THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART I

Article published on 2 Jan 2024

         Israeli great successes, which have been achieved since 1948, created the myth of IDF (Israel Defense Forces) invincibility. However, their triumphant victories on the battlefield cannot be contested. Israelis’ strategies have become examples and subjects for military manuals and their innovations significantly changed the ways of military operations development. The best example is the drones’ usage. IDF was the pioneer in this field and everybody can see today in Ukraine what they began in the 1970s. There are also many other examples. One can easily identify a lot of remarkable achievements in the short history of this army.      

The events that started on 7 October 2023 raised doubts about Israeli forces’ efficiency: the successful surprise attack (a fact heavily debated on media), chaotic IDF reactions and the limited achievements of the military campaign in Gaza Strip. On 21 December, Hamas group conducted rockets attack against Tel Aviv[1] and succeeded to hit some of the targets, which demonstrates that the ground and air Israeli operations failed to achieve their purposes, after two months and a half.

          Normally, all of these raise questions. An army which won over so many adversaries, both on the conventional battlefield and in counterterrorist operations, cannot stop the actions of some groups which have only light and low-quality weapons. These groups do not have MANPADs and ATGMs. IDF had already experienced ground operations in Gaza Strip: 2014 (Protective Edge, started on 8 July, ground phase lasted between 5 and 26 August[2]) and 2018 (11 November, special forces raid). Basically, they should have conducted assessments in order to plan future operations there.  

          In this article, I try to demonstrate that the IDF efficiency in military campaign, whose results no one can contradict, was based not only on exceptional training and high-tech equipment. There were other less visible but important contributing factors.

 

1948 – Arab – Israeli War

          In fact, it took place between 1947 and 1949. The main event was the Arab armies’ invasion of the new born Israeli state. The conflict broke out in 1947, when the three Jewish armed groups (Hagannah, Irgun Zwai Leumi and Stern) begin to fight with different Arab armed groups, consisting of locals and volunteers from neighboring countries. Following the announcement of the independence of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948, five Arab nations (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Transjordan) immediately invaded territory in the former Palestinian mandate. In fact, there were six (Saudi Arabia sent a unit which fought within Egyptian forces[3]). Israeli Forces enjoyed superiority in terms of manpower – 35,000 PAX in May 1948, after mobilization reached 60,000 PAX in June and 100,000 PAX at the end of the year[4]. 4,500 volunteers from USA, Canada, Europe and South Africa also joined IDF. The Arab invading armies had never exceeded 68,000 PAX[5], including local Arab groups. The sources present the obvious disadvantage of Israelis: the equipment. At the beginning of invasion, they had 16 heavy mortars, 75 anti-tank rifles and 4 65mm guns. The air force had some light aircrafts (Piper Cub, Auster, Fairchild, Dragon Rapide), which could perform limited tasks[6]. The Arabs enjoyed superiority in terms of weapons and ammunition, mainly in the form of aircraft, artillery and armor: Egypt, Syria and Iraq had air forces; Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq had tanks and all of them (except Lebanon) had many light armored vehicles[7]. The greatest threat was Egyptian Air Force, which used in operations Short Stirling bombers, C-47 Dakota aircrafts and Spitfire fighters[8] (I could not find figures, the sources mentioned some squadrons – in my opinion, there were about 40 planes in total). During the war, the Israelis’ military situation gradually improved, by equipment deliveries. These consisted of hundreds of thousands of riffles, more than 6,000 machine-guns, 23 Avia S-199 fighters (Messerschmitt Bf 109G made in Czechoslovakia), 13 Spitfire, air bombs, radio sets and air navigation equipment[9], different kinds of ammunition. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the geographical disadvantageous context (Arab armies performed offensive operations from all the directions), the Arab local groups spread over the disputed areas and the huge number of armored vehicles and artillery pieces of the Arab armies, IDF had low chance of success.  

The artillery and armored vehicles deployed by the Arab coalition were as the following[10]: 

State	Tanks	Light armored vehicles	Light artillery	Heavy artillery
Egypt	3 Sherman 132 light tanks Mk VI, M22 Locust	139 Bren carriers	unknown number of pieces	3 Sturmpanzer II Bison
Lebanon	90 light tanks R35	-	4 battalions – unknown number of pieces	-
Syria	45 light tanks R35 and R 39	25 Bren carriers	25mm and 65mm cannons – unknown number of pieces	-
Iraq	1 battalion – unknown number of tanks	1 battalion – unknown number of pieces	-	-
Transjordan	-	10-12 Marmon-Herrington	4-6 anti-tank 4 mortars	8 cannons
Palestinian groups	-	-	7 cannons	3 cannons

 One can easily see that the IDF faced a much more powerful enemy, especially in terms of armor and artillery.  Despite this, Israeli forces achieved success, by stopping Arab offensive operations and gaining control over the disputed territory. The Israeli invincibility myth was born.  

Basically, the IDF achieved a great victory. The main contributing factors were: grit, dedication and exceptionally planning. Well, this is obvious. Nevertheless, there are some other details to mention. If someone carefully analyses them, will identify other contributing factors, which are not taken into consideration in the publications that approach that war.

The human factor is very important in the war. IDF had little artillery and armor, but had much better personnel, because many of them were WWII veterans.  There were PAX of all branches: infantrymen, engineers, signal troops and so on. Even military cooks.

Do not laugh. On contrary, it is not amusing. In restaurants, chefs “fight” with clients’ preferences and objections, which might be sometimes exaggerated. The dishes must be tasty, neither too salty nor too sweet and so on. The military cooks do not pay any attention to his clients’ preferences. The troops must be feed, that is all. It does not matter that they like the food or not. On the other hand, the military cook prepares the food in harsh condition: outside, in hot or cold weather, in improvised shelters, most of the times using lower quantity of food. However, despite all of these, he must provide cooked food to the soldiers. In a restaurant, the chef has everything to do a good job: multifunction oven, sink, fridge and so on. There is none of these right behind own lines, not far from the enemy positions. The water is brought in barrels. Perishable food must be prepared quickly. Most important, the cook must prepare the food very carefully, in order to prevent a disease among the troops. And, be aware of the danger: do not use the light too much, an enemy sniper can shoot.

I can tell a lot about military men, not only about military cookers. Every branch has its own particularities, and it is as important as the others on the battlefield. No campaign can be conducted without any of them. IDF had experienced people for all the branches. It was not about usual training, during the peace time. That experience had been gained on the Europe, Africa and Oceania battlefields. Their adversaries had just a few such combatants.

Based on the lessons learned during the WWII, Israelis established two branches: intelligence and air force.

Israeli leaders were aware of the importance of information for the military operations. This is why they established reconnaissance subunits and units, from lower to higher echelons, including the strategic level. The Arab armies did not have such entities, because their commanders were not aware of the lessons learned from the war. The results appeared in a short time. IDF won a series of battles, despite the lack of artillery and armored troops.[11]

The most serious impact in the war was the Israeli new born air force. Usually, it takes a few years to establish an air force, no matter if the planes are already delivered. The armed forces that begin this need a lot: airfields and specific facilities; trained pilots, who are able to fly day and night, in bad weather condition and perform air combat missions, reconnaissance, aerial bombardment, close air support and so on; technical personnel for planes’ maintenance, who can mend the aircrafts disabled in the combat; logistical officers who provide all the necessary specific assets for flights – spare parts for planes and radio equipment, lubricants for aircrafts’ engines and many other items. After a few months, Israeli Air Force became very proficient at combat operations. It succeeded to repell Egyptian air attacks, to down enemy planes, to collect information, to bomb enemy targets and to conduct close air attacks against Arab troops who were engaging Israeli troops. There is no secret about this. IAF had all the necessary personnel to do this. If they could not find suited personnel for this job among IDF members, there were volunteers abroad. These volunteers (approximately 1,000[12]), fought in the WWII. The recruitment agencies did not need to work much: there were many jobless air combatants in Europe and Northern America. Only the best ones were recruited, of course. Those ones who downed enemy fighters, conducted air bombardment and attacks from low altitude, and evacuated wounded comrades under the enemy fire. Foreign volunteers were also employed to establish radar units[13]. The Arabs did not have any of these. The belligerent who enjoys air supremacy can do whatever he wants. The result was obvious: at the end of the war, IAF bombed Cairo, Aman and Damascus. That is the most conclusive evidence that Israeli victory was based especially on experienced WWII veterans. Nobody can contest this.

Marmon-Herrington light armored vehicle

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[1] The article Sirens, interceptions in Tel Aviv as Hamas fires rockets from Gaza, on-line publication Reuters, on Internet at Sirens, interceptions in Tel Aviv as Hamas fires rockets from Gaza | Reuters.

[2] The article Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza, RAND, on Internet at Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza | RAND.

[3] The article The Arab-Israeli War of 1948, on-line publication Office of the Historian, US Department of State, on Internet at Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian (state.gov).

[4] Maj Andres E. Montenegro, 1948 Arab-Israeli War: Victory in Consolidation, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 2020.

[5] The article Israel's 1948 War of Independence as a Total War, Journal of Contemporary History Vol 43 No 2, p. 245, 2008 SAGE Publications, on Internet at Naor_Moshe.pdf (emory.edu).

[6] The article The Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the War of Independence, on-line publication World Machal, on Internet at The Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the War of Independence - World Machal.

[7] Maj Andres E. Montenegro, 1948 Arab-Israeli War: Victory in Consolidation, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 2020.

[8] The Article Egyptian Air Force, on-line publication Academic Accelerator, on Internet at Egyptian Air Force: Most Up-to-Date Encyclopedia, News & Reviews (academic-accelerator.com).

[9] Maj Andres E. Montenegro, 1948 Arab-Israeli War: Victory in Consolidation, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS 2020.

[10] Steven's Balagan, Arab Order of Battle in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, on Internet at Arab Order of Battle in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War - Steven's Balagan.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Arielli, N (2014) When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel's Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined. Journal of Military History, 78 (2). pp. 703-724. ISSN 0899- 3718, White Rose University Consortium, on Internet at When are Foreign Volunteers Useful? Israel's Transnational Soldiers in the War of 1948 Re-examined (whiterose.ac.uk).

[13] Ibidem.