SADDAM HUSSEIN’S MISSILES - Book presentation

          The theme of the book is the Al-Hussein ballistic missiles launching operations (Iraqi derivative of the soviet Scud missiles) during the First Gulf War (1991), their consequences and the International Coalition effort to prevent and to combat them.

          The subject is somehow old, but some of its aspects that are developed in this book are still present, taking into consideration the nowadays geopolitical context, involving armed forces using military equipment of different provenience, especially US-made, Western European-made and Russian-made, and, also, taking into consideration that many armed conflicts are taking place now.

The book focuses on the following aspects development:

-        Al-Hussein ballistic missiles launching operations were  ways  the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, used to respond against International Coalition Forces, led by USA, that were established to liberate Kuwait;

-        Al-Hussein missile was, in fact, a derivative of an old soviet missile, Scud – type, that had a primitive guiding system;

-        The Coalition Forces leadership realized the danger posed by the Al-Hussein missiles; in this respect, Coalition Air Forces attacked the missiles facilities from the very beginning of the air campaign. Anticipating this, Iraqi Army scattered the missiles and deployed them on a large area, by mounting them on launcher vehicles (TEL – transporter erector launcher); Iraqi missile forces conducted all the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations from TELs (Iraqi-made vehicle Al-Waleed);

-        Al-Hussein missiles launching operations begun immediately after the International Coalition Air Forces had initiated the air campaign, against targets located on Iraqi and Kuwait territories; Al-Hussein missiles  targeted locations on Saudi Arabia and Israel; the launching operations against Israel posed a major threat on International Coalition, due to a possible Israeli response, followed by Arab States withdrawal from this coalition;

-        In order to prevent the missiles launching operations, International Coalition Forces allocated many resources: Air Forces units, sensors, anti-rockets systems (Patriot systems) and Special Operations Forces units;

-        The Patriot systems efficiency was low; there are some authors and scientists which demonstrated that the Patriot system was almost inefficient, although the media has tried  to present it as highly efficient;

-        Although the Coalition Air Forces had high-tech equipment, it was not able either to stop Al-Hussein missiles launching operations or to prevent them; one of the reasons was the lack of ground teams, designated to locate the Iraqi missiles units, to call Air Forces and to guide the air teams to the TELs;

-        For terrain reconnaissance, Iraqi missiles units localization, TELs identification, air teams guidance and missiles neutralization, Coalition Forces deployed Special Operations Forces teams on the Iraqi territory (the well-known Green Berets, Delta Force and SAS); their operations were called Scud-hunting;

-        It is difficult to figure-out the results of Scud-hunting operations results from the books related to the First Gulf War or to the special operations. The authors that have approached this subject have identified very few results, but revealed many failures;

-        The assessment of the Scud-hunting operations shows huge errors in the strategic Desert Storm planning activities;

-        Despite of the International Coalition Forces huge effort to stop the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations, they could not been stopped;

-        After the success of Desert Storm operation, consisting of Kuwait liberation, Iraqi agreement for cease-fire and massive diminution of the Iraqi Army capabilities, a normal step was the continuation of the actions to replace the Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime. If achieved, this aspect would have provided a lot of benefic elements.  At that moment, this was possible, due to the international situation and the Iraqi internal unrest;

-        It is not clear why the International Coalition did not remove Saddam Hussein from power.  Since then, a huge question mark has remained.  The book provides a possible answer: the chemical weapons at the disposal of the Iraqi Army and the inability to stop Al-Hussein missiles launching operations; the probability of a Saddam Hussein’s desperate attack using chemical charges on board of Al-Hussein missiles, discouraged the International Coalition to dethrone him;

-        Another International Coalition (led by USA) succeeded to dethrone Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime, after 12 years, by performing Iraqi Freedom operation (a blitzkrieg – type operation).  The military actions were well-coordinated and very fast, but the anti-Saddam Hussein attitude of the majority of the Iraqi population contributed to the coalition success;

-        Despite the evident success of the International Coalition Forces operations and despite the quick advance of the ground forces, Iraqi Army succeeded to launch ballistic missiles. Although the Coalition Forces overwhelmed the Iraqi Forces and the situation was disastrous for them, Iraqi missiles units continued to conduct launching operations;

-        A hypothesis for the high-speed conducting of the Iraqi Freedom operation is the Coalition Forces fear of the Iraqi missile operations. Coalition Forces tried to prevent the missiles launches by a fast ground advance. The Coalition Forces leaders were aware that there was no other way to prevent them.

Conclusions:

Ø  Modern military technology is not as effective as it is presented in media;

Ø  The high-tech equipment should not determine the military leaders not to take into consideration all the art of war principles when planning and when conducting military operations; in short, the technology does not represent everything;

Ø  There were numerous errors done by a military system which was considered the most efficient all over the world (USA and its allies). These errors are highlighted in the book, for instance the underestimation of the transporter erector launchers threat;

Ø  A country that has little financial resources is sometimes able to protect its independency using obsolete military equipment;

Ø  It is possible that not all the Revolution in Military Affairs theories are entirely viable; the book provides some arguments in this respect, although this is not its subject;

Ø  Saddam Hussein regime was saved in 1991 by the success of the Al-Hussein missiles launching operations and by the chemical weapons that the Iraqi Army had at that time; if the Scud-hunting operations had succeeded, Saddam Hussein would have been dethroned in 1991.