article published on 8 September 2020
In 1944, on an unknown day, a secret
briefing took place at Kremlin. The following leaders participated at that
briefing: Stalin, the Soviet State leader, Vsevolod Merculov, State Security
Commissar, Viktor Abakumov, Red Army Counterintelligence Directorate’ (SMERȘ[1]) chief, Fiodor Kuznețov, Main
Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army’ (GRU[2]) chief
and Pavel Soduplatov, the 4th Directorate of NKGB[3]
– Reconnaissance and Sabotage’ chief. Their names suggest the importance of the
briefing. The result of discussions was the decision to plan an important
diversionary operation: Berezino.
The
operation began with a disinformation. A soviet officer, Aleksandr Demianov, which
Abwehr[4] considered
an important source (code name “Max”), but, in reality, under SMERȘ’ control (he became a “source” for Abwehr
during a soviet secret services operation whose purpose was to infiltrate spies in the German secret networks, in the
beginning of the war; the purpose was to
misinform German Supreme HQ – operation Monastir),
sent a radiogram to Berlin, on 18 August 1944, to inform about the following:
- A great number of German
military men remained behind enemy lines, who could be gathered in a regiment
or even a higher formation, located in a forest near Berezino city, East of Moghilev, Byelorussia;
- Some
of those German military men were wounded;
- They
intended to find a way to the German lines, but they did not have enough
weapons;
- The
agent “Max” could keep in touch with them.
Abwehr’
answer to ”Max” was: “keep in touch with the isolated German soldiers and find
out their location, in order to receive support and a radio operator”.
In
order to continue the diversion, the Soviets recruited a German officer
(prisoner of war) to play the role of the false military unit’s commander. At
the same time, Soviet engineers built facilities in the forests of Berezino
area. A special Soviet unit, whose members were equipped with German weapons
and clothing, was established and deployed there.
On
15 September, three German radio operators were dropped on a location indicated
by agent ”Max”. They were captured and persuaded to collaborate. The operation
was going on. Based on faked radiograms sent by the false unit, German forces
dropped equipment and food. On 27 October, a doctor and an Air Force Officer
were also dropped.
Abwehr
HQ tried to check the reliability of the reports received, by sending more
reconnaissance teams in the area, without informing the supported unit. Those
teams were not successful. They were all captured and convinced to collaborate,
by sending radiograms made by the Soviets. The Germans continued to send
supplies.
Between
September 1944 and 30 April 1945, in order to support the false unit, German
Forces conducted 67 air missions, dropped 25 agents (all were captured) and
provided 13 radio sets and 644 boxes which contained: 615 winter battle dress
suits, 20 machine-guns, 100 riffles and assault rifles, 35 pistols, 2.000 grenades,
142.000 cartridges, 2.5 tons of meet, 370 kilos of chocolate, 4 tons of breed,
400 kilos of sugar, 100 liters of wine and so on. They also sent money, in
whole 2,258,330 rubles. All of these happened while Red Army was fighting on
the German territory and Berlin was in danger! German higher echelons promoted
and decorated the German officer “appointed” as the false units’ commander.
It
seems that the most important achievement of the operation was the Abwehr-kommando
103 commander’s intention to join the false unit. Lieutenant-colonel Rudolf von
Barenfeld was on the Soviet Forces’ top priority enemies list. Abwehr-kommando
103 was a Special Operations Forces unit tasked with performing intelligence
collection and sabotage operations behind Soviet lines[5]. During
an after-action review, the Soviets drew the conclusion that he was killed when
the plane which transported him was hit by the Soviet flak.
On
1st of May 1945, the false German unit from Byelorussia received a
last message from the Berlin HQ, according to the supplies deliveries became
impossible, as well as the radio connection. The war was coming to an end. The
diversionist operation in Byelorussia also came to an end.
[1] СМЕРШ - Специальные
Методы Разоблaчения Шпионов (Spetzialnii Metodi Razoblocenia Shpionov); in
English: Special Methods to Identify Spies; this special service was also known
as Смерть шпионам (Smert Shpionam), in English: ,,Death to the Spies”.
[2] ГРУ - Гла́вное
разве́дывательное управле́ние (Glavnoe Razvedivatelnoe Upravlenie); the whole
name: ГРУ ГШ - Гла́вное разве́дывательное управле́ние Генера́льного Шта́ба
(Glavnoe Razvedivatelnoe Upravlenie Gheneralnovo Shtaba); in English: Main Reconnaissance
Directorate of the General Staff; the word reconnaissance
is used in Russian to specify own
intelligence structures; it does not mean only reconnaissance subunits and
units, it also means strategic intelligence organizations; the word main is used in order to make a
difference between the directorate of General Staff (General Shtaba) and other
directorates of strategic HQs – fronts or military regions, also subordonated
to the main directorate (GRU).
[3] НКГБ - Народный
комиссариат государственной безопасности (Narodnîi Komisariat Gosudarsvenoi
Bezopasnosti); in English: People’ Commissariat for State Security.
[4] German Army’s
Intelligence Service.
[5] Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek, on Internet at
https://www.deutsche-digitale-bibliothek.de/item/JOC3PNRIEFAYHCXOGZ6XPXJBUUIJTIAM, accessed on 27 Aug 2020.
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