US MARINE CORPS GET RID OF THEIR TANKS

Article published on 21 Jan 2021

Marine Corps Times publication related, in an article, that the US Marine Corps top brass had decided to get rid of all their tanks.[1] This is a very important piece of information, because the dismissal of an army branch in an elite corps can indicate that the subjected branch would completely disappear from all the armed forces worldwide.

The debate about the tanks’ utility during the future military conflicts is already old; it was launched in the period of the Cold War. Then, the huge number of tanks that both NATO members and Warsaw Treaty members had, determined the development of a wide range of anti-tank weapons, from portable anti-tank grenade launchers to planes and helicopters adapted to anti-tank missions. The possibility to destroy a tank using a cheap weapon, operated by one or two persons, generated questions regarding the future of tanks. After 1990, most of the armies have significantly reduced the number of tanks, due to financial reasons and also to the reconsideration of their role in the military campaigns.  

The above mentioned article related that a series of wargames[2], conducted between 2018 and 2019, helped inform the Corps’ decision to get rid of tanks because they would have trouble surviving in fight with peer adversaries like China. According to the same article, from those wargames the Corps learned that the unit that shoots first has a “decisive advantage” on the battlefield and forces that can operate inside the range of enemy long-range precision fires “are more operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly maneuver to positions outside the weapons engagement zone”. Personally, I can specify that there is nothing new in what the Marine Corps learnt. The one who shoots first has always an advantage on the battlefield. This is not something new, at all. And a unit, in order to win, needs to get close to the enemy in order to attack, but this supposes to operate inside the range of enemy long-range precision fires. Again, there is nothing new.

The article also provides another argument to get rid of tanks: Syrian Army losses during a Turkish forces extensive offensive operation in Idlib Province (North-Western Syria) in February 2020. Syrians lost many tanks then. Turkish Forces attacked Syrian armored units, which were deployed on defense positions, by employing missiles launched from drones and planes, and heavy artillery.  The Syrian army could not defend from the onslaught of long range systems. Even tanks camouflaged by buildings and bushes were no match for sensors and thermal imaging watching from the skies. Assessment: the tanks had no chance to survive.

I invite you to make a short analysis. We can imagine a battlefield. A tank is about 2 kilometers away and is hurrying to us. What can we do? That is quite simple. We take the anti-tank missiles launcher, pinpoint the tank and launch the missile. The tank will be destroyed or damaged after a few seconds. But, what if the launcher does not work? This is not a problem, an anti-tank chopper shows up right above us, launches one or two missiles and the tank has no chance. Nevertheless, what if the helicopter does not fly here on time? Again, this is not a problem; one of our comrades has for sure an anti-tank grenade launcher and will damage the tank from about 500 meters. So, no matter what happens, the tank has no opportunity to attack us. Is this possible all I have described? If we take into consideration only the technology, yes, this is possible, there are no doubts. There are enough anti-tank weapons that can be used; the list of them is very long. What about taking into consideration the tactics? In this respect, the probability to materialize what we have imagined reduces to near zero. Because the tank is not alone on the battlefield. And it does not remain passive and defenseless. There is a lot to say about this…

The tank never operates alone. It operates in a formation of tanks. Depending on the mission, enemy and terrain, this formation might be a platoon (3-5 tanks), a company (10-20), a battalion (30-60) or a brigade (60-120). The formation of tanks also never operates alone. They will operate together with infantry units or subunits. Sometimes a tank platoon operates together with an infantry platoon, but usually with an infantry company. A tank company operates together with an infantry company, but most probably with an infantry battalion. Some reconnaissance patrols operate in advance, a few kilometers away. The task force consisting of tanks and infantry acts together with engineer and air defense subunits. Behind the task force, there are artillery subunits or units. Behind the artillery, there are transportation units or subunits, carrying fuel, ammunition, equipment, water, food and so on. The fuel consumption of a tank is hundreds of liters per 100 kilometers and it carries more than 40 projectiles. Infantry, engineers, artillery, air defense and transportation units or subunits also need fuel and ammunition. There are also mobile maintenance subunits in the area, in order to support the tanks. A tank needs maintenance after it traveled tens of kilometers. In whole, a huge formation of different branches results. This is very difficult to maneuver.

The science of using tanks in battles means to deploy enough tanks to give a powerful blow to the enemy, but, at the same time, their number must be low enough to be able to efficiently maneuver them. It is also necessary to provide a specific number of combat support and combat service support subunits, accordingly: reconnaissance, engineers, artillery, air defense, transportation, maintenance, in order to ensure their mobility and protection. If there are too many tanks and support elements, the task unit might become slow or might even block. If there are not enough tanks, the task force cannot attack the enemy in an effective way and the purpose is not achieved.

Taking into consideration its features, the tank is a mean designed for offensive operations. A force can perform offensive operations only when its air superiority or air supremacy is ensured. If the enemy controls the air, own forces cannot plan offensive operations. In this situation, own tanks become easy targets, because they can be easily identified and engaged, due to their size and the heat produced by engines. When conducting defense operations, it is necessary to deploy the tanks in the rear and keep them for future offensive operations. An attack conducted by tanks while the enemy controls the air is suicidal.  

What does an operation conducted by infantry and tanks look like? I repeat: this can be conducted only when air superiority is ensured. That means that own Air Force gains at least partial control of the air and the enemy aircrafts’ freedom of action is limited. Based on the intelligence gathering, the staff identifies the enemy strongholds and vulnerabilities and also establishes the axis of advance, objectives and forward line of own troops. The commander chooses the most vulnerable section of the enemy defense line, where own attack has allegedly the best chances of success, taking into consideration the tanks’ capabilities.  The artillery starts to fire on the enemy positions and the task force, consisting of tanks and infantry, begins the assault. Artillery’s fire diminishes enemy’s capabilities, destroys its fortifications, minefields and obstacles. At the same time, it neutralizes anti-tank weapons. Tanks open fire on enemy elements identified by reconnaissance patrols or own crews, using cannons, at a distance of several kilometers. The enemy anti-tanks weapons which remained active after the artillery fire engage the tanks, but, however, they can be targeted by the tanks, using cannons and machine-guns, by APCs[3] and by dismounted infantry. Engineer subunits which join the tanks provide the specialized support by helping them to cross obstacles and minefields, using mobile bridges, mine clearing vehicles and so on. If enemy planes or helicopters show up, the mobile defense systems that support the tanks will act. The enemy might send a high number of drones, but they will also be downed by defense systems and own air support assets. However, the tanks are not helpless in this situation: they have their own air defense machine guns, which can fire up to two kilometers vertically. The task force has the best chances to break through the enemy lines if the staff planned the operation taking into consideration the proper area for attack, used accurate information and, most important, deployed enough tanks to enable own forces to do this, but, at the same time, their number was low enough to permit maneuvers and to receive the necessary support and protection from other branches: air defense, engineers, transportation, maintenance and so on. There will be losses among the tanks, as well as among the infantry, engineers and so on. This cannot be avoided.

The tanks are not so vulnerable on the battlefield, no matter what many people think, because they are neither alone there nor helpless. They are just a component of a greater combat system. We may compare a military unit (no matter the echelon level – battalion, brigade or higher) with a boxer: the staff is the brain, the eyes are the scouts, and the fists are the infantry subunits. The legs and hands are the transportation and supply subunits which move the body. If the boxer has metal elements attached on his fists, his punches are much more powerful. These are the tanks. If the boxer only stay in defense, the metal elements are almost useless.  

In February 2019, Turkish forces destroyed a great number of Syrian tanks (103, according to the article). This is not unusual, because the tanks were taken by surprise and their adversary used many drones, anti-tank missiles, thermal sensors and heavy artillery systems. Many tanks were deployed close to the enemy lines and obviously they did not have enough air defense support. Most probably, the Syrian forces were preparing offensive operations, but the Turkish forces attacked first. The same happened at the beginning of Barbarossa operation, in 1941, during the Six-Day War, in Sinai and Golan Heights, as well as during the Desert Storm, in 1991. This has happened and will happen whenever the tanks will be deployed close to the enemy lines, without the necessary support of the air defense assets, and the enemy will attack by surprise. NATO forces tried the same tactics in Kosovo, in 1999, but failed, because Yugoslavian forces spread the tanks, efficiently concealed them (the terrain gave them an advantage) and used deception techniques to mislead the air sensors.

During the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Azerbaijani forces successfully used tanks, joined by Air Force, artillery, infantry engineers and combat support units. The Armenians could not use their own tanks, because they conducted mostly defense operations, lacked air support and air defense was not able to perform efficiently.

US Marine get rid of their tanks. But Marine Corps is designed to conduct mostly offensive operations, this is why they need tanks, while US Air Force ensures air superiority or supremacy, and there are enough support troops. If the adversary is China, the tanks are necessary. The arguments for getting rid of tanks are not solid. Most probably, the real reason is a financial one.

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[1] Article The Marines want to get rid of their tanks. Here’s why, 26 March 2020, on-line publication Marine Corps Times, on Internet at https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/flashpoints/2020/03/26/the-marines-want-to-get-rid-of-their-tanks-heres-why/.

[2] A pretend military battle that is performed only for the purpose of training, conducted using computer networks. During these exercises, the commanders and staffs, take decisions which are assessed by experts. In the past, these kinds of exercises were conducted using sandboxes. The terrain was reproduced using the sand and the troops were reproduced using wooden objects.

[3] Armored Personnel Carrier.