THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART IV

1967-1970 – War of Attrition

           Following the three wars (the Arab-Israeli War of 1947–1949, the Sinai Campaign of 1956, and the Six-Day War), the trump-cards utilized to achieve victory are quite visible: air power, highly capable intelligence agencies, massive external support, and 'blitzkrieg' tactics. A new trump-card was beginning to emerge: technological superiority through the use of electronic warfare.

After the Six-Day War, Israel's security situation was greatly improved. The military successes provided the Jewish state with a protective barrier and diminished the offensive potential of its adversaries. However, the threats were not eliminated. Egypt's leadership was determined to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula. To this end, Egyptian forces planned low-intensity military actions against Israeli forces, intended to generate serious material and human costs over time and force a withdrawal from the peninsula. [1]

          The demarcation line between Israel and Egypt was the Suez Canal itself. Most of the actions were planned in its vicinity. These began as early as 1967, shortly after the end of the war, and lasted until 1970. Historians have named this series of military actions the 'War of Attrition'. Unlike other military conflicts between Israel and the Arab states, this one is very little portrayed in the media and specialized publications. This is not coincidental. As upon closer examination, several questions arise.

     Let us briefly examine certain events from the timeline of the conflict's progression[2]:

-  July 1, 1967: Egyptian forces begin to conduct artillery strikes on Israeli positions along the Suez Canal; Egyptian commandos infiltrate 10 miles past the canal and inflict casualties among Israeli forces;

-       July 2, 1967: Israeli fighter jets attack Egyptian artillery emplacements;

-    July 1967: Egyptian fighter jets carry out massive attacks on Israeli positions along the canal and in the Sinai Peninsula; dogfights take place, resulting in a large number of Egyptian aircraft being shot down; 2 Egyptian torpedo boats are sunk in the Mediterranean Sea;

-  October 21, 1967: the Egyptian Navy sinks an Israeli destroyer in the Mediterranean (hit by missiles launched by a Soviet-made vessel); in retaliation, Israeli planes attack refineries and fuel depots; along the canal, Egyptian artillery heavily bombards Israeli positions;

-     January 1968: Israeli Air Force receives first batch of A-4H Skyhawk fighter jets;

-   June – October 1968: Egyptian artillery delivers intense fire onto Israeli positions along the canal; the Israelis suffer losses in personnel and equipment;

-  October 30, 1968: Israeli commandos damage components of the Nile's hydroelectric system, causing a massive power outage in Egypt; along the canal, Israeli troops begin constructing a line of fortifications (known as the 'Bar-Lev Line'); Egyptian forces significantly reduce their attacks along the canal;

-     March 8, 1969: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser officially declares the termination of the ceasefire agreement and the start of the 'War of Attrition'; Egyptian forces launch a broad campaign against Israeli positions along the canal and targets deep inland, through sustained artillery and air attacks, causing heavy losses in personnel and equipment; the Israeli artillery, far inferior to the Egyptian one, is overwhelmed; Israeli planes that intervene are shot down by Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles (SA-2);

-    March 9, 1969: Israeli commandos infiltrate deep into Egyptian territory and conduct raids; the Egyptian Chief of the General Staff is killed in a raid while inspecting positions near the Suez Canal;

-     March-July 1969: hostilities escalate; massive artillery and air bombardments on both sides, raids by Egyptian and Israeli commandos, and dogfights;

-       July 1969: Israeli forces escalate their retaliatory campaign; powerful airstrikes are carried out against Egyptian surface-to-air missile batteries and ground artillery; aerial combat intensifies; Egyptian pilots suffer heavy losses (according to sources, the reason was the poor training of the pilots);

-       July 18, 1969: Egyptian commandos perform raid on Israeli bases in Sinai;

-     July 19, 1969: during an attack on an island in the Red Sea, 80 Egyptian soldiers are killed; nearly all of Israel's fighter jets carry out raids in the northern area of the canal; over 300 Egyptian soldiers are killed, and the fortifications are seriously damaged;

-   August 1969: the Israelis fly over 1,000 air missions; surface-to-air missile launch positions are destroyed and over 20 Egyptian aircraft are shot down;

-    September 9, 1969: Israeli commandos conduct raids on Red Sea shore; 12 Egyptian outposts are destroyed and 2 Egyptian torpedo boats are sunk;

-       September 1969: Israeli Air Force receives the first batch of 44 F-4E Phantom II fighter-bombers; they are immediately deployed in strikes against surface-to-air missile batteries and reportedly obtain very good results;

-     September – December 1969: the Israeli campaign yields results; the Egyptian anti-aircraft defense system along the canal is neutralized;

-       October 1969: USA and USSR initiate diplomatic actions to persuade Israel and Egypt, respectively, to put an end to the hostilities;

-     December 9, 1969: dogfights above Sinai; directed by a P-15 radar, Egyptian fighters shoot down 2 Mirages and 1 F-4;

-    December 1969: a P-12 radar (newly entered into service with the Egyptian forces) is captured during an Israeli raid and transported to Israel;

-       December 1969 – March 1970: Egyptian forces avoid to deploy surface-to-air missile units in the vicinity of canal;

-       January 1970: taking advantage of the neutralization of the anti-aircraft missile units along the canal, Israeli fighter jets launch a bombing campaign against targets in the Nile Valley and Nile Delta; F-4 aircrafts are primarily used;

-       January 22, 1970: the Egyptian president travels secretly to Moscow, where he requests direct assistance; he receives a positive response;

-       February 8, 1970: Israeli air raids on targets in the Nile Delta;

-       February 12 – 15, 1970: intense aerial bombardments carried out against Israeli positions along the canal; Egyptian divers sink two Israeli auxiliary ships in the port of Eilat;

-       February 14, 1970: Israeli fighter planes attack a factory near Cairo; at least 80 employees are killed;

-       February 17, 1970: Israeli fighter jets strike targets near Cairo; the Egyptian Air Force carries out attacks on Israeli forces along the canal;

-       February 26, 1970: aerial combat over the Nile Delta; Israeli planes attack an airport near Cairo and other targets in the vicinity of the Egyptian capital; the Egyptian Air Force carries out raids on Israeli positions along the canal;

-       March 1970: USSR sends surface-to-air missile units to Egypt, equipped with SA-2 (S-75) and SA-3 (S-125) systems, an aviation regiment (equipped with MiG-21 MF), and radio-technical systems; additionally, approximately 10,000 advisors are sent to reorganize the Egyptian anti-aircraft defense; Soviet MiG-21 fighter jets begin patrolling west of the Suez Canal; Israeli aircrafts no longer fly deep into Egyptian territory;

-       April 1970: the deployment of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems in the Suez Canal area begins; Israeli fighter planes focus on striking them; despite the attacks, the Soviets succeed in positioning the systems within the canal zone;

-     June 30, 1970: Soviet surface-to-air missile batteries shot down 2 F-4 fighter jets;

-       July 18, 1970: other 2 F-4 shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles;

-      July 25, 1970: Soviet MiG-21 fighters damage an Israeli A-4 Skyhawk fighter jet in flight;

-       July 30, 1970: Israeli Air Force conducts an ambush in which MiG-21 fighters operated by Soviet pilots are lured; following the dogfight, 5 MiGs are shot down, and 1 Israeli fighter is damaged;

-       August (approximately 2-3), 1970: other 2 F-4 shot down by Soviet missiles;

-       August 1970: the diplomatic intervention of the USA, featuring a complex plan to end the hostilities, yields results; all parties involved (except Syria) reach an agreement; the conflict ceases.

In the timeline above, I have presented the events as reported by sources. The battles took place quite frequently, but with varying degrees of intensity. Information regarding this conflict is fairly scarce compared to other campaigns carried out by Israel (excluding, of course, the aerial ambush of July 30, 1970).

Besides the theater of operations in Egypt, clashes were also recorded along Israel's borders with Syria and Jordan, but these were sporadic and of low intensity.

Assessing the losses is difficult. According to their own sources, the Israelis recorded 1,424 military deaths and over 2,000 wounded, along with over 100 deaths and 700 wounded among civilians[3]. The Egyptian sources do not agree with these figures, but do not provide any other information[4], because, naturally, they cannot access data from Israel. Regarding the toll of Egyptian losses, sources provide various data. The number of deaths varies from 2,882 (official figures) to over 10,000[5].

Regarding the losses of military equipment, the Israeli side acknowledges 26 fighter jets lost, while Soviet estimates give a figure of 40. According to Israeli data, Egypt lost between 98 and 114 fighter jets. The Soviets reported 60 Egyptian aircraft lost (this figure also includes the downed Soviet fighters)[6] Concerning the tanks loses, information is very loosely. An Arabic source talks about 72 Israeli tanks destroyed[7] and I could not find any info about the number of destroyed Egyptian tanks.

 It is interesting to study the losses of SA-2 systems recorded by the Egyptians (launchers, missiles, guidance radars). Despite information regarding a large number of destroyed systems, official and unofficial sources, both Israeli and Western ones provide no data, which is strange. Estimates regarding Egyptian personnel killed were published (between 2,882 and over 10,000), yet nothing regarding the anti-aircraft missile batteries. It is much more difficult to account for the loss of human lives compared to the loss of launchers and specialized vehicles, as the latter represented priority targets and great attention was paid to conduct the battle damage assessment. It was absolutely natural, as the missiles posed a serious threat to Israeli fighter jets. And without fighter planes, ground troops became vulnerable and the deep-strike capability ceased to exist. On the Egyptian front, the Israelis dominated through their air force. Reports regarding the destruction of surface-to-air missile batteries contain phrases such as 'most were destroyed,' yet without providing even approximate figures. While such details might have represented classified information at the time, they now hold only historical interest, as tactics and combat technology have undergone significant changes. In other campaigns that ended in clear success, the Israelis provided detailed information about enemy losses - sometimes contested, sometimes not. But for the War of Attrition, nothing. At the very least, some estimates could have been made.

The online publication Air Power Australia presents certain data very vaguely. Thus, in the 1960s, 'between 15 and 25 batteries were delivered' (according to other sources, in the Six-Day War the Egyptians had 32 batteries[8]).  In the previous article about the Six-Day War, I explained that in the Western media, there is a confusion regarding the organization of Soviet surface-to-air missile units and subunits. Thus, the term 'battery' indicated by the sources is not appropriate. SA-2 systems were organized into battalions, consisting of batteries specialized by mission: fire (launch), command, and support. Therefore, we are talking about 15–25 battalions. It is possible that the discrepancy between the 32 indicated by another source and the figures mentioned above stems from the missions of the battalions. That is, out of 32 battalions, some (15, 20, or 25) may have been combat units, while the others (up to 32) were technical units (meaning they supplied the combat battalions with missiles and spare parts, carried out maintenance activities, etc.) and training units. Air Power Australia also provides other information of interest:

-       During the June 1967 offensive, the Israelis captured SA-2 subunits;

-  Soviets deployed to Egypt (March 1970) 3 surface-to-air missile brigades, consisting of 18 battalions, in whole;

-   Soviet loses in the battles with Israelis were '22 SA-2, SA-3, and air defense guns'.[9]

18 battalions is a significant force. Of course, not all of them were combat units; some were technical (probably three). Admittedly, the areas to be protected were also quite extensive. Between the two ends of the Suez Canal, there are 150 kilometers (in a straight line). The maximum horizontal range is 43 km for the SA-2 and 25 km for the SA-3[10]. When deploying to combat positions, the maximum coverage is not taken into account, as the engagement zones partially overlap. Consequently, several lines of SA-2 and SA-3 were organized, each consisting of 3 to 6 battalions.

The loss figure is relative. 22 SA-2s, SA-3s, and air defense guns. It is not specified by category, for instance, '8 guns, 6 SA-2s, and 8 SA-3s.' While the assessment of hitting an air defense gun can be somewhat accurate, for surface-to-air missile systems, it becomes very relative. Was the entire battalion hit? Meaning the launchers, guidance radars, transport and auxiliary vehicles? Or only some of them? If one launcher was hit, it does not mean the battalion was taken out of action.

The reluctance to address this subject and the vague presentation of information point to a concrete fact: the results were poor. This applies both to the engagement of Egyptian batteries and to that of the Soviet ones.

The Israelis held an advantage for nearly three years. They were well-acquainted with the SA-2 system (having captured several) and had faced it multiple times during the Six-Day War. They knew how to avoid, blind, and attack it. However, in the confrontation with Soviet missile operators, it was no longer the same. The SA-3, which was modern at the time, had also entered the fray. Furthermore, the SA-2 units belonging to the Soviet forces were not the same as the SA-2s used by the Egyptian forces. The export version had inferior technical and tactical characteristics compared to those used by the Soviet troops[11]. Moreover, the Soviet SA-2 operators had experience in successfully engaging the F-4 Phantom in Vietnam (110 aircraft shot down) ^[12].

The entry into action of the Soviet missile units dramatically changed the situation: the Israelis began losing planes and pilots. The losses were even considered 'unsustainable,' referring to both the aircraft and their crews[13]. Officially, six were shot down, but it is possible the figure was higher. That was not the most important aspect, but rather the prospect of losses multiplying - a fact acknowledged by the Israelis. In any case, one point emerges clearly: they could not afford to fight the Soviet anti-aircraft systems.

The missile barrage no longer allowed Israeli fighters to strike along the canal and beyond it. However, there were plenty of options to strike deep into Egyptian territory. A simple glance at the map is enough to realize that the space was vast, allowing for aircraft infiltration. From October 1967 until early 1970, Israeli fighter jets successfully struck a large number of targets on Egyptian soil, including in the capital's area. They enjoyed total freedom of action: the air defense was weak (most surface-to-air missile systems were located near the canal), and few modern fighter jets remained after the Six-Day War (30 MiG-21s out of 120). Of the 350 pilots trained for aerial combat, approximately 100 were killed and over 100 others were wounded.[14] Other MiG-21s were purchased, and by the end of 1968, their number reached 115 (after some had been shot down in the meantime). Further deliveries followed in 1969, but it was only in early 1970 that the Egyptian Air Force was significantly reinforced, receiving 80 MiG-21 MF units (a much more capable variant than previous ones in terms of avionics and armament). [15] In 1967, the Israeli Air Force was almost intact, operating over 200 combat planes - some of them outdated, but still far beyond the capabilities of the Egyptian Air Force. Furthermore, they had lost few pilots in June 1967. Starting with January 1968, they also received 48 A-4 Skyhawks. Naturally, until the appearance of Soviet jet fighters in the Egyptian skies, the Israelis maintained air superiority and managed to cause significant damage to the Egyptian armed forces and economy. However, from March 1970, their actions were confined only to the Suez Canal. They no longer carried out any missions deep into Egyptian territory. They avoided this due to the presence of Soviet MiGs and possibly because the Egyptian Air Force had received more advanced MiG variants.

In July 1970, Israeli forces were in a strategic stalemate. They were no longer able to carry out retaliatory strikes against major Egyptian targets, and protecting the troops on the Suez Canal involved aircraft losses. Soviet surface-to-air missile battalion and air squadrons had neutralized Israel's formidable advantages, namely its air force and technological superiority. Israeli ground troops on the canal were at the mercy of Egyptian artillery and aviation, and Egyptian commandos could resume raids into the Sinai. The trump-card provided by the efficiency of intelligence agencies remained valid, but without results achieved through military action, it had no effect. The 'blitzkrieg' tactic could not be applied. Only one trump-card remained: external support.

The US diplomatic intervention (the Rogers Plan, agreed upon by Israel, Egypt, and Jordan) put an end to military actions on August 7, 1970. The efforts had begun in June. Although the plan was immediately violated by the Egyptians and the Soviets through the deployment of surface-to-air missile units close to the Suez Canal[16] (the plan stipulated that no additional troops were to be deployed within a 50-kilometer strip along the canal[17]), Israelis did not resume military actions, which was unusual. But there was no way out for them. They had lost the trump-cards.

In order to maintain their image as victors until the external diplomatic intervention reached its final outcome, the Israelis successfully organized the aerial ambush of July 30, 1970, simulating easy targets for the Soviet fighters and thus luring them into an area where they were cornered. In the overall context of the conflict, this victory - brilliant as it was - did not matter. Prolonging the conflict meant Israel's defeat. However, it was necessary to construct an image: ‘we could win, but we preferred peace’.  

Why did Egypt accept the ceasefire agreement, despite the fact that Israel's military advantages were neutralized? Some reasons are obvious. The material and human losses were high, and the prospect of recovering the Sinai Peninsula by peaceful means (according to the Rogers Plan) was attractive[18]. At the same time, a change in the Egyptian president's attitude toward the US was noticed[19]. If there were other reasons involved, we cannot know.

Jordan accepted the plan for absolutely obvious reasons. Internal conflicts had broken out between the armed forces and Palestinian groups, and the US and Great Britain had begun providing the military assistance that the Jordanian state needed after the losses suffered in June 1967.

Syria did not accept the peace plan. However, it was left standing alone against Israel. In September 1970, Syrian troops intervened in Jordan to support the Palestinian groups that had entered into conflict with the government.[20] The hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors came to an end.

It was the first military conflict in which Israel did not win, although an image of a victor was created. The trump-cards used in previous wars no longer worked. It is true that it was not defeated either. The last trump-card available was used to exit the game honorably.

                                 

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[1] Honest Reporting, section Israel at War, article The War of Attrition: The “War Between The Wars”, https://honestreporting.com/the-war-of-attrition-the-war-between-the-wars/.

[2] Jewish Military Library, article Myths & Facts - The War of Attrition, 1967-1970, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/myths-and-facts-the-war-of-attrition-1967-1970; History Guild, article 51 years ago: Israel won an air battle, and lost the War of Attrition, https://historyguild.org/51-years-ago-israel-won-an-air-battle-and-lost-the-war-of-attrition/; Britannica, article War of Attrition, https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-Attrition-1969-1970; HISTORYNET, article Israel’s Bait-and-Switch: When the IAF Lured Soviet MiGs to Their Destruction, https://www.historynet.com/israels-bait-and-switch-when-the-iaf-lured-soviet-migs-to-their-destruction/; National Air and Space Museum, article Rescue Mission, https://airandspace.si.edu/air-and-space-quarterly/issue-9/rescue-mission; Jewish Military Library, article The War of Attrition: Operation “Rooster”, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/operation-ldquo-rooster-rdquo-december-1969; The New York Times, article 3 MIG's Claimed By Israeli Pilots; Egypt Denies Loss, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/02/27/archives/3-migs-claimed-by-israeli-pilots-egypt-denies-loss-israelis-report.html; Boot Camp & Military Fitness Institute, article What was the War of Attrition (1967-1970)?, https://bootcampmilitaryfitnessinstitute.com/2021/11/23/what-was-the-war-of-attrition-1967-1970/.

[3] Jewish Military Library, article Myths & Facts - The War of Attrition, 1967-1970, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/myths-and-facts-the-war-of-attrition-1967-1970.

[4] Institute for Palestine Studies, article The War of Attrition, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/38277.

[5] Honest Reporting, section Israel at War, article The War of Attrition: The “War Between The Wars”, https://honestreporting.com/the-war-of-attrition-the-war-between-the-wars/.

[6] Time ∞ Note, article War of Attrition, https://timenote.info/en/events/War-of-Attrition.

[7] Nasser Youth Movement, article Nasser and War of Attrition, https://nasseryouthmovement.net/War-of-Attrition#:~:text=During%20the%20battles%20of%20attrition%2C%20Israel%20lost,72%20tanks%2C%2081%20field%20guns%20and%20mortars.

[8] King’s College London, article A History of the Syrian Air Force 1947-1967, https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/studentTheses/a-history-of-the-syrian-air-force-1947-1967/.

[9] Air Power Australia, articolul Surface to Air Missile Effectiveness in Past Conflicts, https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-SAM-Effectiveness.html#:~:text=The%20first%20Soviet%20SAMs%20in%20the%20region,batteries%2C%20later%20supplemented%20by%2016%20SA%2D3%20batteries.

[10] Air Power Australia, article Revisiting the Lessons of Operation Allied Force, https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-04.html.

[11] Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (Macmillan Publishing Co, New York, 1982), 112 – 113.

[12] Air & Space Forces, article Take It Down! The Wild Weasels in Vietnam, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0710weasels/.

[13] History Guild, article 51 years ago: Israel won an air battle, and lost the War of Attrition, https://historyguild.org/51-years-ago-israel-won-an-air-battle-and-lost-the-war-of-attrition/.

[14] Warfare History Network, article The Sinai Air Strike: June 5, 1967, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/the-sinai-air-strike-june-5-1967/.

[15] Plane Encyclopedia, article Korean People’s Airforce Pilots deployed during the Yom Kippur War, https://plane-encyclopedia.com/tag/mig/.

[16] Britannica, article War of Attrition, https://www.britannica.com/event/War-of-Attrition-1969-1970.

[17] United Nations, section The Question of Palestine, page Ceasefire agreement/Rogers Plan B, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209696/.

[18] The New York Times, article Nasser's Reply to Rogers, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/26/archives/nassers-reply-to-rogers.html.

[19] Time, article World: Yes from Nasser, Dilemma for Israel, https://time.com/archive/6814387/world-yes-from-nasser-dilemma-for-israel/.

[20] CIA, article Fifty Years after “Black September” in Jordan, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Black-September-Jordan.pdf.