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DRONES

PART II – PRESENT ȘI TRENDS

Article published on 28 Nov 2021


            Most of the people know about the German submarines operations during the first part of the World War II. The TV documentaries concerning this are very interesting. The Allied losses in Atlantic were huge. The details of the confrontations between German U-boats and Allied Navies are well-known. Nevertheless, beginning with 1943, the efficiency of the U-boats operations dramatically diminished. In 1944, their losses were high: January – 14 submarines (and 8 Allied ships sunk); February: 15 submarines (and 4 Allied ships sunk); March: 17 submarines (11 Allied ships sunk)[1]. This trend continued next months. Four years before, in March 1940, 43 Allied ships and 1 U-boat had been sunk[2]. The German submarines losses started to increase in 1943. In 1945, this German Navy branch’ contribution to overall operations was insignificant. Most important: German U-boats could not stop Allied invasions in Europe, in 1943 (Sicily) and 1944 (Normandy). Why? Because, in 1942, the Allies started to develop innovative technologies for Navy, in order to better combat submarines: modern sonar systems, radars, long range aircrafts, SIGINT equipment and so on.

          It is less known that the Germans used submarines also in the World War I and their operations dramatically affected the Allies. During this war, 6,394 Allied ships were sunk, while the German Navy lost 229 submarines[3].

As a conclusion: although the threat of U-boats was known, from the First World War, no project to combat them was taken into consideration between the two World Wars, even when it was clear that the a new war against Germany was unavoidable. German submarines took by surprise Royal Navy, in the autumn of 1939. Basically, Germans enjoyed freedom of movement because the Allies ignored the threat posed by U-boats. The price was high.

In 2020, Turkish producers enjoyed the lack of drone combating equipment. The usage of drone Bayraktar TB2 offered the freedom of movement for the belligerents who owned it in Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, due to the lack of anti-drone defense equipment, lack of tactics for drones combat and the surprise.  The spectacular success made the journalists and military analysts to promote this drone in media as an amazing military product. General assessment: ”If you have Bayraktar, you win!”. Now, the drones Bayraktar enjoy great admiration. It seems that the modern Russian air combat defense systems (missiles and cannons) are helpless when fighting with the dreaded Turkish drone[4].

The drones have been used in armed conflicts for more than 40 years. The danger posed by them has been quite clear, especially during the Arab-Israeli wars.  But the surprise produced in 2020. Are there not any weapons to combat them?

The problem of combating drones includes two aspects. First one: what can one do against the attacking swarms of small, cheap drones? Wasting expensive air defense missiles is not a good choice. Electronic warfare systems, which can interrupt the link between the control center and the drones, would be a response. But, what is happening if the drones have AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems incorporated, which make them independent from the control center? The second aspect: big drones, like Bayraktar TB2. These can launch air-sol missiles from 10 kilometers[5] and operate independently, not connected to the ground equipment. This kind of drones cannot swarm, because they are too big and too expensive, but they have more capabilities in engaging targets.  

During the air campaign conducted by NATO against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (24 March – 10 June 1999), Yugoslavian air defense downed 15 drones, while the UAVs, in whole, performed 496 missions[6]. A drone RQ-1 Predator[7] was among the downed ones.

At the beginning of January 2018, unknown small drones swarmed the Russian Airspace Forces in Syria. The attack failed, because 7 drones were downed by the air defense systems and 6 drones were brought down by using electronic countermeasures.[8] Lately, other drones tried to swarm the base, but all attacks failed[9].

Of course, some anti-drones technologies have started to develop:

1. The anti-drones drone. This is a Small UAV - sUAV named MIDAS (Modular Intercept Drone Avionics Set), developed by Boeing, which has the following features:

-       Autonomous from launch through landing;

-       Cued by radar​; optical sensor guides to target​;

-       Precise aiming independent of flight direction;

-       Low system cost and low cost per kill​;

-      Ground radar interoperability and future proof AI algorithms.[10]

When this drone gets close enough to the threat, the air gun fires a round consisting of two copper discs attached by a 12-inch Kevlar string. The gun shoots in six-round bursts at a target at a high velocity with the intent to foul up the rotor blades of the threat system. This drone was tested in September 2020.[11]

          A helicopter-drone designed to combat drones is also developed in Russian Federation. It can track down small and low-speed enemy drones at low and extremely low altitudes[12].

          2. The improvement of air defense missiles systems in order to combat swarm drones. In this respect, Russian company Almaz-Antey has adapted the Tor missiles system to this purpose. The system can combat the swarm drones by launching cheap missiles.  The basic version of the system has 16 missiles, whose effective range is 12 kilometers, while the altitude is 10 kilometers.[13] 

          3. Radar adapted to detect sUAVs. In this respect, Thales company developed the radar system Ground Observer 20 Multi-Mission (GO20 MM), which is able to identify small drones which fly at extremely low altitudes and to classify them according to the level of threat.[14]

          4. Anti-drone laser device. These are developed for US Air Force and are mounted on Polaris vehicles. The system can combat the drones which weigh maximum 25 kilograms and fly at a speed of 180 kilometers/hour, up to 1,000 meters.[15]

          5. Anti-aircraft cannon with high rate of fire. In this respect, Rheinmetall Company developed the cannon Skynex Air Defense, mounted on a vehicle. It is very efficient in combating the swarming drones, due to the high rate of fire, which is 1,000 rounds/minute. The range is 4,000 meters. The fire is controlled by radar, which can automatically look and detect the targets.[16]

          6. Small weapons which use electromagnetic impulse. These emit a pulse that damages or destroys the electronic systems of the drones. Some armed forces are using them (for instance, Republic of Belarus), but the details (range, weight and so on) are not published.[17]

          I might add the heavy anti-aircraft cannons at all above mentioned. They are efficient in combating the big drones, which fly at high altitudes. The armed forces throughout the world gave up these weapons, because are considered obsolete, especially after they developed air defense missiles, which are able to cover huge areas and to accurately combat air assets, at high altitude. The costs generated by the cannons’ usage were merely too high, taking into consideration their efficiency. But, nowadays, when the air defense missiles are more expensive than the most of the drones, or, in some cases, as expensive as them, these cannons might be useful and advantageous. In this respect, I can present two examples:

          1. Anti-aircraft cannon KS-19 100 mm. It was introduced in 1949. Main specifications:

-       Maximum tactical anti-aircraft range: 11,000 meters;

-       Maximum horizontally range: 16,500 meters;

-       Weight: 9,400 kilograms;

-       Weight of the projectile: 30.2 kilograms;

-       Rate of fire: 15 rounds/minute;

-       Crew: 8.[18]

2. Anti-aircraft cannon KS-30 130 mm. It was introduced in 1949. Main specifications:

-       Maximum tactical anti-aircraft range: 19,000 meters;

-       Maximum horizontally range: 27,000 meters;

-       Weight: 23,500 kilograms;

-       Weight of the projectile: 33 kilograms;

-       Rate of fire: 12 rounds/minute;

-       Crew: 10.[19]

The Bayraktar TB2, which flies at a speed of 240 kilometers/hour, up to 8,300 meters, would be easy targets for the all above presented cannons, if the drone shows up in their area of operations. A problem for the air defense subunit might be the drones’ detection. Taking into consideration the technical data of the drone (length – 6.5 meters, wingspan – 12 meters), it is difficult for the radar operator to detect it. The surface of aircraft which reflect electromagnetic waves is relatively small and this diminishes the probability of the radar detection. But this does not make the drone invisible. It is just less detectable. However, even the radar operator is not sure about the drone’s presence in the area, the anti-aircraft artillery rounds are very cheap, by comparing with an air defense missile, and the projectiles do not need control and cannot be stopped by counter measures. They are also set to explode at predetermined attitude. In this way, the anti-aircraft artillery subunit creates a kill box that the drones cannot cross. The only drones which are able to infill in the enemy space air are the undetectable ones, like Suhoi S-70 Ohotnik-B.

As a conclusion, the drones are dreaded weapons now because there are not enough technologies and means to combat them. At the moment, there are just few systems specially designed for drones’ combating and some of them are still being tested. After the armed forces will purchase and will have enough technologies and means to combat drones, their importance on the battlefield will get low. They will become usual weapons and no more.


Drones brought down by Russian EW in Syria

MIDAS (Modular Intercept Drone Avionics Set)

Tor missiles system

Ground Observer 20 Multi-Mission


Polaris


Skynet Air Defense


Small weapon which uses electromagnetic impulse



[1] Article German U-Boats at War, Part 5 of 6, on-line publication Naval History, on Internet at https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats5.htm.

[2] Article German U-Boats at War, Part 1 of 6, on-line publication Naval History, on Internet at https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsUboats5.htm.

[3] Article Submarines and Submarine Warfare, on-line publication International Encyclopedia of the First World War, on Internet at https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/submarines_and_submarine_warfare.

[4] Article Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAV Changed the Balance of Forces in Libya and Syria, on-line publication BUGARIANMILITARY.COM, July 2020, on Internet at https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2020/07/15/turkish-bayraktar-tb2-uav-changed-the-balance-of-forces-in-libya-and-syria/.

[5] Article The Drone Defense Dilemma: How Unmanned Aircraft Are Redrawing Battle Lines, on-line publication Defense News, 14 February 2021, on Internet at https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/02/15/the-drone-defense-dilemma-how-unmanned-aircraft-are-redrawing-battle-lines/.

[6] Turning Point: Operation Allied Force and the Allure of Air Power, Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, page 108,  on Internet at http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/June/Gregory%20MMAS%20Final%20Version%2020%20May.pdf.

[7] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., The Effectiveness of the NATO Tactical Air and Missile Campaign Against Serbian Air and Ground Forces in Kosovo, August 2000, page 36.

[8] Article Who Is Attacking Russia’s Bases in Syria? A New Mystery Emerges in the War, on-line publication The Washington Post, 10 January 2018, on Internet at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/who-is-attacking-russias-main-base-in-syria-a-new-mystery-emerges-in-the-war/2018/01/09/4fdaea70-f48d-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html.

[9] Article Did US Drones Swarm a Russian Base? Probably Not, But That Capability Isn’t Far Off, on-line publication Military Times, 29 October 2018, on Internet at https://www.militarytimes.com/news/2018/10/29/did-us-drones-swarm-a-russian-base-probably-not-but-that-capability-isnt-far-off/.

[10] Aurora Flight Sciences Web Page, Boeing Company, COUNTER-UAS (CUAS), at https://www.aurora.aero/counter-uas-cuas/.

[11] Article Three Industry Teams Demonstrate Capability to Destroy Small Drones at Yuma, on-line publication Defense News, 16 April 2021, on Internet at https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/04/16/three-industry-teams-demonstrate-capability-to-take-out-small-drone-threats-at-yuma/.

[12] Article Russia is Developing A Helicopter Drone to Destroy Other Drones, on-line publication  Defense News, 17 December 2020, on Internet at https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2020/12/17/russia-is-developing-a-helicopter-drone-to-destroy-other-drones/.

[13] Article Rusia a adaptat complexul de rachete antiaeriene Tor pentru lupta împotriva roiurilor de drone, on-line publication Romanian Defense, 4 September 2021, on Internet at https://www.defenseromania.ro/rusia-a-adaptat-complexul-de-rachete-antiaeriene-tor-pentru-lupta-impotriva-roiurilor-de-drone_612690.html.

[14] Article Thales a prezentat radarul Ground Observer 20 Multi-Mission, cea mai nouă tehnologie pentru detectarea UAV-urilor, on-line publication Romanian Defense, 11 October 2021, on Internet at https://www.defenseromania.ro/thales-a-prezentat-radarul-ground-observer-20-multi-mission-cea-mai-noua-tehnologie-pentru-detectarea-uav-urilor_613257.html.

[15] Article ЛАЗЕР ПРОТИВ ДРОНОВ И «БОЕВЫЕ МИКРОВОЛНОВКИ» ИСПЫТАЮТ НА ПРАКТИКЕ, on-line publication НОВОСТИ.ВПК, on Internet at https://vpk.name/news/392581_lazer_protiv_dronov_i_boevye_mikrovolnovki_ispytayut_na_praktike.html.

[16] Article Faceţi cunoştinţă cu sistemul de apărare aeriană Skynex, dezvoltat de compania germană Rheinmetall, on-line publication  Romanian Defense, 12 November 2021, on Internet at https://www.defenseromania.ro/faceti-cunostinta-cu-sistemul-de-aparare-aeriana-skynex-dezvoltat-de-compania-germana-rheinmetall_613683.html.

[17] Article БЕЛАРУСЬ ВООРУЖАЕТСЯ ПРОТИВ ДРОНОВ, on-line publication НОВОСТИ.ВПК, on Internet at https://vpk.name/news/281740_belarus_vooruzhaetsya_protiv_dronov.html.

[18] Article ЗЕНИТНЫЙ АРТИЛЛЕРИЙСКИЙ КОМПЛЕКС КС-19, on-line publication САЙТ РОССИЙСКОЙ ВОЕННОЙ ТЕХНИКИ, on Internet at http://www.rusarmy.com/pvo/pvo_vsk/zak_ks-19.html.

[19] Article СОВЕТСКОЕ 130-МИЛЛИМЕТРОВОЕ ЗЕНИТНОЕ ОРУДИЕ КС-30 (1948 г.), on-line publication ВОЕННОЕ ОБОЗРЕНИЕ, on Internet at https://topwar.ru/23277-sovetskoe-130-millimetrovoe-zenitnoe-orudie-ks-30-1948-g.html.


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