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LONE SURVIVOR OR THE CHRONOLOGY OF SERIOUS ERRORS

 

          I promised, in a previous article, to approach a failed SEAL[1] operation in Afghanistan, named Red Wings, which inspired the movie Lone Survivor (2013). Right in the beginning of the movie, we can see that it is based on authentic events. However, the authenticity of the movie is proved by different sources, for example an article in the Slate electronic publication, which describes how the movie was made, indicating the real facts and also the actions that did not really happen. According to the article, to provide much of authenticity, writer-director Peter Berg worked closely with Marcus Luttrell, the Navy SEAL played by Mark Wahlberg in the film, and the author of the memoir of the same name (Lutrell was the only survivor). The article also mentions the parts of the movie that did not happen during the mission: Marcus Luttrell did not flatline, the final battle depicted in the film has never taken place and the terrorist leader targeted by the team did not work for Al Qaeda[2]. All other facts depicted are very close to the reality. Taking into consideration all of these, we can count the serious errors of the mission, by watching the movie. So, let’s watch.

          The team, consisting of four members, infill in the objective area, a village in the mountains, in order to locate an important terrorist leader. The mission is quite usual for Special Forces: to check a piece of information provided by an Intel agency. The target identification was about to be done by occupying an observation post and surveying the village using hi-tech devices. If the Intel report confirmed, another subunit would perform an operation to capture the terrorist. The mountain terrain, covered by forests, favors the action. The team takes a position above the village and identified the terrorist right inside the village.

          First error. The SEAL team presence is discovered by three shepherds, who were herding a flock of goats. Some of the goats have bells. For a professional team is a bad luck to be discovered by civilians in a forest in the mountains, but it is also a big mistake, taking into consideration that those shepherds does not have dogs. The mistake started when the team did not let the extra equipment in a hidden place, named base. Any team that acts in a dangerous zone, before reaching the target area, sets up a base, in a hidden place, where its members let the extra stuff, and resume the action carrying just the mission essential equipment. Usually, they let their food, water, spare pieces of clothes, tent, batteries and so on. The purpose of this is to be more agile if they run into the enemy or, for different reasons, they need to evacuate quickly. The extra equipment makes them heavier, which increases the level of vulnerability. The team members go to the base every time they need to supply, to sleep and so on. Going further, during the mission in the observation post, at least one of them provides the team security, surveying the area, in order to detect any persons who get closer. A herd of goats, some of them having bells attached, is quite loud and can be timely detected. Basically, the guard alerts the team even if he just thinks he detected something, and, if they have the confirmation of the danger (in this situation, the noises of the bells), the team immediately leaves the area quietly. Unfortunately, in this case, the guard identified the danger late, and the team members (who were sleeping at that moment) were taking by surprise.  

          Second error. The team reaches an impasse: it was discovered. At the moment, there is no great danger, because its members have captured the shepherd, but it is clear that the mission must be aborted and the team needs an extraction. Radio connection does not work and they make a phone call using satellite connection. In this way, they get a connection with the operations center but, instead of a brief situation report and a call for extraction, the team leader prefers to require talking only to the unit commander, who is not in the center. The call is interrupted and the center does not find out the real situation in the field.

          Third error. Team members are discussing ways to solve the situation in the presence of the captured civilians. During the talks, they are mentioning insurgent leader’s name several times, which is unprofessional, because the mission target is revealed.

          Fourth error. Team members are facing a dilemma: either to kill the civilians or to release them. Finally, civilians are released, which is admirable, taking into consideration both the written and unwritten laws of war regarding the hostages. But this increases the risk, because the insurgents are about to figure out about the presence of Special Forces near the village. It is just a matter of time. The team members highly underestimated enemy’s abilities. The insurgents can immediately start the chase and the probabilities to succeed is high, because they are locals, know the terrain very well, are able to move quickly in the mountains and easily find traces. A four-member team cannot resist in fighting a detachment of tens of fanatic insurgents, although they are professional Special Forces warriors. The only way to escape would be to take up a position on an elevated area, from where they are able to fight back and hold the position, and also to call for help, by radio, by phone or signaling to the air assets. But the team chooses to make its way through the forest, hoping to leave the dangerous area unnoticed. It is a wrong decision. The insurgent find and attack them. In the close combat, US Special Forces members are very skillful, but, nevertheless, they did not have any chance in the fight against a much numerous group of fanatic insurgents, who are used to fight in that kind of terrain and are not novices. During the fight, the team loses two members but succeeds to make a phone call to the center.

          Fifth error. It is not the team’s error; it was the quick reaction force’s error. The QRF consisted of two SEAL detachments, each of them of about 10 members, mounted on two CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The two airships reach the area where the team is, but without an escort of attack helicopters. A transport helicopter which flies at low altitude (tens of meters) is highly vulnerable to the small arms fire, because it does not have any protection. The AKM[3] effective range is 400 meters, for a RPK[4] light-machine gun is 800 meters and for RPG-7[5] is 330 meters. A section consisting of 3 to 4 AKM and 1 to 2 RPK has great chances to down a transport helicopter which flies at 50 meters height, at a distance of 200 to 300 meters. This is why the transport helicopters need the support of attack helicopters (for instance AH-64 Apache) when delivering troops by landing or abseiling, because the attack helicopters are armored and can neutralize the enemy on the ground using canons, rockets or missiles, insuring the operation security. But, during this SEAL operation, there are no attack helicopters. The mounted detachments might not know about the insurgents on the ground, but they must suppose this and act accordingly. The helicopters start to land troops by abseiling, right above the area where team members made the phone call. One rocket, launched from an RPG-7, hits the chopper, which falls, together with the crew and the passengers. A still helicopter, at 20 meters height, is an easy target for an RPG-7 at a distance of 250 meters. The only way to succeed in this mission would have been to land on a safer area located at approximately 1 to 1.5 km. After landing, the QRF would have been able to rescue the two survivors.

          I do not want to draw any conclusions. The reader can draw them by itself.



[1] Sea, Air, Land – Special Forces branch of the US Navy.

[2] Article How Accurate Is Lone Survivor?, online publication Slate – 10 January 2014,  https://slate.com/culture/2014/01/lone-survivor-accuracy-fact-vs-fiction-in-the-mark-wahlberg-and-peter-berg-movie-adaptation-of-marcus-luttrells-memoir.html, accesed on 2 June 2020.

[3] Автомат Калашникова Модернизированный – Modernized Kalashnikov Automatic Rifle.

[4] РПК, Ручной Пулемёт Калашникова – Kalashnikov Light Machine Gun.

[5] РПГ-7, Ручной Противотанковый Гранатомёт – Antitank Portable Grenade Launcher.


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