ȘTEFAN CEL MARE – MILITARY STRATEGIST

          Ștefan cel Mare, King of Moldova between 1457 and 1504, is well-known in the national and universal History for his armed conflicts with Ottoman Empire, for the churches and monasteries that were built during his rule and for his political, diplomatic and military effort to achieve and maintain Moldova’s independence. Ștefan cel Mare’s name is so well-known as an Ottoman Empire enemy, and, consequently, a defender of Christianity, that it was drawn on a rifle magazine belonging to a terrorist who performed an attack in New Zeeland, in 2019, against a group of Muslims.  In this article, I intend to reveal a less known aspect that was characteristic to the Moldavian King: military strategist. Basically, I am trying to demonstrate that Ștefan excelled in what we call nowadays Geopolitics.

          There is enough information regarding the Vaslui Battle[1] (10 January 1475), between an army led by Ștefan (a coalition army, consisting of about 45,000 – 50,000 troops), and an army sent by the Ottoman Empire (also a coalition army, consisting of about 100,000 – 120,000 troops - the figures depend on the sources). The Ottoman Army superiority in manpower was certainly 2 to 1, at least. One should also add that Stefan’s army consisted mostly of Moldavian farmers, who did not attend an effective military training. The Ottoman Army consisted either of professional military men, who gained a huge battle experience during the campaigns conducted in Europe and Asia, or members of military orders, such as  akângii, who had also gained a good military experience. The certainly victory of Moldavians, gained by using terrain features, deceiving methods and well prepared maneuvers, demonstrates Ștefan’s abilities as a military tactician. The historians approach very little another aspect that I consider more important than the battle itself: the Moldavian cavalry subunits harassing actions against Ottoman units during the retreat. It seems that these actions inflicted huge losses to Ottomans, possibly higher than during the Vaslui Battle. This is quite possible, because Ottoman Army was not used to retreat. I must specify that the retreat operations suppose a succession of actions that nowadays we call force protection: reconnaissance patrols, flanks protection, rear protection mobile subunits etc. The question is: why Ștefan sent his cavalry to harass the enemy, this supposing own troops losses, although the campaign goal had been achieved? The Ottomans were retreating. Taking into consideration the Ottoman Empire’s huge army, the losses inflicted did not matter. The explanation is quite simple: Ștefan tried to achieve two purposes. The first one was to show that Moldavia had efficient operational mobile capabilities to conduct offensive operations, by rapid deployment. In short, to show that the Moldavians’ military capabilities were not just those ones demonstrated in the battle of Vaslui. The second one was to demoralize the Ottomans, to use psychological method of discouragement, based on the supposition that the Ottoman Army members that succeeded to escape told others about the catastrophic retreat and the huge losses. These facts demonstrate that Ștefan cel Mare was not only a great tactician, but he was a great strategist.  

          In 1476, the Ottoman Empire reacted, as it was expected. One needs to have a general look and to assess that the empire had undergone a period of rapid expansion, in terms of military, politics, diplomacy and economics. The reaction produced in the summer of 1476, which means after a year and a half. One might consider this a delay, but it was not, taking into consideration other ongoing campaigns, the time for troops mobilization, the means and the infrastructure specific to that age. The reaction was very fast. A question results from these: did Ștefan anticipate the reaction? The answer is: certainly yes, and the succession of events demonstrates this. The Ottoman Army was bigger, approximately 150,000 troops. Some sources indicate 200,000 troops. The Ottomans expected some Tatar units to join, but the Moldavians succeeded to stop and annihilate them.  

Ștefan was very smart. He knew he had not been able to use the Moldavian Army in order to oppose the Ottoman Army, because the former consisted mostly of farmers and he decided to avoid useless losses. He ordered harassing actions and combat operations against Ottoman forward units, inflicting huge losses to them. He opposed the Ottoman Army at Valea Albă (26 July 1476), leading a small contingent (between 6,000 and 12,000) against a numerous army. The result was sure: Moldavians were defeated and had to withdraw from the battlefield. But why did Ștefan want to fight, although the result was predictable? There is only one answer: for harassing. Moldavian units succeeded to leave and to keep the battle strength, in spite of the losses they suffered. Another aspect results: the Ottomans followed the Moldavians to Valea Albă, losing time and resources.

After Valea Albă battle, Ottoman Army conducted Moldavian fortifications siege operations, the only way to completely defeat Moldavian Army. The great achievement of the Moldavians was to resist the sieges. The Ottomans could not take any fortifications (do not forget that Constantipol was taken in 1453). We should also take into consideration that an army needs a long period of time to prepare a fortification for siege, not just a few days. Think only to the food necessary to the garrison, which might have consisted of hundreds of warriors. All of these suggest that the preparations of fortifications were just a part of a bigger plan.

What was next? The sieges lasted a while, the documents do not provide a specific chronology, but for sure the Ottoman Army did not stay in Moldavia until next year. They had to withdraw. Had Ștefan cel Mare anticipated this, that the Ottomans were able to operate in Moldavia just for a limited period? It is a fact; all that happened before Podul Înalt battle until the summer of 1476 demonstrate this. Nevertheless, what happened if the Ottomans had remained in Moldavia until they conquered the fortifications? What did Ștefan based upon? He based upon a certain fact: although the Ottoman Empire was very strong and was expanding, it could not afford to block a huge army in a specific area for long. A huge army needs a huge amount of resources: food for troops and for auxiliary employees, ammunition for cannons, different kinds of materials for troops, money for combat service support providers, money for mercenaries and so on. There is no empire to afford this for a long period of time. This general principle is also valid today.

After they had found out how costly it was, the Ottomans retreated. The withdrawing troops were again harassed by mobile Moldavian units, which inflicted them losses.

As a conclusion, the Moldavians’ defense campaigns, conducted between 1474 and 1476, were part of an one plan, based upon a strategic decision making process, that took into consideration all the internal and external facts, especially the vulnerabilities of an imperial army. Ștefan cel Mare was not only a great military tactician; he was a great military strategist. From the Moldavian point of view, we can consider that just one campaign that lasted for about two years.  

Maybe it was not Ștefan who developed the campaign plan, maybe one of his advisers, a military expert, which was able to develop war strategies. We cannot know. However, we can also consider Ștefan a military strategist. He was smart enough to assess the plan and to apply it, by mobilizing all the country for this.

Taking into consideration the specificity of that age, the technical development level and the size of Moldova, as well as the huge military power of the Ottoman Empire, I can conclude that the Moldavians’ victory was a great one and it is as important as the most important victories of the World History.

[1] Also known as battle of Podul Înalt.