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FALKLAND WAR. PART ONE – OPERATIONS

 

The military conflict which took place in Falkland Islands (also known as Malvine) began on 2 April 1982 (the day when Argentinean forces invaded the islands) and ended on 14 June 1982 (the day when the city Port Stanley was liberated and Argentinean forces capitulated). The belligerents were Argentine and United Kingdom. In short, the official reason for war is historical: Argentinean government pretended that the islands belonged to Argentine beginning with 1765, after gaining the national independence. The same year, UK took the control of the islands, after a short military conflict between the two states[1].

According to other sources, due to the great internal problems, the military junta that was governing Argentine preferred to occupy the Falkland Islands, hoping to a victory in order to compensate the inefficiency of domestic economic policies[2]. No matter if we take into consideration the historical and moral reasons, one should know that the military regime was facing great economic difficulties. This is proved by the following facts:

-       The inflation rate exceeded 100% in 1982;

-       The government introduced tough austerity measures;

-       The government tried to distract public attention from the internal problems by making all possible to achieve international success, no matter in which field; for instance, during the 1978 World Football Cup, they intensely exploited the national team’s success in internal propaganda;

-       The act of cheapening national currency, in order to increase exports, caused the massive decrease of reserve currency (for instance, the reserves lost 308 million USD, during a single day)[3];

-       Massive riots caused by low living standard were stopped using force[4].

Falkland Islands are located on the South-Eastern Atlantic, at approximately 8,000 nautical miles from UK and approximately 400 nm from Argentine.

When the military conflict started, the belligerents had the following military assets available (for UK, we took into consideration just the assets deployed in the operations area and in the proximity areas)[5]:

Type of asset

Argentine

Great Britain

Nuclear propelled submarines

-

4

Diesel-electric submarines

4 (only 2 operational)

1

Aircrafts carriers

1

2

Assault ships

-

2

Cruisers

1

-

Destroyers

7

8

Frigates

3

15

Patrolling ships/Corvettes

15

3

Auxiliary Ships (cargos, tankers, maintenance and so on)

22

82

Multirole fighting planes

5 Super Etendard

60 Skyhawk

40 Mirage III/V

28 (Sea-Harrier – VTOL).

Close air support planes

60 Pucara

-

Helicopters

60[6]

150

Strategic bombers

-

2 – 4 Vulcan

Armored vehicles and support vehicles (landed)

1,100[7]

 

         

It is necessary to add that, during the campaign, other British warships and auxiliary ships were deployed in the operations area.

Troops landed: Argentine – approximately 13,000; UK – approximately 4,000.

Chronology of the main events during operations[8]:      

13 March 1982: 60 Argentine civilians land from an Argentinean civilian ship at Southern Georgia Islands (British islands, located at 800 nm South-East from Falkland), in an apparent economic conflict in Southern Atlantic, between Argentine and UK.

29 March: UK deploys a nuclear propelled submarine to Southern Atlantic.

2 April: Argentinean forces land in Falkland and engage the British garrison. After a few hours, British troops surrender.

3 April: Argentinean troops, transported by helicopters, land on Southern Georgia Islands. They engage a British Marines subunit which resist for a while, succeeded to down an Argentinean helicopter but, finally, surrender.

5 April: UK gathers a powerful Navy Task Force which immediately starts the deployment to South Atlantic.

12 April: British impose a 200 nm Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around Falkland. The exclusion zone was initially enforced by submarines.

22 April: British Special Forces conduct reconnaissance missions in Southern Georgia Islands. Two helicopters crashed due to the severe meteorological conditions.  

25 April: A British Navy Task Force performs assault operations in Southern Georgia Islands. An Argentinean submarine is damaged and captured. The Argentinean Forces surrender.

30 April: British submarines succeeded to impose a 200 nm Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around Falkland.

1 May: A Vulcan bomber, which took place from a British base located in Ascension Island (approximately 3,300 nm North-East of Falkland) bombs the airport located near Port Stanley and damages it. Argentinean fighters engage British ships near the islands, but no results.

2 May: Argentinean Navy deploys four Task Groups in the proximity of MEZ. A British nuclear propelled submarine attacks and sinks cruiser General Belgrano, the Argentinean Navy flag ship, outside the MEZ.

3 May: British helicopters damage an Argentinean patrolling ship.

4 May: A Vulcan bomber and British fighters engage land targets on Falkland. Argentinean Super Etendard fighters engage and damage the destroyer Sheffield, using an Exocet anti-ship missile. Sheffield will sink after six days.

7 May: UK warns that any Argentine warships or military aircraft over 12 nm from Argentina's coast would be treated as hostile.

9 May: two British fighters attack and sink an Argentinean intelligence-collection vessel.

11 May: A British frigate sinks an Argentinean naval cargo ship near Falkland.

12 May: 12 Argentinean A-4 perform attacks against two British destroyers. Results: a destroyer damaged, three planes downed.

14 May: British warships, coordinated by landed Special Forces teams, destroy 11 Argentinean close air support planes, an ammunition store and one radar.

21 May: British troops land at four separate points in the North-Western area of the main Eastern island of Falkland (Eastern Falkland). Argentinean warplanes engage ships and landed units in several waves. A British frigate is sunk; other two are hit by bombs which fail to explode. Two transportation ships are severely damaged. 15 Argentinean warplanes are downed.

22 May: Landed British troops expand and consolidate their positions inside the island.

23 May: Argentinean warplanes engage British ships. A frigate is damaged (she will sink later) and seven planes are downed.

24 May: Argentinean warplanes continue to attack British ships in several waves. Eight planes are downed and two auxiliary ships are damaged.

25 May: More Argentinean air attacks against British Navy. A destroyer is sunk by bombs and a transportation ship is sunk by an Exocet missile. Seven planes are downed.

27 May: British troops advance to Port Stanley. New attacks of Argentinean warplanes take place against British ships, but no results. Two Argentinean planes are downed.

28 May: British airborne subunits gain control of key-points on Eastern island, after 12 hours of fighting.

29 May: Argentinean warplanes attack British landed troops but cause few losses. 30 May: Argentinean warplanes attack British ships. Three planes are downed.

7 June: British Special Force teams take key-points near Port Stanley.

8 June: Argentinean warplanes attack British ships. A transportation ship is sunk and other three are damaged; a frigate is damaged. For planes are downed.

12 iunie: A British destroyer is damaged by land-based Exocet missile.

13 iunie: British troops launch major offensive operations against Argentine positions.

14 iunie: British troops enter Port Stanley. All Argentine troops surrender. End of operations.

Losses:

a. Personnel:

    - Argentine: 655 dead, 1,300 wounded, 11,848 prisoners of war[9];

    - United Kingdom: 253 dead, 775 wounded[10].

b. Assets[11]:

    - Argentine:

Ø Ships sunk: 1 cruiser, 1 patrolling ship, 4 auxiliary ships;

Ø Ships damaged: 1 corvette, 1 patrolling ship;

Ø 1 submarine damaged and captured;

Ø Air assets downed or crashed: 60 warplanes, 43 helicopters (based on estimation);

Ø Armored vehicles and support vehicles: 1,100 (captured or destroyed).

    - United Kingdom:

Ø Ships sunk: 2 destroyers, 2 frigates, 1 assault ship, 2 auxilliary ships;

Ø Ships damaged: 2 destroyers, 14 frigates, 2 assault ships, 7 auxilliary ships;

Ø Air assets downed or crashed: 10 multirole fighting planes, 29 helicopters.



[1] Katelyn Tietzen, After Thirty Years: The Falklands War of 1982, Clemson University, 2014, p. 1.

[2] Peter Willetts, Filipe Noguera, Prospects for a Settlement of the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution George Mason University, March 1992, p. 7.

[3] Lucas Abeledo Vilarino, articolul Falklands War, History Society, The University of Exeter, online at https://thehistorianjournal.wordpress.com/2016/12/12/britain-versus-the-south-atlantic-the-causes-of-the-falklandsmalvinas-war/, accessed on 25 April 2017.

[4] Lt. Jason McClure, article The Falklands War: Causes and Lessons, Strategic Insights magazine, Volume III, Issue 11 (November 2004), Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

[5] Department of the Navy, EET C- Washington, D.C. 20350, Lessons of the Falklands - Summary Report, February 1983, Appendix B.

[6] Based on my personal observation: both belligerents, especially Argentine, tried to minimize the published losses;  that is why the figures from the table are approximate; depending on the source, they are bigger or smaller.

[7] Article The Falklands ConflictHistory and Predictions for the Future, Historia i Polityka magazine, nr. 24 (31)/2018, p. 14.

[8] Department of the Navy, EET C- Washington, D.C. 20350, Lessons of the Falklands - Summary Report, February 1983, pp. 15-21.

[9] Martin Middlebrook, Argentine Fight for the Falklands, Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009, pp. 282-284.

[10] Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. 772-774.

[11] Department of the Navy, EET C- Washington, D.C. 20350, Lessons of the Falklands - Summary Report, February 1983, Appendix B.






Sorce: https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-the-Falkland-Islands


                                      Source: http://www.scottportelli.com/falkland-islands-dec-2019/



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