PROJECT:
INFANTRY
INTRODUCTION
The military tactics
depend on the level of military technology development.
Vladimir
Ilici Lenin
The armed conflicts that are ongoing in Ukraine and Syria reveal important aspects regarding the military tactics. Military campaigns conducted on those theaters of operations confirm that the military science needs to adapt to the new challenges, by studying them and developing new theories. The issues raised during the military operations performed in the two areas are complex, requiring huge effort and a lot of time to analyze them, and this book is trying to approach just one of those aspects: the future of infantry in the military campaigns.
Armed forces tactics
depend on the level of the military technology development, which also depends
on the level of the civil technology development. The invention and the wide
usage of new category of weapons and military equipment have decisively influenced
military organizations and the way to conduct operations. In this respect, the
automatic weapons development and the armored vehicles production determined
the decrease of the cavalry role on battlefield and its disappearance. The air
force and anti-ship weapons development determined the disappearance of the
huge armored battleships. The technological race in the aviation industry
determined the impossibility of some states to maintain enough air defense
capabilities. The economic development during the 18th and 19th
centuries determined the establishment of the mass armies and the military
campaigns started to be conducted on very large areas. There are other numerous
examples in this way. The eventual invention of the materials and people
teleportation will surely determine changes in the military tactics, for both the
armies that will posses this technology and for those ones that will not posses
it.
Based on the military
campaigns which took place during the last period of the Cold War and immediately
after that, most of the military analysts drew some conclusions. It is useless
to insist, because those campaigns were very carefully studied, especially due
to the modern recording technology which became accessible to wide public
during the Eighties. The US military intervention in Panama and the two Gulf Wars
(1991 and 2003) are the best examples. These conclusions can be summarized as
the following:
- The
states no longer need the big armies, consisting of huge constituent parts and equipped
with obsolete weapons;
- The
states need new kind of armed forces; these must be smaller, consisting,
interoperable, mobile and modern units, employing high professional personnel, led
by very skillful managers and equipped with high-tech weapons;
- There
is no chance of success for a big army, equipped with obsolete weapons, in
confrontation with a small but modern army, consisting of mobile and modern
units.
The term „technology
trap” was added to the above mentioned assessments. That means the accelerated
increase of the military equipment prices, which results in the decrease of
their amount, due to the lower quantities that the governments purchase. As a
result, few states can actually afford a great number of tanks and planes,
provoking a continuous military size down. In this respect, the armed forces
require new weapons systems that posses greater and greater capabilities
(range, accuracy, speed, maneuverability, reliability, protection etc) from the
defense industry companies, in order to have more opportunities in case of war,
by technological superiority over the enemy. Supposing that a national army has
a modern warfare mean, which possesses certain capabilities, at least another
national army will try to acquire either a quite similar mean, or a different one
that can counter it. In this way, a tough technological race began. In order to
develop new equipments that can meet the required standards, the defense
companies use technical innovations, obtained due to the complex research activities,
which involve more and more expensive materials and components. The new mean resulted from this will be more
effective, especially regarding its operational capabilities, but also more
expensive. The real price is even higher, due to both acquisition cost and the
cost of their exploitation and personnel training. On the other hand, the military budgets do
not increase, they, generally speaking, are on the same yearly level. However,
these budgets do not cover the increasing costs prices of military equipment.
The result is obvious: the number of the purchased military pieces of
equipments decrease more and more. The question which results is: how long? If
this phenomenon continuous, just a few states will be able to afford modern and
effective warfare means, such as tanks and aircrafts, although much fewer than
before.
Taking
into consideration the armies’ professionalization and size down, but also the
obvious trend of limited access at military equipments, due to the higher
prices, one can state that all the world armies have been reorganizing. This
phenomenon is noticeable after 1990, except a few states, that have decided to
keep their military strength, but spending higher amounts of money (Turkey,
Israel). One can also think that US Armed Forces suffered the same phenomenon
and the official figures demonstrate this: in 1990, US Army consisted of
780,800 persons, and, in 2005, there were only 492,700 persons[1]. According
to this figures, there was a great size down. Nevertheless, US Armed Forces
were not reduced, but reorganized, and kept the same number of personnel, in
another way. This aspect is not the subject of this book, but it will be
approached in another book.
Referring
to the armies’ reorganization and transformation, we need to mention that they
affected not only the active structures, but also those subunits designed to
activate in case of war, consisting mostly of reserve personnel. The main
reason for this fact is not only the increase of military equipments prices,
resulting in the fewer warfare means, but also their complexity, that requires
a higher level of training and education which determines a higher cost of
training. Basically, the armies can mobilize a certain number of reservists,
but this number is limited, especially due to the limited amount of equipments,
that cannot be significantly expanded in case of war.
As a conclusion, mass
armies are about to disappear and replaced by smaller ones, equipped with high
quality combat systems and employing highly trained personnel. Modern technology and the greater mobility
provide them a wide range of better capabilities: rapid deployment, realistic
operations planning process, high maneuverability and efficiency, as well as
risk mitigation and limited losses. In this respect, for about 25 years, terms
like Revolution in the Military Affairs,
leadership, mobility, efficient management,
flexibility, force projection etc. have been very common in the studies
concerning the armies, while the military structures were reducing. Many
analysts have provided a lot of convincing arguments to support the above
mentioned conclusion, until two conflicts erupted: the civil wars in Ukraine
and Syria. Regarding them, one can find a simple fact, which, in reality, has
profound implications: the mass armies are still necessary. A modern army, but
smaller, consisting of interoperable, mobile and modern units, led by very
skillful managers and equipped with high-tech weapons would be ineffective, due
to a single reason: it cannot cover great areas, because it does not have
enough tactical combat subunits and units, that means platoons, companies,
battalions and brigades (or similar echelons), as well as combat support
subunits and units. Being unable to deploy forces to conduct operations
(offensive, defensive or others) on all the areas, large gaps appear and the
enemy can use them to conduct own operations: maneuvers, infill, reconnaissance
etc. Basically, entire areas remain no controlled. Even if an army has enough
sensors (detection systems, radars, drones, intelligence network etc.) to cover
the gaps (that is, in fact, almost impossible), the identification of enemy
units would be useless, because there are not enough forces to react.
Geographically,
Syria and Ukraine are much different, especially regarding the terrain, rivers,
localities, climatic and vegetation. Nevertheless, both conflicts have a common
feature: huge areas, in which military operations are performed continuously.
If, during some specific periods of time and in some specific areas there are
no fights, that does not mean the military actions cease and the troops left or
remain less. Even if in a section of the line of contact there are no
shootings, military operations are still ongoing: intelligence gathering
(observation posts, reconnaissance patrols etc.), engineers’ specific activities,
artillery fire preparations, deployments and redeployments, ammunition and
equipment supply etc. In some cases, some units will be transported to other
areas, in order to cover more important sections (for that specific moment),
but, in the “inactive” area remain enough forces to react in case of a surprise
attack.
Combat
forces (in the army) consist of two branches: infantry and tanks. These
effectively perform the combat actions. There are more combat support branches:
artillery, air defense troops, engineers, communications, NBC[2]
etc. The subject of this book is infantry.
As
I presented above, in the conflicts like those conducted in Ukraine and Syria,
many infantry units are necessary in order to completely cover all the line of
contact sections, which can be hundreds of kilometers long. One needs to
consider that a unit way of deployment in the terrain to conduct an operation
would consist of at least two lines: first line close to the enemy, sometimes
in contact, and the second one at a specific distance, with a specific role: in
defense to stop the enemy that succeeded to break the first line; in offensive,
to continue operation if the first line stopped. However, the headquarter must
have other infantry units as reserve, in order to react in case of contingency
situations. And the infantry troops is are not needed just on the frontline. In
the rear, in the areas under own troops control, there are some important
objectives (airports, depots, routes, strategic facilities etc.) that need to
be protected. That means other infantry units. And the Supreme Joint
Headquarter needs other more infantry units as a reserve, in case of important
future operations.
During
the two armed conflicts, in Ukraine and Syria, the problem of infantry troops
deficit was artificially solved: local militia, paramilitary groups employment
and sometimes armed gangs employment. The disadvantages of these ways to solve
that problem are obvious: easy infill of enemy spies inside own units, weak
control over the combat forces, that can be disastrous in some situations,
vulnerabilities in the force protection system, due to the lack of organization
and experience. Sometimes, some individuals or entire groups desert and join
the adversary side for different reasons: financial, ideological, ethnical,
political and so on. I would like to highlight the disadvantages by specifying
that a paramilitary group that joins own forces is just a temporary solution,
involving possible disadvantages on medium and long term, because that group
has its own purposes, own leaders and own methods. In some situations, such a
group is coordinated from abroad, by a state or a non-government entity, which
is interested to produce certain effects that can be contrary to the side which
it joins. That is why this kind of deal
is not a solution.
The
question that instantly results is: how is it possible for a state to have, in
case of war, enough infantrymen to cover all the front lines but, at the same
time, to not exceed the defense budget? The question is quite general, so I
need to make it more specific: a country whose budget is low, would be able to
have enough infantry units to defend its sovereignty and national independence in
case of war? One must take into
consideration that the defense budget is not designed just for infantry troops.
That amount of money is used to support and modernize all other branches
(aviation, air defense, communications, electronic warfare, artillery,
transportation and so on), to pay salaries, medical insurances, to maintain
facilities etc. Generally speaking, this money is never enough. Nevertheless, I
ask again: a country whose economy is not able to support a modern army would
be able to deploy, in case of war, enough infantry troops to defend its
sovereignty and national independence?
This
book tries to provide an answer.
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