representatives of the Taliban Movement[1]. Although the deadline for withdrawal is 1 May 2021, according to the agreements, the US leaders have decided to postpone it until September 2021[2]. The Taliban consider this a violation of the agreements and have threatened with reprisals[3].

However, US officials have announced that, even the US Forces and their allies would completely retreat from Afghanistan, they will keep enough military capabilities in the region, in order to conduct counterterrorist missions and check the Taliban[4]. On the other hand, the Pakistani foreign minister has announced that his country would not accept US bases and US troops on its territory after the withdrawal from Afghanistan[5]. One can assess that it will be very difficult or even impossible for the US Forces deployed in the Persian Gulf region to support the Afghan government and to conduct operations on Afghan soil.

After the official statements regarding the Coalition Forces’ retreat and the begging of the redeployment, the Taliban insurgent groups have intensified armed operations against Afghan security forces and international forces[6]. This brings up a question. Taking into consideration the beginning of the withdrawal, which was established after official talks, nobody needs to unilaterally amplify the turmoil.  Another fact that must be taken into consideration is that US government also recognized the Taliban Movement by negotiating with them, along the Afghan government. Why do Taliban need more military actions? The answer is obvious: to show they are the most powerful group in Afghanistan, to demonstrate that they won the war and to intimidate any internal adversary, in order to seize the power.

What will it happen after the complete withdrawal of Coalition Forces? How long will the Afghan government resist? Considering the latest information, the actual government and its security forces will collapse in less than three months after the last international unit leaves the country (in my estimation).

What will it happen after the actual government fails? Will the Taliban control the whole Afghan territory? Will a civil war start? Will the international terrorist organizations establish safe-heavens there? It is difficult to forecast. There will be a security vacuum, in one way or another. Will someone interfere there? I have figured out something interesting: the People Republic of China’s ambassador in Afghanistan said that the Chinese companies will be encouraged to take part in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and the both countries will collaborate to build One Belt and One Road. However, China provides humanitarian aid in Afghanistan[7]. This brings up another question: which government will collaborate China with? Will Chinese leaders support the actual government to resist the Taliban or they refer to a new government, consisting of Taliban Movement’ members? In my opinion, China is considering a Taliban government or a government composed of different political groups’ representatives, but dominated by Taliban.

There is an important aspect regarding Afghanistan, no matter the US withdrawal and internal unrest: drugs. Opium poppy cultivation and drug production have a long history in Afghanistan. Opium is the raw material for heroine production. Opium poppy cultivation and drug production also substantially fund different groups which have activated throughout Afghanistan. The group Mudjahedeen, which fought against Soviet Army, received funds from such activities. During that period, the drugs production in Afghanistan significantly increased. From 1984 to 1985, Afghan opium production was estimated to more than double, from 140 to 400 tons, and in 1986, doubled again. After 1990, the opium production gradually increased. In 1996, the Taliban gained control of most of Afghanistan. Opium production soared under Taliban rule, nearly doubling between 1996 and 1999, from 2,248 to 4,565 tons. By 1999, Afghanistan became the world’s largest supplier of illicit opium. In 2000, Taliban forebode the opium production and this fact caused 75 percent drop in the global supply of heroin. After 2001, opium production rose to unprecedented levels, (9,000 tons in 2017), while 328,000 de hectares are used for cultivation, involving 590,000 persons, despite a huge amount of money spent by USA to stem this phenomenon. From 2002 through 2017, the U.S. government allocated approximately $8.62 billion for counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Drugs traffic is an important source of money income for Taliban. For instance, in 2016, drug trade in Helmand Province provided about 60 percent of the Taliban’s funding.[8]

It is less probable for Taliban to give up or to decrease the opium poppy cultivation and drug production after the withdrawal of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan. On contrary, by taking advantage of their freedom of action, most probably they will increase cultivation and production, in order to obtain more money. The results are quite foreseeable: new international traffic networks, supplementary funds for terrorist activities in more states and the generation of new crises. The consequences are not foreseeable.



[1] Article Afghanistan Peace Talks Since 2018: A Timeline, International Crisis Group Internet page, 11 August 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-between-february-2018-and-august-2020-timeline.

[2] Article US, NATO Troops to Withdraw from Afghanistan by 9/11, US Official Says, 13 April 2021, on-line publication Defense One, on Internet at https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/04/us-nato-troops-withdraw-afghanistan-911-us-official-says/173326/ .

[3] Article Today's D Brief: Afghan withdrawal update; Taliban reax; Escalation in Taiwan, Yemen; SOF under the microscope; And a bit more, 26 March 2021, on-line publication Defense One, on Internet at https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/03/the-d-brief-march-26-2021/172949/.

[4] Article US, NATO Troops to Withdraw from Afghanistan by 9/11, US Official Says, 13 April 2021, on-line publication Government Executive, on Internet at https://www.govexec.com/defense/2021/04/us-nato-troops-withdraw-afghanistan-911-us-official-says/173329/.

[5] Article Pakistanul nu va accepta trupe americane pe teritoriul său după retragerea acestora din Afganistan, 11 May 2021, on-line publication Romanian Defense, on Internet at https://www.defenseromania.ro/pakistanul-nu-va-accepta-trupe-americane-pe-teritoriul-sau-dupa-retragerea-acestora-din-afganistan_610389.html.

[6] Article Today's D Brief: Austin's big idea; Fighting increases in Afghanistan; Army budget ‘risk’; China’s free-falling rocket; And a bit more, 06 May 2021, on-line publication Defense One, on Internet at https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/05/the-d-brief-may-06-2021/173850/; see also the article Talibanii nu vor să mai meargă la negocierile din Turcia. SUA se află într-un moment foarte dificil în Afganistan, 12 April 2021,  on-line publication Romanian Defense, on Internet at https://www.defenseromania.ro/talibanii-nu-vor-sa-mai-mearga-la-negocierile-din-turcia-sua-se-afla-intr-un-moment-foarte-dificil-in-afganistan_609721.html.

[7] Article China Encourages Companies to Invest in Afghanistan: Envoy, 25 April 2021, on-line publication Tolo News, on Internet at https://tolonews.com/business-171718.

 

[8] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 2530 Crystal Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202, June 2018, on Internet at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-18-52-LL.pdf.

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