THE MYTH OF ISRAELI INVINCIBILITY. PART V

1973 – Yom Kippur War

           In 1970, following the War of Attrition, Israel's military superiority over its Arab neighbors had been largely neutralized. Some of the advantages present in the first three armed conflicts (the 1947–1949 Arab-Israeli War, the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and the Six-Day War) were no longer applicable, namely air power, 'blitzkrieg' tactics, and technological superiority. What remained were intelligence superiority and massive external support.

       Overall, Israel's security situation had improved. Egypt and Syria remained enemies, but Jordan no longer threatened Israel's borders. Although Jordan was to participate in the war with troops, the eastern border no longer posed problems for the Israeli army, allowing it to concentrate its forces in the northeast and the Sinai. The Suez Canal remained the demarcation line with Egypt, where the Israelis had constructed a line of fortifications (known as the Bar-Lev Line). The Egyptian and Syrian leaderships had not abandoned the idea of reclaiming the lost territories (Sinai and Golan) at any cost; however, starting in 1971, Egyptian leaders intensified contacts with US representatives to identify a peaceful solution. In 1972, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat no longer agreed with the Soviet military presence in his country and sent the advisors and troops back to the USSR.[1] However, according to some sources, it was merely a deception strategy aimed at masking preparations for a new war, with only the Soviet troops being redeployed, but not the advisors ^[2]. At the same time, the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces were reorganized and equipped with modern Soviet technology. Most importantly, the air defense units of both armed forces were significantly strengthened. Egypt possessed 220 SA-3 launchers (approximately 55 battalions[3]), 10 SA-6 (2K12 Kub) battalions and approximately 65 SA-2 battalions. Syria had acquired 37 anti-aircraft missile battalions (11 SA-2, 11 SA-3, and 15 SA-6). The arsenals of the two Arab states also included portable SA-7 missile launchers (9K32 Strela-2), with 600 in the Egyptian army and 165 in the Syrian army. Air defense guns were not neglected, as new batches were acquired, reaching significant numbers (Egypt – 2,750, Syria – 1,100). The most important aspect to mention here: after 1970, radar-equipped ZSU-23-4 guns entered service[4], which made them dangerous for fighter jets flying at low altitudes. The fighter aviation of both states was also heavily reinforced. In October 1973, the Egyptians had 326 MiG-21 fighter jets in service, while the Syrians had 186 of the same type. Regarding tanks, the two armies together possessed approximately 3,800, with the presence of the T-62 tank—ultra-modern at the time—being particularly noteworthy. For anti-tank defense, both armies had received systems 9M14 Malyutka.[5] Heavy artillery was the strong point of the Arab forces, with the Egyptians possessing over 2,000 pieces and the Syrians over 1,000 in their units designed for offensive alone, without taking reserves into account ^[6].

          The Israelis, in turn, continued to strengthen their armed forces through acquisitions of modern technology. In 1973, they possessed over 480 fighter jets, of which 130 F-4 Phantom, 172 A-4 Skyhawk and 61 Mirage III[7]. The anti-aircraft defense relied on 75 Hawk batteries and 1,000 air defense guns. The number of tanks was increased considerably, reaching 1,950. Regarding anti-tank missiles, certain questions arise. The French SS-11 systems were decommissioned just before the start of the war, without any explanation being recorded.[8]

      Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement) is the most important Jewish holiday. It involves fasting and specific rituals. On this day, no work is done in Israel, road traffic is voluntarily suspended, and shops are closed.[9] Naturally, a large part of the active military personnel go on leave to be with their families. This is precisely why the Egyptian and Syrian leaderships chose this date to launch the offensive.

Did the Israelis find out about the intention to attack in time? The subject is still debated today. Some sources claim that information did exist, but with a high degree of uncertainty, meaning that a major failure occurred at the intelligence level[10]. Other sources mention that there was certain information, but the Israelis had well-founded reasons not to carry out preemptive strikes (as they did in 1967), the most important being the request from U.S. officials to that effect[11]. In other words, they were forced by circumstances not to be the ones to initiate hostilities, as the political factor took precedence over the military one.

Personally, I believe the reason for not executing preemptive strikes is not among those mentioned above. The Syrian and Egyptian preparations for war were very well masked; for example, the Egyptian forces conducted several mobilization and deployment exercises toward the canal involving large units, without entering the final phase—namely, an actual attack on Israeli forces. The Syrians proceeded in a similar manner. Additionally, false information was 'leaked' regarding serious maintenance problems with their combat equipment.[12] Nevertheless, the Israelis did find out about the upcoming offensive. This was only natural, as they possessed extremely efficient intelligence services. But they chose not to strike first. This fact is acknowledged. Did they know, however, that the Arab attack would take place specifically on Yom Kippur? It was not hard to guess; that particular day offered a great advantage, both by reducing the forces on the Suez Canal and in the Golan, and by delaying the response.

Preemptive strikes are effective if the enemy does not expect them and is caught 'off guard,' at the very moment they are concentrating troops for the start of the offensive. This was no longer the case in October 1973. The Arabs were aware that the Israelis could execute preemptive strikes, rapidly and by surprise, without any indicators of preparation. For these strikes, the Israelis primarily utilized their air force. However, at that moment, there was a 'wall' of missiles that could neutralized the Israeli advantage in terms of air power. Any aerial attack would have been repelled by missiles, and the losses would have been heavy. The Israelis had no other solution but to let the Arabs make the first moves and find solutions based on the evolution of the situation.

Let us attempt to reconstruct a chronology of the military operations ^[13]:

6 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       At 14:00, the vanguard of the Egyptian forces (five infantry divisions, two mechanized divisions, and two independent tank brigades, commando units, totaling approximately 80,000 troops) crosses the Suez Canal under artillery fire support, initially using assault boats and subsequently establishing pontoon bridges. Bridgeheads are seized and expanded. By evening, forward Egyptian subunits reach up to 10 km west of the canal. Most of the western bank is taken over by Egyptian forces, while small Israeli garrisons remain encircled.

-     The Israelis conduct counterattacks with tank subunits; these are repelled by the Egyptians using anti-tank missiles.

-       Israeli aircraft attack Egyptian ground forces and canal crossing points; surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries shoot down 3 A-4 attack aircraft and 1 F-4 fighter, while 4 A-4 aircraft and 1 F-4 are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-      At 14:00, Syrian forces (three mechanized divisions, two tank divisions, and three independent tank brigades—70,000 troops, 950 tanks, and 650 heavy artillery pieces) launch massive artillery strikes. Syrian Air Force also joined them. Infantry and armored units attack Israeli positions. However, the momentum of the attack is reduced by poor coordination with engineer units tasked with breaching Israeli obstacles.

-       Israeli forces (two armored brigades and one infantry brigade – 7,500 personnel, 180 tanks, and 50 heavy artillery systems) are withdrawing to more advantageous positions.

-       Israeli war planes conduct strikes against Syrian ground forces.

-       air defense missile batteries shoot down 2 A-4 aircraft.

-       The Israeli Naval Forces sank 5 Syrian warships off the Syrian coast.

7 October

Israeli forces initiate the mobilization of more than 300,000 reservists.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli armored tank subunits resume the attack against Egyptian forces but are hit by anti-tank missiles, sustain losses, and withdraw; by this point, Israeli forces have already lost approximately 150 tanks.

-       Egyptian forces continue the offensive and expand the area under their control east of the canal; forward subunits reach up to 20 kilometers from the canal.

-     The Israeli Air Force conducts strikes against Egyptian ground forces and pontoon bridges; 6 A-4, 1 F-4, and 3 Super Mystère aircraft are shot down; 8 A-4s and 6 F-4s are damaged.

-       The first Israeli reinforcements arrive.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Israeli forces conduct counterattacks that reduce and, in some sectors, halt the Syrian offensive; however, in certain areas, Syrian forces manage to break through and advance into the Israeli defensive layout to depths of between 10 and 25 kilometers; by evening, Israeli forces have already lost approximately half of the territory previously held in the Golan Heights.

-       Numerous Israeli reinforcements arrive in the area (including three armored divisions).

-       Israeli combat aircraft strike Syrian armored columns; 4 A-4s, 6 F-4s, 1 Mirage, and 1 Super Mystère aircraft are shot down; 10 A-4s and 3 F-4s are damaged.

8 October

The leadership of the USSR decides to send weapons and military equipment to Syria and Egypt.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli ground units launch multiple counterattacks; an Israeli armored brigade enters a kill zone and is almost completely destroyed.

-       Israeli air operations against Egyptian ground units and bridges continue; 4 A-4s, 3 F-4s, and 1 Mirage are shot down; 9 A-4s and 9 F-4s are damaged.

-       Two Israeli armored divisions arrive in the area of operations.

-       The Israeli Navy sinks three Egyptian warships near Port Said.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-      Israeli counterattacks continue, supported by massive air operations; they succeed in recapturing part of the lost territory.

-       1 A-4 and 2 F-4s are shot down; 3 A-4s and 4 F-4s are damaged.

9 October

Shipments of Soviet weapons and military equipment to Egypt and Syria begin, totaling cargoes of more than 63,000 tons.
The Israeli leadership considers the use of nuclear weapons.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-      Israeli forces abandon ground counterattacks conducted by tanks and infantry due to heavy losses; air-launched counterattacks continue; 8 A-4s and 2 F-4s are shot down; 8 A-4s and 3 F-4s are damaged.

-       Egyptian forces shift to consolidating the captured lines.

-       The Egyptian grouping of approximately 80,000 troops designated for operations in the Sinai has fully crossed the canal.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       The Syrian offensive is halted; by this point, Syrian forces have lost approximately 800 tanks.

-       3 A-4s, 1 F-4, and 1 Mirage are shot down; 4 A-4s and 1 F-4 are damaged.

10 October

The President of the United States announces that all Israeli losses in tanks and aircraft will be replaced. To this end, he immediately authorizes an airlift to Israel. At this point, Israeli forces have already lost more than 50 combat aircraft (shot down) and 500 tanks. An additional 72 combat aircraft have been damaged.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Egyptian forces continue consolidating the captured lines.

-   Israeli forces conduct harassment actions with infantry and armored subunits; air operations in the bridge areas cease; 1 A-4 and 7 F-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Israeli forces launch a counteroffensive and advance to the demarcation line established in June 1967.

-       1 A-4 and 2 Mirages are shot down; 3 A-4s and 8 F-4s are damaged.

11 October

Soviet leaders announce the possibility of an intervention with forces in the Middle East. The United States immediately makes the same announcement.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Egyptian forces continue consolidating the captured lines.

-       Israeli forces conduct harassment actions.

-       2 F-4s are shot down; 2 A-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Israeli forces cross the demarcation line and advance toward Damascus, but suffer heavy losses; the first echelon consists of three armored divisions; the vanguard reaches up to 20 kilometers beyond the demarcation line.

-       6 A-4s, 1 F-4, and 1 Super Mystère are shot down; 5 A-4s and 5 F-4s are damaged.

12 October

The first shipments of U.S. weapons and military equipment arrive in Israel. The airlift will operate throughout the duration of the conflict. Equipment, combat systems, and ammunition totaling more than 22,000 tons will be delivered (including, among others, 36 F-4s and 46 A-4s).

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Two additional Egyptian armored divisions begin crossing the canal.

-      Israeli troops regroup and begin preparations for a large-scale counterattack, with the objective of crossing the canal.

-       2 A-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       The Israeli offensive toward Damascus continues; Syrian troops put up increasingly strong resistance; Iraqi and Jordanian units join them.

-       The Israeli command redeploys forces toward the Sinai.

-       2 A-4s, 2 F-4s, and 1 Mirage are shot down; 2 A-4s and 4 F-4s are damaged.

13 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-      The two Egyptian armored divisions that began crossing on 12 October are fully deployed east of the canal and are preparing for offensive operations in the Sinai.

-       Egyptian subunits attempt to advance deeper into the peninsula and along the Gulf of Suez coast, but the advance is insignificant.

-       1 A-4 is shot down; 1 A-4 and 1 F-4 are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       The Syrian defensive posture is significantly reinforced with Iraqi troops.

-       Israeli forces halt the offensive, primarily due to losses; Israeli commanders assess that any resumption of the advance would result in heavy casualties and order a transition to the defensive on the positions reached; at this point, the line of contact is located 30 kilometers from Damascus.

-       2 A-4s, 2 F-4s, and one Mirage are shot down; 3 A-4s and 1 F-4 are damaged.

-       The redeployment of Israeli forces toward the Sinai continues.

14 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Egyptian forces launch an offensive into the depth of the Sinai Peninsula, with two armored divisions as the main striking force (approximately 1,000 tanks in total); the advance moves Egyptian troops out from under the protection of air defense missile systems; they encounter strong resistance, especially from the air, and lose more than 200 tanks.

-       Israeli forces prepare to conduct a large-scale westward attack, with the objective of reaching the Suez Canal.

-       1 F-4 is shot down; 3 F-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       The phase of positional warfare begins.

-       1 F-4 is shot down.

-       Iraq and Jordan continue deploying troops to the area of operations.

15  October

Egyptian officials announce the possibility of negotiating a ceasefire agreement, asking the Sinai Peninsula; the Israelis reject the offer.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-     An Israeli force grouping, consisting of two armored divisions and engineer units, exploits an uncovered gap in the Egyptian combat formation and conducts a breakthrough operation to the canal, successfully securing a corridor; an Israeli airborne brigade crosses the Suez Canal north of the Great Bitter Lake; the corridor’s flanks are secured by the two armored divisions, reinforced with infantry units.

-       1 F-4 is shot down; 1 A-4 and 6 F-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional fighting continues.

-       2 A-4s are shot down; 1 F-4 is damaged.

16 October

The President of Egypt requests diplomatic support from the USSR for the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli troops succeed in capturing a bridgehead on the western bank of the canal; a pontoon bridge is installed and the movement of additional troops across the canal begins; by evening, an infantry brigade and an armored brigade are already deployed on the western bank.

-     In the area of the Israeli bridgehead on the western bank, only a single Egyptian mechanized brigade is deployed; it conducts actions against the bridgehead without success.

-       Israeli subunits which crossed the canal advance and neutralize Egyptian air defense missile batteries.

-       Egyptian commando subunits attack the Israeli corridor on the eastern bank, supported by artillery and air power; these actions inflict losses on Israeli troops and at times disrupt their movement across the canal, but fail to halt it.

-       1 A-4 and 1 Mirage are shot down; 6 A-4s and 1 F-4 are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Counteroffensive operations are conducted by a combined grouping of Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian forces; the Israelis repel the attacks.

-       1 A-4 is damaged.

17 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Egyptian forces conduct artillery and air strikes against the Israeli canal crossing point but fail to halt the movement of troops across the canal.

-       Israeli subunits continue to advance and neutralize Egyptian air defense missile batteries.

-       Egyptian armored and mechanized units conduct attacks against the flanks of the Israeli corridor on the eastern bank; Israeli forces counterattack, and intense fighting occurs, with heavy losses on both sides.

-       1 F-4 and 1 Mirage are shot down; 2 A-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional fighting continues.

-       2 A-4s and 1 Super Mystère are shot down.

18 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli forces succeed in securing the bridgehead west of the canal.

-       An Israeli armored division crosses the canal and begins expanding the bridgehead.

-       An entire Egyptian brigade attempting to attack the Israeli bridgehead is destroyed.

-       The Israeli Air Force (IAF) begins conducting large-scale operations over the canal and deep into the Egyptian tactical depth, taking advantage of the fact that much of the Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries have been neutralized; nevertheless, 4 A-4s and 2 F-4s are shot down, while 7 A-4s and 2 F-4s are damaged.

-       The Egyptian command decides to withdraw SA-6 SAM divisions westward in order to reinforce the air defense of the capital; this decision allows even greater freedom of action for the Israeli Air Force.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional fighting continues.

19 October

High-level diplomatic consultations are initiated between representatives of the United States and the USSR regarding a ceasefire agreement in the Middle East.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       10,000 Israeli troops, supported by 200 tanks, are fighting on the western bank of the canal; an additional pontoon bridge has been installed; air defense batteries are deployed at the crossing point.

-       The Israeli Air Force carries out heavy strikes against Egyptian ground forces along the canal and deep within the Egyptian tactical depth; 3 A-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional warfare, with the exception of a successful attack carried out by Jordanian troops, though without altering the overall situation.

20 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli air operations against Egyptian ground forces continue.

-       2 F-4s and 1 Mirage are shot down; 2 F-4s are damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional warfare.

21 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Heavy Israeli air operations are conducted against Egyptian ground forces; 1 Mirage is shot down.

-       Israeli subunits reach an area at about 60 kilometers from Cairo.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional warfare.

-       1 A-4 and 1 F-4 are shot down.

22 October

At the proposal of the United States and the USSR, the United Nations adopts a resolution calling for a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. Egypt accepts. Israel immediately accuses the Egyptians of violating the agreement and continues military operations.

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-       Israeli forces conduct heavy air operations against Egyptian ground forces; 4 A-4s aircraft are damaged.

-       Israeli forces on the western bank of the canal push southward (toward the city of Suez); advanced sub-units destroy Egyptian air defense missile batteries.

The Syrian theater of operations:

- Positional warfare.

-  Syrian government rejects the draft ceasefire agreement.

23 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-  The Israeli force group on the western bank of the canal continues its advance southward.

-  1 A-4 is damaged.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional warfare.

24 October

The Egyptian theater of operations:

-  There are already 20,000 Israeli troops on the western bank of the canal, supported by 500 tanks.

-  Israeli forces reach the city of Suez; the Egyptian force group in the Sinai (45,000 troops) is completely encircled; 1 F-4 is damaged.

-  Israel agrees to the ceasefire.

The Syrian theater of operations:

-       Positional warfare.

-       The Syrian government agrees to the ceasefire.

After 24 October:

-       The ceasefire agreement is violated several times by all parties.

-       Egyptian units in the Sinai attempt to break out of the encirclement but fail.

-       On 28 October, the Israelis allow the transfer of humanitarian aid to the encircled troops.

-       On 11 November, Egypt and Israel conclude a permanent ceasefire agreement, mediated by the United States; Syria refuses to sign the permanent agreement.

Let’s make a brief analysis. The Israelis knew that a large-scale attack on two fronts would follow. They were not in a position to carry out preemptive strikes, as the Soviet air defense missiles prevented them. They let the Arabs make the first moves, just like on a chessboard. This does not mean, however, that they were unprepared. They let it be assumed that they considered themselves invincible after the successes of 1967 and would not anticipate an Arab offensive. In practice, they encouraged the attack, pretending to be strategically surprised. That is why, along the Bar-Lev Line on 6 October, there were fewer than 600 troops, organized into sub-units of 10–20 soldiers each[14]. And that over 200 kilometers! We can no longer speak of a fortified line, but rather observation posts. They were left to be sacrificed. In the Sinai, rapid-reaction forces were scarce. For the Egyptians, it was an invitation to act. But the Israelis had no reason to fear. Between the territory that needed to be protected and the Suez Canal lay the Sinai Peninsula—impossible to cross in a short period of time. And, in any case, the Egyptian forces were not numerous enough to reach Israel’s old border. Most importantly, the dispersion of Egyptian forces in the Sinai would have placed them outside the protective umbrella of the air defense missile battalions. Which, in fact, happened to some extent. Strategically, the Egyptian offensive did not pose any real threat. All they could do was seize bridgeheads across the canal and possibly expand them slightly, then transition to a defensive posture, forcing Israel into a war of attrition. In fact, this was the plan of the Egyptian leadership, with the intention of resolving territorial disputes at the negotiating table.[15]. For this reason, the Israeli leadership allowed the Egyptians to attack, and even encouraged them. They knew exactly what the Egyptians could and could not do.

The situation on the Syrian front unfolded somewhat differently. Israeli settlements were in close proximity, and a large-scale penetration would have posed serious challenges to Israel. Moreover, the area’s terrain, with elevations exceeding 1,000 meters, provided the Israelis with a strategic advantage, enabling electronic surveillance over large portions of Syrian territory. Consequently, they deployed an armored brigade even before the outbreak of hostilities[16]. The line of contact extended over 65 kilometers across rugged terrain, a factor that significantly reduced offensive capabilities. The relatively small number of Israeli troops in the area initially appeared to be an encouraging factor. However, given the limited length of the front, the terrain favorable to defense, and the ability to rapidly deploy reserves, it becomes clear that the strategic situation was far from critical for the Israelis. Even though Jordanian and Iraqi forces intervened on a large scale, alongside contingents from Cuba, Pakistan, North Korea, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, the lack of coordination with Syrian forces greatly diminished their overall effectiveness[17]. Broadly speaking, the situation was the same as in the Sinai. The only difference was that the Syrian front required a faster resolution.

Everything was under control for Israel. There was no reason for panic. The Arab attack was bound to be perceived as aggression, and external support would arrive swiftly. The Arab coalition fell into the trap.

The crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces was a brilliant operation—by all accounts. Such an operation is difficult even during peacetime exercises. The crossing involved leveling the canal banks and neutralizing any potential Israeli intervention. Although ground resistance was minimal and Israeli air operations were constrained by the missile umbrella, they were limited—but not stopped. Numerous strikes were carried out, both against the crossing points and against the forces that had crossed. Admittedly, the Israeli Air Force paid a heavy price as a result of these near-suicidal attacks. However, the Egyptian leadership subsequently committed a whole series of errors: it dispatched strong formations to conduct deep strikes into the peninsula, yet without adequate protection against the Israeli Air Force; it failed to prevent Israeli forces from reaching the canal, crossing it, expanding the bridgehead, and isolating the forces in the peninsula; it allowed the Israelis to neutralize its surface-to-air missile systems; and it did not withdraw the Sinai forces despite the risk of encirclement. These are difficult aspects to explain.

While the advance of armored and mechanized divisions beyond the protective range of surface-to-air missiles can be considered a mistake, the arrival of Israeli units at the canal raises major question marks. Historians offer a clear explanation: accurate intelligence, detailed planning, effective execution, and flexibility. In other words, the Israelis identified a gap between two Egyptian armies and exploited the breach. They inserted forces into the newly created gap, secured the flanks, pushed through to reach the canal, and crossed it—initially using elite troops. They then deployed engineer units that installed a pontoon bridge, allowing armored and mechanized brigades to cross to the western bank. All of this appears plausible. These aspects are also confirmed by Egyptian sources, based on recently declassified information. The uncovered interval was created as a result of the Egyptian president’s intervention in military planning. He ordered a deep offensive into the interior of the peninsula, executed on 14 October, which resulted in a rupture of the Egyptian force posture and created a gap in the order of battle.[18] Nevertheless, it was a series of very fortunate coincidences for the Israelis.

During the conduct of operations, a gap may appear between two units. This is highly likely. Between two large units, the probability increases. When it comes to two armies, the likelihood is even greater. However, such a breach does not last long. The time interval is short—just a few hours. As soon as it is detected, command dispatches reserve or redeploys units from the second echelon to close it, since the enemy could exploit the situation. The breach that appeared between the two Egyptian armies was due to a decision by the Egyptian president, fairly well justified politically: the Syrian offensive had been halted, and there was a need to apply greater pressure on the Israelis in the Sinai. The military leadership opposed it: if we remove the troops from the protection of the surface-to-air missiles, we will incur heavy losses and the entire operation will fail. But the president insisted, and the military executed the order. It was an error created by the president. The question is: when was this order given? The information is very vague. It appears to have been on 11, 12, or 13 October. On the 14th, in any case, the order was carried out, which led to a catastrophe.

On 12 October, the Israelis began preparations for an offensive toward the Suez Canal and its crossing. The fact that, on 15–16 October, they were able to establish the access corridor, force the canal, and seize the bridgehead demonstrates that they knew precisely the sector where the gap between the two Egyptian armies would appear. Such an operation is not simple. The paratrooper brigade needed to be brought into the area. At the same time, to get tanks and heavy equipment across the canal, engineer units were required. The paratroopers crossed using assault boats, but the first tank subunits crossed on pontoons. In addition, ammunition, equipment, fuel, and many other supplies necessary for tank crews and infantry had to be transported. For this, the Israelis had to deploy engineer units with pontoons—meaning many convoys of trucks. Time was needed. Preparations began on 12 October, meaning that the engineer units were ordered at that time to prepare the vehicles and pontoons and to move to the area of departure for the operation—that is, the location from which the access corridor was to be created. These preparations and movements take time; they cannot be carried out quickly. In addition, protective measures are required—that is, additional forces, trucks, artillery pieces, and so on. Everything indicates that the Israelis knew in advance where the breach would occur. While they were preparing to force the canal, the Egyptian president was still in disputes with the Chief of the General Staff. The uncovered interval appeared on 14 October because the Egyptian troops advanced toward the center of the peninsula, and the disposition shifted, resulting—coincidentally or not—in an uncovered gap. Fairly typical, it appeared between the combat formations of two armies. But precisely where the Israeli force was expecting a breakthrough toward the canal, positioned two days earlier!

After crossing the canal, Israeli subunits advanced rapidly and neutralized the Egyptian surface-to-air missile battalions. As these were taken out of action, the Israeli Air Force gained increasing freedom of maneuver. This allowed Israeli combat planes to intervene quickly and nullify any Egyptian attempts to attack the access corridor to the canal, the crossing point, and the bridgehead. Despite the heroic efforts of the Egyptian forces, it was no longer possible for the situation to turn in their favor. Losses of Israeli aircraft and tanks were offset by U.S. support. The Egyptian Air Force had little impact against Israeli squadrons that were decimating their ground forces. The Israelis once again dominated the skies, operating as they had in 1967. The trump card had just been regained.

Why didn’t the Egyptians withdraw their SAM battalions further back, from where they could at least cover part of their own combat formations? An SA-2 or SA-3 battalion can be redeployed in a few hours[19] [20]. Why weren’t the SAM units provided with troops to protect them? Several hours passed between the canal crossing and the attack on the SAM units. More importantly, in the following days the Israelis continued to advance and neutralized even more air defense systems—like a game of bowling. No one took measures to withdraw them further back, except for the SA-6s, which were officially redeployed to protect the capital. I suspect the Soviets intervened, as they did not want these systems—state-of-the-art at the time—to fall into Israeli hands.

There are too many question marks. Apparently, there are no explanations for the serious mistakes that occurred and for the coincidences that favored the Israelis on the battlefield. However, if we look at how Egypt’s international relations evolved afterward, we might find some answers.

After 1973, Egypt broke off relations with the USSR and turned toward the United States. President Anwar Sadat was even accused of serving American interests in the 1973 war. American and Western investments boosted the Egyptian economy. Relations with Israel were greatly improved, while those with Syria were drastically reduced. The Sinai Peninsula was returned in full, but gradually, by 1982. The only territory not returned was the Gaza Strip.[21] Egypt benefited from American economic and military assistance totaling over 60 billion USD, starting in 1979[22].

        Let’s recap. In October 1973, the Israelis still had two trump cards: intelligence superiority and strong external support. Through effective deception operations, they encouraged Egypt and Syria to launch large-scale offensive operations. There were no possibilities for preemptive strikes, primarily due to the air defense missile systems. Nevertheless, the Arab offensive produced significant surprises. They were no longer the same enemies as in 1967. The combat effectiveness of the Arab militaries had increased significantly. On the Syrian front, the length of the contact line, the terrain, and the rapid deployment of forces gave the Israelis the ability to halt the offensive and transition to a counteroffensive. However, after losing personnel, territory, and equipment, the situation in the Sinai was developing unfavorably for them. The effectiveness of the Egyptian forces exceeded estimates, and the Israeli forces were at a disadvantage. The intervention of an unforeseen factor was necessary. This materialized through a series of erroneous decisions and coincidences that helped the Israelis gain the initiative, particularly through the reemergence of another trump card previously considered lost: air power. This advantage immediately restored another, namely the ‘blitzkrieg’ capability. The Egyptian president was the main decision-maker who turned the situation in favor of the Israelis. The trump card represented by external support functioned once again.

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[1] Office of the Historian, article The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/arab-israeli-war-1973.

[2] The Jerusalem Post, article How fake news becomes fake history, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/how-fake-news-becomes-fake-history-499418; History News Network, article Origins of a Misnomer: The “Expulsion” of the Soviet “Advisers” from Egypt, 1972, https://www.hnn.us/article/origins-of-a-misnomer-the-expulsion-of-the-soviet-.

[3] Public Intel-Report, SA-3 Goa (RWR: 3), https://www.v303rdfightergroup.com/index.php?posts/800/printfriendly.

[4] National Air and Space Museum, article Rescue Mission, https://airandspace.si.edu/air-and-space-quarterly/issue-9/rescue-mission.

[5] CIA, Intelligence Report: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf.

[6] United States Army ROTC, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, article The Battle for the Golan Heights in the Yom Kippur War of 1973: A Battle Analysis, https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2012&context=utk_chanhonoproj#:~:text=Syria%20had%20five%20permanent%20divisions%20capable%20of,their%20side%20of%20the%201967%20cease%2Dfire%20line.

[7] National Air and Space Museum, article Rescue Mission, https://airandspace.si.edu/air-and-space-quarterly/issue-9/rescue-mission.

[8] CIA, Intelligence Report: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf.

[9] Hebrew Studies, article Iom HaKipurim יום הכיפורים – Ziua ispășirii – cea mai sfântă zi a anului [anul 5780], https://www.evrei.ro/iom-hakipurim-ziua-ispasirii-cea-mai-sfanta-zi-a-anului-5780-%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D-%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%A3/.

[10] The Times of Israel, article Eli Zeira, Yom Kippur War intel chief who assessed Egypt and Syria wouldn’t attack, dies at 97, https://www.timesofisrael.com/eli-zeira-yom-kippur-war-intel-chief-who-assessed-egypt-and-syria-wouldnt-attack-dies-at-97/; The Jewish Chronicle, article Yom Kippur War 50 years on: The midnight warning which came too late, https://www.thejc.com/news/yom-kippur-war-50-years-on-the-midnight-warning-which-came-too-late-swgpc01o.

[11] National and Air Space Museum, article Rescue Mission, https://airandspace.si.edu/air-and-space-quarterly/issue-9/rescue-mission.

[12] United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Yom Kippur: Deception in Warfare, https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p15040coll2/id/3116/download.

[13] CIA, Intelligence Report: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf; Jewish Telegraphic Agency, article Timeline of Yom Kippur War, https://www.jta.org/1998/09/20/lifestyle/timeline-of-yom-kippur-war; War History.org, article 1973 Yom Kippur War, https://warhistory.org/@msw/article/1973-yom-kippur-war; Center for International Maritime Security, article The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War, https://cimsec.org/the-impact-of-insignificance-naval-developments-from-the-yom-kippur-war/; HistoryNet, article The Arab-Israeli War of 1973: Honor, Oil, and Blood, https://www.historynet.com/the-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-honor-oil-and-blood/; Marine Corps University, article Crossing under Fire. The Israeli 143d Armored Division at the Suez Canal, 1973, https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/Expeditions-with-MCUP-digital-journal/Crossing-under-Fire/#:~:text=Harkening%20back%20to%20the%201967%20Six%2DDay%20War%2C,in%20contrast%20to%20just%2015%20for%20Israel.;  RAND, Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R1864.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

 [14] CIA, Intelligence Report: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf.

[15] HistoryNet, article The Arab-Israeli War of 1973: Honor, Oil, and Blood, https://www.historynet.com/the-arab-israeli-war-of-1973-honor-oil-and-blood/; GlobalSecurity.org, article The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Arab Policies, Strategies, and Campaigns, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Jordan.htm?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[16] CIA, Intelligence Report: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1975-09-01A.pdf.

[17] WarHistory.org, article Aid to Arab Forces – Yom Kippur, https://warhistory.org/%40msw/article/aid-to-arab-forces-yom-kippur?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[18] Crater, article Egypt declassifies, for the first time, the war documents from October… What is the significance of this moment?, https://www.cratar.net/archives/318461?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[19] Air Power Australia, article Almaz S-75 Dvina/Desna/Volkhov, https://mail.ausairpower.net/APA-S-75-Volkhov.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[20] Air Power Australia, article Almaz 5V24/5V27/S-125 Neva/Pechora, https://mail.ausairpower.net/APA-S-125-Neva.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[21] The American University in Cairo, online publication The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, article Miscalculations and Legacies: A Look Back at the 1973 War Half a Century On, https://www.thecairoreview.com/issues/fall-2023/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[22] GAO, section Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-06-437?utm_source=chatgpt.com.