FALKLAND WAR. PART III – CONTINUATION

article published on 24 April 2020

 

          The short military in 1982 demonstrated that Argentine did not have any chance to take Falkland Islands. The British military response, taking advantage of the vulnerabilities of the Argentinean Forces, was so effective that it discouraged any such intention for a long period of time. In addition, this was a warning for other states who virtually intended to do the same. Nevertheless, the object of a military analysis process is a possible repeat of the conflict, no matter how many chances would be.

          On 6 February 2013, Héctor Timerman, the Argentinean Foreign Minister, during a visit in London, made a quite controversial statement regarding Falkland. He stated that that Argentina would take the control of the remote South Atlantic islands within 20 years due to the decline of the British Empire, and Falkland’s inhabitants are Argentinean citizens[1]. Because it was about an official person, who was able to speak behalf on Argentine, and not about a journalist, we can infer that the Argentinean leadership did not give up the idea to take Falkland. A foreign minister’s statement is very important, because, in a state, a limited number of officials can make statements concerning the international politics behalf on their country, and he is one of them. And, if such an official exceeds his mandate or he makes statements that are against national politics, the state leadership demotes him immediately and offers excuses. But, in the case of Héctor Timerman’s statements in London, no Argentinean official took any position. This is a conclusive example, and it is not singular. One can find more other examples. It is important that the Argentinean leaders hope to take the islands. And, if Argentinean people did not accept this idea, they would not discuss it.

          The relationships between Unite Kingdom and Argentine regarding Falkland are much more complex, because there are also some economic aspects and the borders of economic exclusive zones are not clearly established. In 2009, Argentine requested at UN an extension of its economic exclusive zone, in fact an extension of the maritime territory in the South Atlantic by about 35%. The request was accepted by UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) in 2013, but it should be noted that the decision was a recommendation only and not binding. Nevertheless, this amplified the disputes between the two countries[2]. Another fact that has amplified the tensions is an oil-rich area near Falkland which the British companies intend to exclusively exploit[3]. It is significant to know that Argentine President called the British Prime Minister “arrogant”[4], following the dispute on the oil exploitation in the area.

          It is not important a further analysis of disputes on Falkland between the two states. It is important that the dispute exists and there are no solutions. A transfer of islands to Argentina using diplomatic ways is excluded. For sure UK will never do this and its activities in the area are relevant: a referendum held in islands for remaining under the sovereignty of Great Britain, in 2013[5] and the establishment of a military force in order to defend islands in case of an Argentinean aggression, consisting of approximately 1,200 PAX[6]. This is why the only way to take into consideration, by any military analysis, is the military action.

          Question: can Argentine, at the moment, choose the military solution in order to take Falkland? The answer is not. From the military point of view, Argentine is not able to conduct successful operations against British forces, supported by US forces. But, in the near future, would it be possible for Argentine to develop new strategies in order to approach a military option? I think so.

          Russian Federation involvement in Venezuela demonstrated its increasing capabilities to project its forces to almost any area in the world and to involve in the worldwide geopolitics. If we take this into consideration, anything is possible. Theoretically, we can consider the hypothesis of a military partnership between Russia and Argentine. It is difficult to assess if the two states are available for this, but one should consider that possibility, even if the probability cannot be determined. But it is the only real option for Argentine for succeeding to take Falkland.

          What would mean a military partnership between the two countries? It is simple: export of Russian military equipment to Argentine and military assistance necessary for its usage and for the adaptation of strategy and tactics, which would subsequently suffer changes. It would be about the acquisition of huge quantities of equipment and about at least two years for the military units using it to get accustomed and become operational. And this activity cannot be covered. They might hide it from the public, but not from the intelligence services.  

          For sure, the equipment acquisition will concern those categories necessary to win the battles against British Navy and Air Force. And, based on this, one can estimate the types, which can be categorized into two groups: for Air Force and for Navy.

          In the first group, one can nominate Diesel-electric submarines class Kilo (Type 877EKM), which use anti-ship missiles Novator 3M-54E and the anti-ship land based system Bastion (K-300P). The missile Novator 3M-54E has a range of 200 to 300 de kilometers, depending on the model[7]. Taking into consideration the distance between Argentinean seaside and Falkland Islands (approximately 400 nautical miles), the Argentineans can opt for the installation on air assets, which would significantly increase the range and would cover the islands and an area around them. The missile SS-N-26 Strobile, launched by system Bastion, has a range of 300 km[8]. In order to avoid the mistakes done in 1982, Argentine should have at least 6 submarines, at least 50 Novator missiles, at least 8 Bastion systems and at least 50 SS-N-26 Strobile missiles.

          In order to combat British submarines, Argentine should purchase anti-submarine helicopters Kamov Ka-28 (Helix-A). They have a range of 800 km and modern detection devices[9]. This type of helicopter would provide the anti-submarine protection when fighting one of the most powerful Navies in the world.   In the group of equipment for Air Force, one can nominate S-400 missiles systems and multirole fighters Suhoi Su-35S. The S-400 does not need any presentation, because it is the subject of many articles and studies nowadays. S-35S, which has a range of 2,400 nm[10] and can carry RVV-AE air-to-air missiles, could provide the air cover of Argentinean forces in Falkland area. The Argentinean Air Force would need at least 4 S-400 systems and at least 48 S-35S planes for achieving success.  

          The Argentinean forces would also need a modern electronic warfare system to be able to combat the British. This could be one of the Krasuha types, depending on the Russian Federation availability to export such a system.

          How Argentinean forces would perform a strategic operation in order to take the Falkland, if considering the above mentioned equipment? First of all, the modernization and transformation of Argentinean military by implementing new equipment cannot be covered. UK would immediately react, by deploying a powerful Navy Task Force in the area and infantry/marines units on islands, supported by modern anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles systems. British forces would also bring a wide range of sensors (SIGINT systems based on the ground, on air assets and on ships, radars, drones and so on). Argentine would no longer afford a surprise attack, like in 1982, when there were only 80 marines in the islands. An Intel report regarding an imminent attack would determine British to deploy new forces in the area.

          How could the Argentinean top brass approach this problem? There are two courses of action. First one: a direct assault on the islands. The second one: an interdiction on the islands, using military means, and subsequently operations against British forces.

          The first course of action would consist of the following steps:

          1. Air and naval assault on the islands;

          2. Islands full occupation;

3. Troops consolidation and preparation for defense operations, by conducting engineering activities, naval mines emplacement and installation of anti-ship systems and surface-to-air systems, in a short time;

4. Defense operations against British forces sent to liberate the islands.

          The first step would consist, initially, in air attacks against British warships and against a huge number of ground targets. An invasion would follow, conducted by an airborne brigade and a marines brigade, while special forces would perform reconnaissance actions and direct attacks against certain land based facilities. The success during this step depends on more factors: the neutralization of surface-to-air systems, the neutralization of anti-ship systems, the neutralization of electronic intelligence systems, the efficiency of attacks against the warships and so on. The general success can be achieved only cumulating the success of each operation. The estimated losses would be high, in terms of means and personnel, because it is about operations against forces already prepared for defense. The probability of success is medium to low. The Argentinean would need a huge number of fighters, multirole planes and anti-submarine helicopters, as well as warships and submarines, which are compelled to operate by responding to British maneuvers. In this situation the British would have freedom of movement. Suhoi S-35 and Kilo class submarines would inflict losses to British, but would not necessary obtain the victory for the strategic operation.

          The second step is based on the success of the first one and would be easily conducted.

          The third step supposes the deployment of many engineers subunits and assets, as well as technical support elements, which would prepare the islands and the maritime nearby area for defense. All of these activities would be done while the British Navy is active in the area and suppose much air and naval transportation and, on the other hand, would need air cover and Navy presence, even fights against British fleet. The probability of success is medium, depending especially of the transportation capacity.

          The fourth step would have great chances of success, if attained. A well prepared and coordinated defense would diminish the chances of British Forces to liberate Falkland.

          As a conclusion, the first course of action implies huge losses and the necessity of a large quantity of resources, while the probability of success is quite low.

          The second COA would consist of the following steps:

1. Imposing a maritime and Air Exclusion Zone around Falkland;

2. Operations against British forces, on air, land and sea, for an indefinite period;

3. Defense operations against British response actions on the seaside and deep continental areas.

First step does not need any further details. Basically, this would be the Argentinean way of the exclusive zones imposed by British in 1982.

The second step supposes a targeting process and offensive operations against British targets, as well as conducting simulated attacks, simultaneously. The main advantage would be a high degree of freedom of movement, while involving few assets. The usage of Russian modern equipment would inflict losses to British, but it is impossible to estimate figures or percentages, because, up to now, nobody has used modern Russian equipment against Western equipment at a large scale. This would be the first time and one cannot be sure that military leaders are interested or not to do this.

The third step supposes British response operations, using Air Force and Navy assets, against Argentinean targets on continent (aerodromes, headquarters, radars and so on). S-400 and Bastion would significantly reduce British chances of success and would inflict them losses.

It is very difficult to anticipate the outcome of the second COA. It would depend on the following: UK ability to resist in such conditions and to cover the costs; Argentinean forces ability to inflict as many losses as possible to British forces; Argentinean ability to maintain the operations intensity; British ability to neutralize Russian made assets.

As a conclusion for the second COA, the longer period of operations, the more chances for UK to not resist and to cede islands, using a diplomatic solution. It would be a guerilla war, but using modern means. The factor “time” would gradually transform into the factor “money”. For the British leadership, the war would become a mere economic problem.  When it is about an economic problem, there is always a limit of acceptability. If this limit is reached, the conflict is no longer worthy and the diplomacy takes the place of military solution.

https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/south_atlantic_maritime_claims.pdf

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[1]  https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-02-07/argentinas-foreign-minister-hector-timerman-says-no-such-thing-falkland-islander, accesed on 21 Apr 2020.

[2] Article The Falklands Conflict – History and Predictions for The Future,  Historia i Polityka , no. 24 (31)/2018, page 25.

[3] Ibid page 22.

[4] Ibid. page 22.

[5] Ibid page 23.

[6] Article Britain to Boost Falklands Islands Defences, BBC News on-line, 24 March 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32031342, accessed on 21 Apr 2020.

 [7] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/club.htm, accesed on 23 Apr 2020.

[8] http://www.military-today.com/missiles/bastion_p.htm, accessed on 23 Apr 2020.

[9] http://www.military-today.com/helicopters/kamov_ka27_helix.htm, accessed on 23 Apr 2020.

[10] https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=88, accessed on 23 Apr 2020.