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THE KHALKIN GOL BATTLE

Article published on 19 March 2022


         The battle at Khalkin Gol River (Mongolia) took place on 20 August 1939 and it was the decisive fight during the military conflict between USSR and Japan. The military campaign began on 11 Mai 1939 and ended on 16 September 1939, when the belligerents sign a truce.[1]

          The Japanese attack against Mongolia was a natural continuation of the aggressive expansion in neighboring countries, after the empire occupied large areas of China. Due to the economic development, the Japanese Empire was looking for resources. The target was obvious: Siberia. At the USSR border, the Japanese Forces provoked incidents, starting with 1935. The conquest of Mongolia was just a step of a broader strategic plan. This country did not have enough forces to resist. Realizing the danger, the USSR leaders signed a mutual agreement with Mongolian counterparts, in 1936.[2]

          The Japanese offensive in Mongolia started with small scale actions against Mongolian Forces. The firm intervention of the Soviet Forces stopped the Japanese offensive and made the Japanese military leaders to send a numerous invasion force, consisting of more than 30,000 troops, which, lately, receive reinforcement. After a series of intense fights, the front line stabilized along Khalkin Gol Rivers. Both adversaries began to consolidate their operational capabilities, and the Japanese troops performed some offensive actions against the Soviets, but did not achieve any noticeable result. In the morning of 20 August, Soviet troops, supported by Mongolian units, started a giant offensive operation, using 57,000 troops, 500 tanks and 550 planes. The Japanese losses were huge[3]: according to some sources, it was about 55,000 military men[4]). The soviet success based on three factors:

          1. The surprise was big. The Japanese troops did not expect the Soviet offensive at all.

          2. The Japanese troops were preparing for offensive, that is why they were vulnerable.

          3. Naturally, the Mongolian soldiers knew the terrain very well.

       The most important factor of the above mentioned ones is the surprise. Theoretically, the preparations for an offensive operation involving more divisions cannot be concealed, especially when tanks, APCs, heavy artillery assets and planes are used and the terrain is smooth. How did the Soviets succeed to trick the Japanese forces?

      They used several deception techniques, based on a detailed deception plan. The most significant techniques were:

Ø The usage of blacked out vehicles to move forward during the hours of limited visibility, from the railway station to the front line;

Ø During the daylight, the transportation vehicles moved back, to the railway stations, gave the appearance to the Japanese scouts and observation aircrafts that forces were leaving the area, not coming into the area;

Ø The employment of special loud speakers mounted on trucks; they played prerecorded sounds of armored vehicles movement from the front line to the rear; sounds of soldiers building defensive works were also played over loud speakers in multiple areas;

Ø Soviet soldiers received handbook which taught them how to act during a long term defensive operation; these handbooks were captured and sent to the Japanese Intelligence branch;

Ø Use of disinformation by using false troop movement reports on Soviet Army Group internal radio and communication networks; the radio messages were intercepted by Japanese SIGINT units.[5]

The surprise was big. The deception plan worked. The defeat was catastrophic for Japanese forces. Basically, this was a trap. The Soviets let the Japanese Army believe that they were weak.

What were the consequences?

The next day after the truce, Soviet forces entered Poland. The Japanese Emperor and the Japanese leaders lost their confidence in the Army. They decided to expand the empire to the East, in the Pacific Ocean. The most important, they hesitated to attack USSR in a very favorable period, in December 1941, when German Army was fighting at the gates of Moscow.




[1] Amnon Sella, Khalkin-Gol: The Forgotten War, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Military History (Oct., 1983), pp. 651-687.

[2] Article The decisive Battle at Khalkhin Gol, on-line publication MontSame, on Internet at https://www.montsame.mn/en/read/274078.

[3] Article Battle of Khalkhin Gol, World War II Database, on Internet at https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=89.

[4] LTC Michael C. Manner, US Army, Soviet Application of Operational Art in the Khalkhin Gol Campaign, May-August 1939, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2018, on Internet at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1087268.pdf.

[5] Ibidem.


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