FALKLAND WAR. PART II – ANALYSIS

 

A detailed search of the military campaign conducted in the two group of islands, Falkland and Southern Georgia, reveals interesting facts in the military field, both at the strategic level and tactical level. Due to this reason, we analyze separately the two levels.

 

1. STRATEGIC LEVEL ANALYSIS

 

The first detail to mention is weather. In the Southern Hemisphere, during the period that Argentine chose to start the conflict is winter. The average temperature, during the winter, is 4°C, the yearly average of precipitation is quite low (620 mm), it snows in winter, but few snow remain on the soil; there is a medium wind blowing. Generally speaking, it is about a climate specific to the regions close to the polar areas[1]. It is difficult to conduct military activities, in all three environments: ground, air and sea. And it is also necessary to calculate the supplies in a very strict manner. Argentine deployed 13,000 PAX to the Falkland Islands. It was quite a huge number. They needed a huge quantity of supplies: except food and medicines, they also needed fuel for generators and different stuff for heating (coal, wood, HFO, Diesel fuel and so on). The 1,100 armored vehicles and auxiliary ones also needed a huge quantity of petrol and lubricant, too. They needed to bring all of these from the very beginning, before the UK Navy arrival in the area. At the same time, the Argentinean Forces occupied Southern Georgia Islands, where they needed to bring other forces, other resources and other means of transportation. It is about a great effort for a country which was facing great economic difficulties. In such conditions, it is a fact that resources are limited. On the other hand, UK had a more powerful economy; its armed forces possessed much more capabilities (one should not forget that it was the Cold War era); the most important, one does not need much experience in the military-political field to realize that the UK strategic ally, USA, would provide enough resources in case of conflict. The Argentine’s only strategic advantage was the distance. The short distance between the mainland and the operations area offered Argentine, theoretically, freedom of movement, while UK faced enough restrictions.

The British reaction was immediate. For sure, the speed of joint task force establishment was motivated not just by public image. They merely did not want to let Argentineans enough time for defense preparations in the two groups of islands. If the British command had waited, the Argentineans would have had enough time to transport resources (at least theoretically, they might have not enough), to fortify the islands, to emplace mines, both on sea and on ground, to build casemates and bunkers and to also prepare infantry defense positions.  

Also regarding the climate, in that situation, both belligerents needed to deploy personnel adapted to harsh environment. We do not take into consideration the ships crews, who are adapted to different weather condition; we refer to the ground forces. In the first place, for the British forces, this detail was more problematic, because their troops were supposed to perform landing operations and offensive actions, using just individual equipment and tents. There was a great advantage for Argentineans, because they were supposed to perform defensive operations and used more comfortable facilities. But, concerning the personnel deployed, Argentinean top brass amazingly mistook from the beginning. Most of the combatants were from units deployed in the central and northern part of the country during the peace time, where the climate is mild. Most of them were conscripts and these significantly increased the level of vulnerability. In short, the Argentinean troops’ ability to fight in harsh environment and in rough terrain was low. The Argentinean command decision is astonishing, because they had two mountain brigades available, who were organized, trained and equipped to conduct operations in the environments similar to the Falkland‘one. But the Argentinean command preferred to keep them in their bases, for fear of a possible conflict with Chile[2]. This brings up a question: why the Argentinean junta started a conflict with UK, during a period of tensions with Chile and during an economic crisis?

Unlike the Argentineans, British sent forces very well trained in that kind of environment[3], although less numerous, consisting of 4,000 PAX (approximately 1,000 were Gurkhas, which is very significant for the British way to prepare for the campaign)[4]. Despite the numerical superiority of Argentineans, more than 3 to 1, and despite the necessity to conduct offensive in rough terrain, during severe meteorological conditions, British succeeded to achieve victory.

Regarding the intelligence, British had the supremacy. US Intel services provide information, and this fact could not been kept secret. For instance, U.S. Navy sent information concerning the training level of Argentinean Navy[5]. However, the allies have never revealed the whole intelligence cooperation during the conflict, which is normal. For sure US military satellites collected enough images for British. And this is just an example. The risky actions performed by British Royal Forces (ground targets engagement using guns of the warships, from a short distance, air raids, landing in a sector between islands, using a less numerous force) based on a very detailed acknowledgement of the enemy. Unlike the British, the Argentineans could not conduct a proper strategic intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Their way of action shows a very precarious intelligence preparation. This is demonstrated especially by the underestimation of British way of reaction.

Exocet missiles inflicted huge losses to the Royal Navy. After the sunk of the destroyer Sheffield, the missile’s price suddenly increased, from 200,000 USD to 1 million USD. The Argentineans had a limited number of such missiles, between 5 and 10, depending on the source, however I could not find an official specific quantity. But what if they had about 50? Taking into consideration that the adversary was British Royal Navy, the Argentineans started the conflict possessing a very small number of anti-ship missiles. Argentinean air crews had to attack British ships using bombs, like in the Second World War, but suffered huge losses.

Of course, there are other dozens, maybe hundreds of aspects which can be subject for the analysis at the strategic level. An example is the loss of Santa Fe Argentinean submarine, during an equipment transportation mission in Southern Georgia, instead of tasking her with harassing operations against British Task Force in the MEZ around Falkland. There are many other examples. The Argentinean command made a lot of mistakes, from the planning process to the execution.  

 

2. TACTIC LEVEL ANALYSIS

 

Argentinean warships involvement in the conflict was minimal. The loss of a submarine and a cruiser made Argentinean Navy to minimize naval operations, to not engage British warships. This is why its losses were quite low. The desperate attempts to supply ground troops in Falkland failed.

The combat actions against British ships, the supply operations and intelligence collections operations had to be conducted by aviation, both the Air Force fixed wing and rotary wing units, and Navy Air Component. Argentinean pilots proved great heroism, performing almost suicidal missions. The low quantity of modern warfare equipment and low quality of tactical information compelled the pilots to conduct risky actions, such as attacks against British ships using obsolete bombs, which not all of them detonated. This kind of approach inflicted huge losses among the air crews.

Ground operations demonstrated the superiority of British joint operations. Their ground forces, although less numerous in terms of personnel and means, achieved amazing victories. An example is the battle for Goose Green key-point, a locality defended by a numerous Argentinean unit, which prepared defense positions that the British forces planned to capture. A small British unit, consisting of 450 combatants, conducted a successful offensive operation and took 1,500 Argentinean prisoners[6]. These figures are significant. All the lectures about the Falkland campaign suggest that the victories achieved on the ground are the result of both Argentinean command’s strategically errors (deployment of personnel unprepared to fight in the specific environment, mistakenly usage of special forces as a military police force, instead of employing them in specific missions, lack of adequate equipment and so on) and efficiency of British military, described in the best way. I dare to add something, without contesting British military efficiency. Between 30 April, when the islands were isolated, and 21 May, when the landing took place, Argentinean troops were facing strong bombardments, from air and from sea, while trying to survive using few resources. This fact is proved by the desperate attempts of their comrades, airmen and seamen, to break the blockade and supply them. Beginning with 21 May, ground operations started. The 13,000 Argentinean combatants, many of them conscripts, who were starving and suffering of cold, psychologically affected by bombardments, proved a very low level of combativeness. This was a normal consequence, and the British expected it.  Otherwise, they would not have landed.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

The conflict can be presented, in short, as the following:

-       Buenos Aires junta, facing huge internal problems, decides to perform a risky military movement in order to strengthen its political status;

-       Junta decides to occupy the Falkland and Southern Georgia, because its members, along the top brass, are sure that UK will not react in a military manner; they intended to use Southern Georgia for an exchange, in order to guarantee their control over Falkland; winter was also taken into account, as a discouraging aspect for British;

-       Based on a hasty planning process, politically imposed, Argentinean Armed Forces occupy Falkland and Southern Georgia; the operational planning process did not include further details analysis;

-       Numerous forces are deployed to Falkland, in order to discourage possible British military attempt to retake the islands; due to the mistakenly estimation and hasty planning, the landing troops have a precarious logistic, which makes them vulnerable to a British military reaction;

-       UK reacts very quickly and deploys a powerful fleet in Southern Atlantic; the Argentinean action could encourage other states to perform the same kind of actions in the international arena; the rapidity of answer is motivated by the intention to not let time for Argentinean forces to consolidate their defense on the islands;

-       USA provide intelligence support and, supposedly, deliver military equipment;

-       In short time, British forces succeed to liberate Southern Georgia and to impose MEZ around Falkland;

-       Argentinean leadership realizes its mistakes, is compelled to involve the whole country in the conflict and the armed forces desperately try to combat British Fleet and to save the 13,000 PAX that are under siege; the Argentinean aircrews are mostly involved in this;

-       Ground troops face strong bombardments and electronic warfare actions, while suffering due to the precarious logistic and lack of important resources;

-       Based on exceptionally battlefield intelligence preparation and high-tech equipment, British forces land in Falkland and succeed to neutralize Argentinean forces quite easily;

-       The military success is heavily exploited in a propagandistic way; certain details are excluded or minimized.

All I mentioned above brings up a question: if based on a detailed planning process (including the deployment of personnel adapted to the combat environment) and an efficient estimation, could Argentine win the war? The answer is certainly not. At strategic level, US involvement could not be limited and British forces would have been provided with all they needed. There was a major interest to discourage other states to do the same and to affect the international balance of power. At tactical level, much more modern equipment was necessary and Argentine could not afford it at that moment. The war was just a poker players’ adventure, based on false suppositions, but the Argentinean armed forces shown proficiency and courage during the battles. This fact cannot be contested.

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[1] https://www.climatestotravel.com/climate/falkland-islands, accessed on 25 Mar 2020.

[2] Scott Nietzel, The Falklands War: Understanding the Power of Context in Shaping Argentine Strategic Decisions, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, September 2007, 37.

[3] Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands, (Washington D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1991), 60.

[4] Sir Lawrence Freedman, The 1982 Falklands War and its Aftermath, 50-54.

[5] Ibidem, 73.

[6] Martin Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2003), 196-197.