Skip to main content

 


DRONES

PART I – EVOLUTION

Article published on 24 Jul 2021


         Drones have drawn the attention of large audience and also of military analysts, due to amazing results gained during their usage in the recent armed conflicts conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh (September-October 2020) and Libya (ongoing). According to some statements, the drones represent a key-factor for achieving success on the battlefield. The results of military operations which involved Bayraktar TB2 drones have confirmed this.[1] One can clearly assess that the possession of enough Bayraktar TB2 drones is a guarantee of victory, if the adversary does not have the same type of drone or something similar, also in an adequate quantity. I am trying to demonstrate that it is not true.

          Drones’ usage on the battlefield is not new. On contrary, they have been used for more than 40 years. During Vietnam War, US forces performed thousands of air reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and China by using drones[2]. The drones presented a huge advantage: the risk of losing pilots and expensive air assets during intelligence gathering operations disappeared.  

Israeli armed forces succeeded to employ more efficiently the drones during armed conflicts, due to the operational necessities. In the period between two Israeli – Arab wars (1967 – 1973), because of fighters’ losses, downed by anti-aircraft missiles made in USSR during air incursions for testing Egyptian defense, Israeli forces started to use drones for intelligence purposes. In 1971, first specialized unit was established in Israel, using unmanned air vehicles propelled by reaction engines, BQM-34 Firebee (maximum speed: 1,140 kph; ceiling – 18,300 meters; maximum range – 960 km[3]. During the South Lebanon campaign, in 1982, Israeli Air Force sent many drones to Syrian air defense positions, in order to deceive the operators, who launched missiles. Some of the drones were downed, but, in this way, Israeli pilots precisely identified the air defense positions and successfully engaged them.[4]

The Soviet aviation industry also obtained good results. After 1960, intensive research started in the field of drones’ development in USSR. In 1963, the first flight of jet drone Tu-123 Yastreb took place. Its capabilities were amazing: maximum speed – 2,700 kph; ceiling – 23,000 meters; maximum range – 3,580 km[5].

During the most of the conflicts after 1970, then drones have been used more or less. The range of operations has widened.  The drones have incorporated technologies which allowed them to perform not only deception and intelligence collection operations, but also signal intelligence, electronic warfare and even tactical support operations, by launching bombs and air-to-ground missiles. Suicide drones have also been made. However, most of the drones have been used for intelligence missions, employing photo and video devices. The advanced technologies in the field of sensors have increased the drones’ capabilities in the intelligence operations. The asymmetric conflicts, which require the necessity to survey large areas for a long period, made the armed forces to give up jet drones and to develop new types, propelled by heat engines, in order to increase the endurance. The drone RQ-1 Predator, used by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to collect information and engage ground targets, is a good example. Its first flight took place in 1994. This UAS has synthetic aperture radar, video cameras and a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) which allow surveillance imagery to be distributed in real-time both to the front line soldier and to the operational commanders, or worldwide in real-time via satellite communication links. Main capabilities:

-       Maximum range: 740 km;

-       Maximum speed: 450 kph;

-       Ceiling: 15,000 meters;

-       Endurance: 30 hours.[6]

Nowadays, there is a wide range of drones on the world weapons market. The diversity regards their capabilities, seize, missions and price. There are small drones, designed for small units’ tactical support, but there are also large drones, designed for strategic operations. As examples, I have chosen five types of drones, from the most representative ones:

 

1. Bayraktar TB2

  - Made in Turkey;

  - Entered production in 2014;

  - Mission: IMINT[7] and Tactical Support;

  - Automatic system for take-off, navigation, combat and landing;

  - Real Time Imagery Transmission System;

  - Payload Weapons: 4 Laser guided smart munitions.

    Main capabilities:

Ø Maximum speed: 240 kph;

Ø Operational Altitude: 5,500 m;

Ø Ceiling: 8,300 m;

Ø Maximum range: 300 km;

Ø Payload Capacity: 150 kg;

Ø Endurance: 27 hours.[8]

Price: 5 million USD[9].

 

2. MQ-9 Reaper

  - Made in USA;

  - Entered service in 2007;

  - Mission: IMINT; SIGINT[10]; Tactical Support; Electronic Warfare; Anti-Submarine Combat (depending on configuration);

  - Automatic system for take-off, navigation, combat and landing;

  - Real Time Imagery Transmission System;

  - Payload Weapons: Laser guided bombs and air to surface missiles.

    Main capabilities:

Ø Maximum speed: 450 kph;

Ø Ceiling: 15,240 m;

Ø Payload Capacity: 1,360 kg;

Ø Endurance: 27 hours[11].

Price: approximately 17 million USD[12].

 

3. Suhoi S-70 Ohotnik-B (Hunter)

  - Made in Russian Federation;

  - Will enter production: probably 2024; First flight: 2019;

  - Mission: IMINT; Tactical Support;

  - Cannot be detected by RADAR (stealth);

  - Payload Weapons: Laser guided bombs and air to surface missiles.

    Main capabilities:

Ø Maximum speed: 1,400 kph;

Ø Payload Capacity: 2,800 kg;

Ø Maximum range: 5,000 km[13].

Price: approximately 14 million USD[14].

 

4. Wing Loong II

  - Made in People’s Republic of China;

  - Presented for the first time to the public in 2016;

  - Mission: IMINT; Tactical Support;

  - Real Time Imagery Transmission System;

  - Payload Weapons: Laser guided bombs and air to surface missiles.

    Main capabilities:

Ø Maximum speed: 370 kph;

Ø Ceiling: 9,900 m;

Ø Payload Capacity: 480 kg;

Ø Endurance: 32 hours;

Ø Maximum range: 1,500 km[15].

Price: approximately 1-2 million USD[16].

 

5. Orion

  - Made in Russian Federation;

  - First time in combat: in 2018 (Syria);

  - Mission: IMINT; Tactical Support;

  - Real Time Imagery Transmission System;

  - Payload Weapons: Laser guided bombs and air to surface missiles.

Main capabilities:

Ø Cruise speed: 120 kph (maximum speed - probably 225 kph);

Ø Ceiling: 7,500 m;

Ø Payload Capacity: 250 kg;

Ø Endurance: 24 hours.[17]

Price: unknown.


Bayraktar TB2

MQ-9 Reaper

Suhoi S-70 Ohotnik-B (Hunter)

Wing Loong II

Orion



[1] Article The Drone Defense Dilemma: How Unmanned Aircraft Are Redrawing Battle Lines, on-line publication Defense News, 14 February 2021, on Internet at https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/02/15/the-drone-defense-dilemma-how-unmanned-aircraft-are-redrawing-battle-lines/.

[2] John F. Kreis, article Unmanned Aircrafts in Israeli Army Operations,  Air Power History publication, Winter 1990, on Internet at https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271146.

[3] Combat Air Museum, Ryan Firebee BQM-34A "Drone" at Combat Air Museum website, https://www.combatairmuseum.org/aircraft/ryanbqm34afirebee.html.

[4] Article Damascus Claims 2 Israeli Drones, The New York Times magazine, 7 December 1983, on Internet at https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/07/world/damascus-claims-2-israeli-drones.html.

[5] Article ОПУБЛИКОВАНО МАЛОИЗВЕСТНОЕ ФОТО БЕСПИЛОТНОГО СОВЕТСКОГО "ЯСТРЕБА", on-line publication РОССИЙСКАЯ ГАЗЕТА, on Internet at https://rg.ru/2020/05/13/opublikovano-maloizvestnoe-foto-bespilotnogo-sovetskogo-iastreba.html.

[6] Article Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV, on-line publication  Air Force Technology, on Internet at https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/.

[7] Imager Intelligence.

[8] Baykar website, Bayraktar TB2 page, on Internet at https://baykardefence.com/uav-15.html.

[9] On-line publication Military-Today.com, Bayraktar TB2 page, on Internet at http://www.military-today.com/aircraft/bayraktar_tb2.htm.

[10] Signal Intelligence.

[11] General Atomics Aeronautical website, MQ-9 Reaper page, on Internet at https://www.ga-asi.com/remotely-piloted-aircraft/mq-9a; article Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV, on-line publication  Air Force Technology, on Internet at https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/.

[12] Article Congress Resurrects MQ-9 Reaper Program, Adding 16 Drones for the Air Force, on-line publication Defense News, on Internet at https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/12/22/congress-resurrected-the-mq-9-reaper-program-adding-16-drones-for-the-air-force/.

[13] Article ОХОТА КРЕПКАЯ. РОССИЯ СОЗДАЕТ САМЫЙ ТЯЖЕЛЫЙ УДАРНЫЙ БЕСПИЛОТНИК. ЧТО О НЕМ ИЗВЕСТНО?, on-line publication Lenta.ru, on Internet at https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/02/13/okhotnik/.

[14] Article «ОХОТНИК» НА МИЛЛИАРД: СТАЛА ИЗВЕСТНА ЦЕНА САМОГО МОЩНОГО ДРОНА РОССИИ, on-line publication  ИЗВЕСТНЯ, on Internet at https://iz.ru/1019351/anton-lavrov-bogdan-stepovoi/okhotnik-na-milliard-stala-izvestna-tcena-samogo-moshchnogo-drona-rossii.

 [15] Article Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance China, on-line publication  Army Recognition, on Internet at https://www.armyrecognition.com/china_chinese_unmanned_aerial_ground_systems_uk/wing_loong_ii_2_uav_male_armed_drone_data_pictures_video_11906174.html.

[16] Article Strike-Capable Wing Loong II Drone Enters Service With China’s PLAAF, on-line publication The Diplomat, on Internet at https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/strike-capable-wing-loong-ii-drone-enters-service-with-chinas-plaaf/.

[17] Article Details Behind Russia’s First Ever Strike Drone ‘Orion’, on-line publication Russia Beyond, on Internet at https://www.rbth.com/science-and-tech/333518-details-behind-russias-first-ever-striking-drone.


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

  US INTERVENTION IN IRAN – A STRATEGIC TRAP?            I will begin with a straightforward question: what is the current state of affairs in Venezuela? Following the US-Israeli intervention in Iran, this Latin American nation has slipped off the geopolitical radar. Nonetheless, it remains a subject of interest .           Subsequent to the apprehension of the Venezuelan president on the night of January 2-3, 2026, by US special forces during a domestic military incursion, the United States has sustained its naval presence in the region to exert military pressure on the Venezuelan administration [1] . Despite Washington's recognition of the interim government, the continued deployment of significant military assets suggests that the primary objectives remain unfulfilled. Effectively, the state continues to be led by members of the previous regime. It is possible that they are now undergoing a strategic shif...
IRAN, US, THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ. HOW WILL IT END?          On an online forum where geopolitics and military analysis are debated ( Moon of Alabama ), I read a comment that seemed very convincing to me. I will rephrase it slightly, but keep the essence: 'Iran does not need a nuclear weapon. It already has one: the Strait of Hormuz.' Perfectly true. Control of the strait has proven to be a powerful weapon in the hands of the Iranian leadership . The negotiations, or rather the attempts at negotiations between the US and Iran, have been ongoing since April 11. With no result. The US is trying to negotiate from a position of strength, but it lacks the necessary tools of force. Iran is also negotiating from a position of strength, but it has the strong argument: the nuclear weapon – the Strait of Hormuz. Of course, no agreement will be reached. The US cannot afford to give in, and Iran can afford to maintain the current status quo. The situation is like a fisherman w...
  US INTERVENTION IN IRAN – HOW WILL IT END?           There is a heated debate in the media regarding how the current military conflict in the Gulf will end. It is naturally difficult to predict, as the US is at a deadlock. It has failed to achieve its objective (regime change in Iran); on the contrary, Iran's military retaliation has caused it major problems. The facts are well-known, so there is no need for further detail .           The US leadership has just announced a two-week suspension of military actions against Iran [1] . The real underlying motive is difficult to guess. Regardless, this move does not resolve the conflict; it merely provides a pause .           Let us try to identify and analyze the options for ending the hostilities. We proceed from the premise that it does not depend solely on the US-Israel camp, but also on Iran .     ...